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I. JURISDICTION
A. In Personam Jurisdiction
IN DEJONG V BELL Helicopter Textron,' the defendant
manufactured and processed a tail rotor yoke assembly
for helicopters. The defendant did not maintain a busi-
ness office within the State of Missouri, nor did it have a
registered agent or agent of any kind within the state.
I 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,382 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
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The defendant further alleged that it did not conduct
business in the State of Missouri.2 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Missouri explained
that a federal diversity court, in deciding a motion to dis-
miss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident, is required to engage in a two-step analysis: first,
whether the defendant committed one of the acts enumer-
ated in the state's long-arm statute; and second, whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted, however, that in deciding
a motion for dismissal the facts were to be viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, who were only re-
quired to show a prima facie case of jurisdiction.
In considering the first step of the analysis, the court
noted that the plaintiff had claimed that the defendant was
involved in the manufacture of the allegedly defective tail
rotor yoke assembly, and that the crash had occurred in
Missouri. 4 Therefore, the plaintiffs had alleged a prima fa-
cie tort which resulted in an injury in the Missouri forum,
and the Missouri long-arm statute was satisfied.5
In determining whether the exercise of personal juris-
diction over the defendant in this case violated the Four-
teenth Amendment, the court examined the criteria set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in the Interna-
tional Shoe6 and World-Wide Volkswagen 7 cases. The court
examined the relationship among the defendants, the fo-




Id. The Missouri long-arm statute provided for jurisdiction over persons
committing any tortious acts within the state of Missouri. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 506.500 (1)(3) (1971).
' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that due
process requires a personal jurisdiction analysis based on the defendant's "mini-
mum contacts" with the state).
I World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (emphasiz-
ing fairness and the foreseeability of the defendant being subject to suit in the
jurisdiction as factors in the "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction).
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tact with the forum state was purposeful. Consequently,
they should have reasonably anticipated being hailed into
court there. 8 Therefore, the requirements for due pro-
cess were satisfied, and the court had personal jurisdiction
over the defendants.
In Insurance Company of North America v. Judge,9 the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
held that the owners of a Piper Cherokee Archer single
engine aircraft, although residents of Illinois, had the req-
uisite minimum contacts with Minnesota to be subject to
personal jurisdiction in that forum.'0 The defendants had
entered into a sale and leaseback arrangement with an Illi-
nois flying service that agreed to rent their plane to third
parties. Although the flying service had total control over
who the plane was rented to, the court held that the de-
fendants were subject to the personal jurisdiction of a
Minnesota court, where the accident occurred."
Under Minnesota law, the pilot of an aircraft is deemed
to be an agent of the owner, and the owner is vicariously
liable for injury or damage caused by the negligent opera-
tion of the aircraft.' 2 The court cited a five factor analysis
of minimum contacts used in the Eighth Circuit: (1) the
quantity of the defendant's contacts with the forum state;
(2) the nature and quality of the contacts; (3) the source
and connection of the cause of action to the contacts; (4)
the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its
residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties.' 3 The
court explained that while the mere foreseeability that a
Djong, 20 Av. Cas. at $ 18,383.
20 Av. Cas. (CCH) $ 18,594 (D. Minn. 1987).
Id. at 18,598.
Id. at 18,594.
'2 MINN. STAT. § 360.0216 (1989). The Statute states:
When an aircraft is operated within the airspace above this state or
upon the ground surface or waters of this state by a person other
than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied,
the operator shall in case of accident be deemed the agent of the
owner of the aircraft in its operation.
Id.
1.3Judge, 20 Av. Cas. at 18,597. The court stated that the first three factors
were of primary significance. Id.
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product would cause injury in another state was not a suf-
ficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the due
process clause, foreseeability was a relevant factor, partic-
ularly where a defendant either directly or indirectly
served the market in the state by delivering its product
into the state's stream of commerce. 4 The court there-
fore focused its inquiry on whether the defendants could
be deemed to be serving, directly or indirectly, the market
of other states as a result of their leasing a plane which
was rented out to third parties.
The court held that the defendants purposefully served
the market for interstate travel by leasing an airplane to
third parties on an ongoing basis without placing any geo-
graphical restrictions on its use.15 They received continu-
ing financial benefit from the leasing and did not
simultaneously relinquish their ownership of the airplane
at the time they introduced it into the stream of com-
merce. Finally, the court distinguished this case from
cases where automobile owners gave their casual permis-
sion for a third party to use their automobile out-of-state
by noting that the defendants made a conscious business
decision to lease their plane to third parties on a continu-
ing basis.' 6
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In Muwelled v. Lufthansa German Airlines,I7 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held that an airline which refused to honor a ticket
purchased in the United States for a passenger in a for-
eign country when it was presented to the airline's per-
sonnel in that foreign country was not entitled to
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'"
Id. at 18,597-98 (citing dicta from World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295).
Id. at 18,598.
I;Id.
7 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,472 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982). This Act generally provides foreign states
with immunity from the jurisdiction of United States' courts. Id. § 1604. The Act
defines a foreign state as the following:
1989]
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The plaintiff was an American citizen who alleged that a
friend purchased an airline ticket for him from a travel
agency in New York so he could return home from
Yemen. When he presented the ticket to the airline per-
sonnel in Addis Adaba, the airline personnel believed that
the ticket was black-listed, confiscated it, and refused to
either reimburse him or replace the ticket.' 9 The plaintiff
brought an action in federal court in New York for false
imprisonment, conversion and breach of contract.
The court began by noting that the airline had the bur-
den of establishing that it was entitled to sovereign immu-
nity by demonstrating that it did not fall within one of the
statutory exceptions specified in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.20 Section 1605(a)(2) of the Act specifies
that a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of either the United States courts or the courts of in-
dividual states when an action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state. 2I The court noted that the circuit courts have inter-
preted the provisions pertaining to "commercial activity"
to mean that immunity will not be avilable when there is a
(a) A "foreign state" includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any en-
tity - (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3)
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . I nor
created under the laws of any third country.
Id. § 1603.
M Muwelled, 20 Av. Cas. at 18,473.
2I Id.
21 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). The Act provides that foreign states will not
be immune from a United States' federal or state court in any case
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in United States[.]
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nexus between the defendant's commercial activity in the
United States and the cause of action. 22
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the travel agency
in New York was acting as the airline's agent. The court
held that the plaintiff's claims arose solely because the
ticket was allegedly sold in the United States, and the
cause of action therefore bore a sufficient nexus to the air-
line's commercial activity in the United States.23 While
the airline was denied protection under the sovereign im-
munity doctrine, the court acknowledged that if the plain-
tiff had never entered into a contract with the airline, the
airline would be immune from suit and dismissal would be
appropriate.24
C. Forum Non Conveniens
In Diaz v. Mexicana de Avion,25 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed a law-
suit arising out of an air crash in Mexico since the federal
court was not the appropriate forum to entertain the dis-
pute, even though it had jurisdiction to do so. The law-
suit arose out of the crash of Mexicana Airlines flight 940
on March 31, 1986, in the mountains west of Mexico City,
Mexico. 26 Boeing, a codefendant in the action, was suc-
cessful in convincing the court that an adequate and avail-
able alternative forum for resolution of the dispute
existed in Mexico, even though the plaintiffs claimed that
trial there would be delayed for years and that it would be
difficult to obtain jurisdiction over Boeing in Mexico.2 7
Boeing agreed that the court could condition its dismissal
on Boeing's agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Mexican courts.
Applying Texas conflict of laws principles, the court
22 Muwelled, 20 Av. Cas. at 18,473.
2. Id. at 18,474.
24 Id.
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found that the forum with the most significant relation-
ship to both the event and the parties was Mexico. The
crash occurred in Mexico, the domicile and residence of
the original plaintiffs were in Mexico, and Mexicana had
its principal place of business in Mexico. All the plaintiffs'
decedents purchased their tickets in Mexico City. The
court noted that, as to the products liability claim in the
case, the conduct causing the injury occurred in the
United States where the plane was designed and manufac-
tured. Any acts of negligence in the inspection of the
plane by Mexicana occurred in Mexico, however, subse-
quent to any negligence in the inspection of the plane in
the United States.28 The court held, therefore, that even
if Mexican law was less favorable, it was not so clearly in-
adequate or unsatisfactory that it would constitute no
remedy at all. 29
Having determined that an adequate and available fo-
rum existed, the court then proceeded to balance the pub-
lic and private interests involved. The court explained
that, although the usual rule was that unless the balance
of these factors was strongly in favor of the defendant the
plaintiffs' choice of forum would rarely be disturbed, the
presumption applied with less force when the plaintiffs
were foreign.3 0 Since access to the sources of proof were
more readily available in Mexico where the investigation
of the crash was being conducted by a Mexican govern-
ment agency, most of the proof regarding liability existed
in Mexico. In addition, the plaintiffs were Mexican resi-
dents and citizens, and proof of damages was located in
Mexico as well. Explaining that there was no nexus to the
Texas forum, other than the fact that Mexicana did busi-
ness in Texas and the plaintiffs' attorneys had their offices
there, the court then dismissed the action. 3' A writ of cer-
2 Id.
211 Id. The court stated that "the possibility of a change in substantive law
should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum
non conveniens inquiry." Id.
Id. at 17,984 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981)).
Id. at 17,985.
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tiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. 2
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. Admiralty
In Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International,33 the plain-
tiff instituted a wrongful death action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York
under the Death On the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 34 aris-
ing from a plane crash on the high seas. The plaintiff
brought a motion to reaffirm her right to proceed to trial
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and to affirm her right
to trial by jury nearly a year after the court had granted
the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's jury de-
mand.3 5 The plaintiff argued that the two-prong test set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Executive Jet
Aviation v. City of Cleveland 36 must be met before the provi-
sions of DOHSA can be applied so as to deprive a plaintiff
of a jury trial.
The Executive Jet test requires that for admiralty jurisdic-
tion to exist, the court must first find that the accident in
question occurred on the high seas, and secondly that
such action bears a significant connection to traditional
maritime activity. 37 The court explained that this two-
.12 Diaz v. Mexicana de Avion, 109 S. Ct. 76 (1988).
• .1 678 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
.4 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982). The Act provides that
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any state, or the District of Columbia, or
the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative against the vessel, person or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued.
Id. § 761.
.1 Friedman, 678 F. Supp. at 1064.
,' 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
Id. at 268. The Supreme Court concluded that
The mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on or
over navigable waters - whatever that means in an aviation context
- is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence case into a
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prong test only applies in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, however, and the Supreme Court had explicitly
stated that DOHSA was such a statute." Therefore, the
requirement of a traditional maritime nexus is not a pre-
requisite to the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction pursuant
to DOHSA. The court further held that DOHSA is the
exclusive remedy where death results from a plane crash
on the high seas, and that substantive state wrongful
death remedies are preempted outside the territorial wa-
ters of a state.39 Consequently, the court denied the
plaintiff's motion, holding that she had no right to a jury
trial.40
B. Government Contractor Defense
The Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Boyle
v. United Technologies Corporation,4' on June 27, 1988. The
decision was a 5-4 split with Justice Scalia writing the ma-
jority opinion.42 The issue was whether a contractor sup-
plying military equipment to the federal government
could be held liable under state tort law for injuries
caused by defectively designed equipment.43 In Boyle, the
plaintiffs' decedent, a United States Marine helicopter co-
pilot, was killed when the helicopter he was flying crashed
into the ocean during a training exercise. The decedent
survived the impact of the crash, but he was unable to es-
"maritime tort." It is far more consistent with the history and pur-
pose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless
such a relationship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are
not cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the
contrary.
Id.; see also Friedman, 678 F. Supp. at 1065.
18 Friedman, 678 F. Supp. at 1065.
39 Id.
Id. at 1066.
108 S. Ct. 2510 [hereinafter Boyle II], cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 559 (1988); see
infra note 47 for Boyle I citation.
42 Id. at 2512. Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Jus-
tice Scalia's majority opinion. Id Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, while Justice Stevens filed a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion. Id.
4. Id. at 2513.
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cape from the helicopter and drowned. 4 4 The decedent's
father brought suit against the Sikorsky Division of United
Technologies Corporation, the company which built the
helicopter for the United States, alleging that Sikorsky's
defective repair of the helicopter caused the crash. 45 The
plaintiff also alleged that Sikorsky had defectively
designed the co-pilot's emergency escape system. Since
the escape hatch opened outward instead of inward, the
decedent was unable to escape from the submerged craft
because of water pressure. The plaintiff further alleged
that other equipment obstructed access to the escape
hatch handle.46
The jury returned a general verdict for $725,000 in
favor of the plaintiff but the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded with directions that judg-
ment be entered for Sikorsky. The appellate court held
that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of demon-
strating that the repair work responsible for the alleged
malfunction of the flight control system was performed by
Sikorsky, rather than the Navy. 47 The court also con-
cluded, as a matter of federal law, that Sikorsky had satis-
fied the requirements of the "military contractor
defense," and therefore could not be held liable for the
allegedly defective design of the escape hatch.48
The plaintiff sought review by the United States
Supreme Court, challenging the Fourth Circuit's decision
on three grounds. First, Boyle contended that no justifi-
cation exists under federal law for shielding government
contractors from liability for design defects in military
equipment. In the alternative, he argued that even if the
44 Id.
4 Id. The plaintiff claimed that "Sikorsky had defectively repaired a device
called the servo in the helicopter's automatic flight control system, which alleg-
edly malfunctioned and caused the crash." Id.
411 Id.
47 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 415-16 (4th Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter Boyle I]; see supra note 41 for Boyle H citation.
4, Id. at 414-15. The Fourth Circuit had recognized the "military contractor
defense" that same day in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
19891
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military contractor defense should exist, the court of ap-
peals inappropriately formulated the conditions for its ap-
plication. Third, Boyle contended that the court of
appeals erred in failing to remand the case for a jury de-
termination of whether the elements of the defense were
met.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff's con-
tention that specific legislation immunizing government
contractors from liability for design defects was necessary
for judicial recognition of such a defense.50 The Court
noted that two areas of law involving uniquely federal in-
terests were concerned. First, obligations to and rights of
the United States under its contracts are governed exclu-
sively by federal law. Second, civil liability of federal offi-
cials for actions taken in the course of their duties is a
peculiarly federal concern warranting the displacement of
state law. 5 1
With respect to the first area, the Court found that the
Boyle case did not involve a contractual obligation to the
United States, but rather liability to third persons. While
that liability may have been styled in tort, it essentially
arose out of the performance of the contract. With re-
spect to the second area, the Court acknowledged that the
Boyle case involved the performance of an independent
contractor's obligation under a procurement contract,
rather than a federal employee's performance of his du-
ties, but noted that both are intended to get the govern-
ment's work done.5 2 The Court explained that the United
States has an interest in whether liability is imposed on
government contractors since the imposition of such lia-
bility might cause the contractor either to decline to man-
41, Boyle H, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
.1, Id. The Court acknowledged that it has usually failed to recognize federal
preemption of state law absent either clear statutory authority or a direct conflict
between federal and state law. Id.
-1' Id. at 2514.
.12 Id. at 2515. The Court held that "it is plain that the Federal Government's
interest in the procurement of equipment is implicated by suits such as the pres-
ent one - even though the dispute is one between private parties." Id.
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ufacture the design specified by the government or to
raise its price.53
The fact that the procurement of equipment by the
United States was an area of uniquely federal interest
merely established a necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tion for the displacement of state law. 54 Displacement re-
quires either that a significant conflict exist between an
identifiable federal policy and operative state law, or that
the application of state law would frustrate specific objec-
tives of federal law. 55 In Boyle, the state-imposed duty of
care asserted as the basis of the contractor's liability was
contrary to the duty imposed under the government con-
tract. 56 The Court nevertheless recognized that this situa-
tion does not always result in a significant conflict
between the state law and the federal interest. 57
The Court refused to adopt the Feres58 doctrine as the
limiting principle to identify situations in which a signifi-
cant conflict with federal policy or interest arises for two
reasons. First, if the government contractor defense pro-
hibited suit against the manufacturer whenever Feres pre-
vents suit against the government, strict application of the
doctrine would be overly broad since even injuries to mili-
tary personnel caused by standard government equip-
ment would be covered.59 Second,' since the Feres doctrine
.: Id.
I ld. The Court specifically refused to expand the theoretical scope of federal
preemption by analyzing this situation "as the displacement of federal law refer-
ence to state law for the rule of decision." Id. at 2515 n.3. The Court stated that
this distinction between displacement of state law and displacement of federal
law's incorporation of state law does not make any practical difference in this case.
Id.
Id. at 2515.
Id. at 2516. The two conflicting duties were the state-imposed "duty to equip
helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was neces-
sary" and the government contract "duty to manufacture and deliver helicopters
with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications." Id.
r,l Id. The Court recognized that it was impossible to say that the government
has a significant interest in having the escape hatches open outward. Id.
.1 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Feres doctrine states that the
Federal Tort Claims Act does not cover injuries to armed service personnel in-
curred in the course of military service. Id.
.- Boyle H, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
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covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries to ci-
vilians caused by the military, the doctrine would be too
narrow since it could not be invoked to prevent a civilian's
suit against a government contractor. 60
Instead, the Court pointed to the exemption for "dis-
cretionary functions" under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 6 ' The Court agreed with the Fourth and the Ninth
Circuits that state law holding government contractors lia-
ble for design defects in military equipment presents a
significant conflict with federal policy and must be dis-
placed under certain circumstances.62 State law will be
displaced only if the suit is within an area where the policy
of the "discretionary function" would be frustrated, and
the design feature in question was considered by a gov-
ernment officer and not merely by the contractor itself. A
further requirement, that the supplier warn the United
States about the dangers in the use of the equipment, is
necessary because in its absence the displacement of state
tort law might create some incentive for the manufacturer
to withhold its knowledge of risks, since conveying that
knowledge might disrupt the contract while withholding it
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). In this Act, Congress made an exception to the
general rule that the United States government could be liable for damages for
negligent or wrongful conduct to the same extent as a private person. Excepted
was "[any claim .. .based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused." Id. The Boyle 11 court stated that the Armed Forces design selection
for military equipment is certainly a discretionary function. Boyle H, 108 S. Ct. at
2517.
62 Id. at 2518. The Court stated:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be im-
posed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States.
ld; see also McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983) (set-
ting out circumstances under which a supplier of military equipment is not liable
for a design defect as a result of the government contractor defense), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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produces no liability.63
C. Proof of Defect
In Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,64 the Florida
Supreme Court held that a person injured while a passen-
ger on an airplane did not have a cause of action under
implied warranty against the airplane manufacturer sepa-
rate and distinct from a strict liability action. The plain-
tiffs were injured when the Piper Cherokee plane in which
they were passengers crashed on takeoff in Virginia.6 5
The plaintiffs named only the airplane manufacturer,
Piper Aircraft, in their complaint, and asserted negli-
gence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty of fit-
ness, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
The Florida Supreme Court had previously adopted the
doctrine of strict liability in tort.66 The court agreed with
the manufacturer that "the adoption of the doctrine of
strict liability in tort supplants and renders unnecessary a
side-by-side remedy of non-contractural warranty for per-
sonal injury."'6 7 The court clarified that the doctrine of
strict liabilty did not result in the demise of the contract
action of breach of implied warranty, where privity of con-
tract is shown. It did, however, supplant all no-privity,
breach of implied warranty cases for personal injury, be-
cause it was the state supreme court's intent to abolish
that cause of action where the remedy of strict liability is
appropriate.68
In Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International Incorporated,69
the United States District Court for the District of Minne-
sota applied Texas state law in a diversity case due to a
choice of law clause in the contract of sale for the aircraft.
United Aircraft International (United) purchased a 1979
Boyle II , 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
520 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1988).
Id. at 38.
See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
67 Kramer, 520 So. 2d at 89.
- Id. The court stated that this decision is implicit in the West decision. Id.
w, 672 F. Supp. 369 (D. Minn. 1987).
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Mitsubishi MU-2b-40 aircraft from Mitsubishi Aircraft In-
ternational. While making its final approach into the Min-
nesota airport, the aircraft crashed, killing all five
occupants aboard and completely destroying the plane.70
United brought an action against Mitsubishi to recover
the value of the aircraft, the deductible on their insurance
policy, the costs of removing the wreckage, and $130,000
paid as a settlement in one of the passenger claims. 7' In
addition, trustees for the four other victims asserted
wrongful death claims, seeking more than $50,000 for
each victim. 72 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
were negligent 1) in the design, construction and manu-
facture of the aircraft and its components, and 2) in the
overhaul, service and repair of the plane. The plaintiffs
also sought to recover on the theories of strict liability and
breach of express and implied warranties of fitness and
safety.73
The court distinguished a situation where a plaintiff
seeks to recover damages- for a defective product which
has caused damage only to itself from a situation where
the defective product caused damage not only to itself but
also to other persons or property.7 4 In the first case, the
loss is deemed to be purely economic and recovery under
strict liability is not permitted. In the second case, the en-
tire resulting damage is recoverable under strict liability. 75
Relying on a 1977 Texas case which cited section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,7 6 the court held that
71 Id. at 372.
7, Id. at 373. United brought this suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its
insurers. Id. at 372-73. The insurers paid $897,000 to United pursuant to an
insurance policy covering the plane and paid $130,000 to one of the victims of the
crash pursuant to its policy. Id. at 373 n.4.
72 Id. at 372-73.
7. Id. at 373.
74 Id. at 374.
7. Id. The court explained that this rule reinforces that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code is the system for allocating losses which arise from commercial transac-
tions. Id. Additionally "to the extent that the product itself has become part of
the accident risk or the tort by causing collateral property damage, it is properly
considered as part of the property damages, rather than an economic loss." Id.
U General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977) (holding
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the settlement payment of $130,000 to one victim's family
did not convert an otherwise economic loss into a prop-
erty loss recoverable under strict liabilty.
With respect to United's claims for recovery of eco-
nomic loss, the court held that an economic loss caused by
a defective product is recoverable under a tort theory of
negligence, but not under a theory of strict liability, when
third parties were injured as a result of the product's de-
fect. After a comprehensive examination of Texas law,
the court held that economic loss is recoverable in strict
liability only when the party alleging the economic loss
has also suffered personal injury or other property dam-
age.77 Since United suffered only economic loss, the
court dismissed its claims of strict liability in tort against
both defendants. While noting that Texas law represents
the minority position on the issue, however, the court
held that economic loss not recoverable under strict liabil-
ity was recoverable under the' theories of breach of im-
plied warranty and negligence in the state of Texas.78
In Fullerton Aircraft v. Beech Aircraft,79 a diversity action
based on alleged breaches of express and implied warran-
ties, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment to the
manufacturer. The district court held that the plaintiff was
collaterally estopped from bringing a second action due
to an earlier action against a Beechcraft dealer and to lack
of contractual privity between the aircraft's manufacturer
and the plaintiff.8 0 The first action, against both the man-
ufacturer and the dealer, had been brought in a district
court in Virginia, seeking revocation of the acceptance of
that the plaintiffs could not proceed under a theory of strict liability in tort since
they themselves had not suffered physical harm or personal injuries as required by
section 402A of the Restatement) (overruled in part on other grounds by Duncan
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984)).
77Held, 672 F. Supp. at 377.
7. id. at 374 n.6, 377-78.
7! 842 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1988).
- Id. at 719. The district court granted summary judgment to both Beech Air-
craft Corporation and a finance company, Beech Acceptance Corporation. Id. at
718.
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the aircraft. The plaintiff alleged that abnormal vibrations
rendered the aircraft in nonconformity with the contract
and substantially impaired its value. The manufacturer
was voluntarily dismissed from the first action because the
revocation of acceptance remedy properly lay only against
the dealer."' Following a bench trial, the district court en-
tered judgment against the plaintiff, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to show nonconformity or substantial
impairment. The trial judge apparently accepted the
plaintiff's claims of abnormal vibrations, but found that
the airplane was safe due to the repair efforts of both the
manufacturer and the dealer. On appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit declined to affirm the district court's finding of con-
formity but did affirm on the grounds of failure to show
substantial impairment.82
After entry of the district court's judgment in the first
action, the plaintiff commenced a second action against
the manufacturer by filing a complaint alleging breach of
express and implied warranties.8 3 In its answer, the man-
ufacturer claimed that the action was barred by collateral
estoppel. In addition, the manufacturer asserted that the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim for breach of warranty
upon which relief could be granted, due to a lack of con-
tractual privity between the plaintiff and the manufac-
turer. The district court granted the manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds of collat-
eral estoppel and want of privity of contract.8 4
The district court found that plaintiff's breach of war-
ranty claim was based on the same alleged defect of ab-
normal vibration in the aircraft that was central to the
I' /d.
2 Id.
"I Id. at 719. The plaintiff asserted that the finance company was liable for all of
his claims against Beech since it was Beech's wholly-owned subsidiary. Id.
11 Id. As grounds for its summary judgment motion, the defendants asserted
that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the breach of warranty
issue since it had already been decided against the plaintiff in the prior action
against the dealer. Id. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiff's complaint
failed to state a claim for breach of either express or implied warranties since
there was a lack of contractual privity. id.
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plaintiff's claim for revocation against the dealer in the
first action.8 5 The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the effect of its decision in the first action was limited to a
finding of no substantial impairment irrespective of con-
formity. Accordingly, that holding had no preclusive ef-
fect in the second action on the distinctly different issue of
whether the alleged defect in the aircraft resulted in a
breach of the express and implied warranties between the
manufacturer and the buyer. The specific "defect" issue
was not litigated in the first action, so the second action
was not precluded on collateral estoppel grounds.8 6
As to the district court's holding regarding lack of con-
tractual privity, the Fourth Circuit held that lack of con-
tractual privity did not bar the plaintiff's implied warranty
claim against the manufacturer under Kansas law."' The
court noted that the manufacturer had extensive personal
contacts with the plaintiff throughout the sale, both
before and after it was consummated by the manufac-
turer's dealer. The court also held that contractual privity
was not a prerequisite to an action for breach of express
warranties under Kansas law.88
In Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corporation,9 the plaintiff
was an employee of Commuter Airlines, Inc. in New York.
The plaintiff was injured after she, had finished unloading
baggage from an aircraft. While attempting to lower her-
self from the aircraft cargo compartment, she caught a fin-
ger on a ladder hanger attached to'the doorway of the
compartment, injuring the finger so severely that it had to
be amputated.9 0 She brought an action against the manu-
.id. at 720. The district court concluded that although the plaintiff was seek-
ing different remedies in the second action, the basic issue was identical to the one
decided in the first action: "was there a vibration in the plane serious enough to
render it defective." Id.
81 Id.
87 Id. at 722.
' Id. The court noted that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to permit a manufac-
turer to avoid express warranty representations made to a buyer simply by insur-
ing that the actual contract of sale was with a dealer or other third party." Id.
70 N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
Id. at 583, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
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facturer of the hanger alleging negligence and strict prod-
uct liability based on design defect. At trial, the jury found
that the hanger was not the original but a replacement
part made and installed by the airline's employees. Thejury concluded, however, that it was substantially the
same design and had substantially the same characteristics
as the hanger originally installed by the manufacturer.
The jury found that the hanger was defectively designed
and that the design caused the plaintiff's injuries. It
awarded the plaintiff $185,000 in damages. 91
The appellate division reversed and dismissed the com-
plaint because the hanger had not been manufactured by
the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals then re-
versed the appellate division and ordered that the com-
plaint be reinstated-92 The court of appeals found that
the airline had replaced the original ladder hanger "by
flattening the original part with a roller and then cutting a
new part to duplicate the original design." 9 At trial, the
manufacturer's representatives acknowledged that they
did not expect the airlineto purchase a new part from the
manufacturer if the hanger broke because the purchaser
could easily fabricate a replacement.9 4 Noting that this
was not a case in which a purchaser had removed or al-
tered safety mechanisms or substituted parts of lesser
quality, the court found that the airline's employees had
merely perpetuated the manufacturer's bad design, and
that the manufacturer's own representatives foresaw that
this might happen.9 5 Insulating the manufacturer from li-
ability under those circumstances would allow it to escape
!I Id. In awarding damages, the jury apportioned fault 75% to the manufac-
turer and 25% to plaintiff's employer, who had been impleaded by the manufac-
turer. Id. '
"12 Id. The court held that "because of the Appellate Division's factual determi-
nation that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the matter should
be remitted for a new trial." Id.
,w Id. at 583-84, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The replacement part
made by the airline employees "was attached to the doorway of the cargo com-
partment in the same location and in the same manner as the original." Id.
94 Id.
11Id at 587, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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liability for designing flimsy parts, secure in the knowl-
edge that once a part broke and the purchaser replaced it
the manufacturer would no longer be liable. 96
D. Evidence
In Davis v. Stallones,97 the plaintiffs brought a wrongful
death action against the estate of the pilot of a Bell 206B
Jet Ranger helicopter. The helicopter crashed in bad
weather, killing all three men aboard.9 At the end of a
jury trial, the plaintiffs were awarded $1.8 million in dam-
ages. On appeal, the estate claimed that the trial court
had erred in twice refusing to declare a mistrial after the
plaintiffs' expert witness revealed to the jury the NTSB
conclusions regarding the probable cause of the crash.
Plaintiffs had offered expert testimony that the accident
could have been caused by the negligence of the pilot.99
The appellate court observed that prior to trial, the
court had granted a motion in limine excluding the entire
NTSB report. When the report was referenced several
times during trial testimony, however, the defendant
failed to make a timely objection. In fact, the defendant
themselves elicited some of the testimony which men-
tioned the NTSB report.10 0 The court of appeals upheld
the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial, explaining that
the proper predicate for complaint on appeal is a timely
objection made when the evidence is offered by the
opponent.' 0 '
The court of appeals also held that the trial court had
properly refused to declare a mistrial based upon the
Id. The court stated that "[pilacing the economic burden on the manufac-
turer under these circumstances does no more than induce it to design quality
equipment at the outset." Id.
1,7 750 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 236.
Id. The expert witness testified about the NTSB conclusions during cross-
examination. Id.
.. Id. at 236-37.
lo' Id. at 237. The court noted that a "timely objection is necessary when an
improper question has been asked in violation of a motion in limine." Id.
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mention of insurance during the trial. 112 On direct exami-
nation the defendant's expert repeatedly alluded to parts
of the wreckage that were missing or unavailable for in-
spection. He theorized that these parts might have
proved that the accident was caused by a mechanical fail-
ure, rather than by pilot error. 10 3 The plaintiffs sought to
establish in cross-examination that the wreckage had been
in the continuous control of the insurance company which
had insured the deceased pilot.' 0 4 The court of appeals
held that, while evidence of insurance is not admissible to
show negligence, it was admissible in this case since the
defendant had put the issue of control in dispute. 0 5
Therefore, the testimony about control was properly ad-
mitted. Once again, the court appeared to have little pa-
tience with the defendant's failure to make timely
objections.
In Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corporation,10 6 the plaintiffs
brought a products liability action against the manufac-
turer of an aircraft following an accident in which the pilot
and passengers were killed. The plaintiffs alleged that an
elevator was defectively designed and may have frozen
when the aircraft met with icing conditions. 0 7 At trial,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the aircraft manu-
facturer. The plaintiffs appealed, alleging that the trial
court had committed numerous abuses of discretion in
111 Id. at 238.
-", Id. at 237. The trial court overruled a relevancy objection, reasoning that
because the defendant had suggested to the jury that the plaintiffs "were responsi-
ble for the mystery of the allegedly missing pieces, the testimony was relevant to
the issue of control of the wreckage." Id.
-4 Id. at 238.
-5 Id.
... 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
1(7 Id. at 1265. As described in the court's opinion, "the elevator is a movable
control surface which is attached to the fixed, horizontal portion of the tail called
the stabilizer .... The position of the elevator controls the rise or fall of the nose
of the plane in relation to the tail, otherwise known as the plane's pitch." Id. Theplaintiff's expert witness testified that the airplane had stalled, and the pilot was
unable to recover from the stall "because ice had accumulated in the covegap due
to the elevator's exposure to the airstream." Id. Consequently, the pilot was un-
able to regain pitch control. Id.
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ruling on evidentiary issues. 108
The plaintiffs' first contention was that the district court
erroneously excluded evidence of a subsequent accident
which was substantially similar to the one in question.109
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that evi-
dence of other accidents in product liability cases is rele-
vant to show "notice to the defendant of the danger, to
show existence of the danger, and to show the cause of
the accident."' 10 Before a court may admit such evidence,
however, the proponent must show that the other acci-
dents occurred under substantially similar circumstances,
especially in cases where the evidence is proffered to show
the existence of a dangerous condition or causation."'
Even when the proponent proves substantial identity of
the circumstances, the trial judge still has discretion to
find the evidence inadmissible after weighing "the dan-
gers of unfairness, confusion, and undue expenditure of
time in the trial of collateral issues against the factors
favoring admissibility."' 1 2 Since the plaintiffs had not
presented any evidence that the alleged dangerous condi-
tion was in any way involved in the subsequent similar ac-
cident, the court of appeals refused to disturb the district
court's ruling.
The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that evidence concerning the subsequent similar acci-
dent should have been admitted because their expert
witness relied upon this evidence in forming his opinion
as to the cause of the crash in question. The court ex-
plained that admissibility of expert opinions under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 703 is still subject to Rule 403's
's Id. at 1266.
".. Id. at 1266-67. The similarities between the subsequent crash and the crash
involved in this case included: (1) the planes were essentially identical aircrafts,
(2) both pilots were instrument-rated, (3) both flights occurred in icing condi-
tions, (4) both planes reported an accretion of air-frame ice, and (5) both planes
were in icing conditions for a short time period before the pilots lost control and
the aircrafts crashed. Id. at 1267.
1- Id. at 1268.
'it Id.
2 Id. at 1269.
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general bar against the admission of unduly prejudicial
evidence.i '1 Thus, the trial court has greater flexibility in
deciding when to permit an expert witness to testify about
otherwise inadmissible facts. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in refusing to admit the testimony.
In addition, the court of appeals held that the district
court did not err in redacting a sentence from an incident
report which was filed following an accident subsequent
to the one in question. The plaintiffs were permitted to
read into evidence portions of the deposition taken of the
pilot involved in the subsequent similar incident. 14 The
sentence redacted from the report stated that "[t]here was
considerable ice packed in the gap between the elevator
and the horizontal stabilizer by the horn."'" 15 The district
court redacted this statement because the pilot testified at
his deposition that he was not the person who wrote the
sentence, he did not know who wrote the sentence, and he
only assumed it had been the instructor pilot."16
The plaintiffs argued that the entire report was admissi-
ble under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) because it
qualified under the public documents exception to the
hearsay rule. 1 7 The court of appeals noted that the the-
ory behind this exception is that government reports are
"" Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271. The subsequent similar incident involved a Forestry Service pi-
lot who experienced an icing problem while flying the same model plane but was
able to land safely after physically snapping the elevator back into position. Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
,,7 Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides an exception to the hearsay
rule for the following:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office
or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by
law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, how-
ever, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings
and against the government in criminal cases, factual findings result-
ing from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indi-
cate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
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probably reliable, and the rule is silent about a require-
ment of personal knowledge. The introductory notes to
Rule 803 state, however, that the Rule does not dispense
with the requirement of first-hand knowledge. Since the
pilot testified in his deposition that he did not have first-
hand knowledge, the evidence was properly excluded."18
The plaintiffs also claimed that the district court erred
in excluding a government bulletin issued by the United
States Forestry Service almost two years following the ac-
cident. The bulletin advised Forestry Service pilots not to
fly into known or forecast icing conditions with that model
aircraft and offered some suggestions on frequent in-
flight exercise of the elevator if the pilots encountered
this condition. ' 9 The pilot who testified about the filing
of the incident report in the subsequent similar incident
stated that he had read the bulletin and incorporated it
into his flying habits.' 20 The plaintiffs asserted that he
was able to identify the problem with his elevator and
avoid disaster because of this'warning. They argued that
the bulletin was therefore relevant to the manufacturer's
duty to warn, to show the feasibility of warning pilots, and
to demonstrate the positive effects such warnings can
have. 12 1
The court of appeals conceded that the bulletin was rel-
evant to an issue in the case, but noted that the district
court permitted the pilot's testimony that he knew to ex-
ercise the elevator frequently during the flight in icy con-
ditions because he had received a warning. 22 Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), the trial court had the
discretion to exclude an actual public document for lack
Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1272-73.
Id. at 1273. The plaintiffs offered the bulletin on the issue of the manufac-
turer's duty to warn. Id. The bulletin stated that "[ilf icing is encountered in
flight, deactivate the auto pilot, make every effort to get out of the icing condi-
tions, and exercise the elevators frequently to avoid jamming." Id.
0 Id.
21' Id. at 1273-74.
"22 Id. at 1274. Thus, the fact that the pilot "had been warned of the danger of
flying in icing conditions was before the jury." Id.
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of trustworthiness. 123 In this case, the plaintiffs were un-
able to provide any information about the author of the
bulletin and the trial court questioned its trustworthiness.
The court of appeals was unwilling to overturn this
ruling. 124
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer
should not have been allowed to introduce into evidence a
video tape demonstrating the manner in which ice ac-
cumulates and is removed by deicing equipment on the
aircraft. The court of appeals held that the video tape in
this case was presented to show the normal operation of
the plane in icing conditions. 25 The court noted that a
disputed issue at trial was whether the plane could fly
safely in icing conditions, and the video tape was not of-
fered to reenact the'accident. In addition, there was no
suggestion that the experiment simulated actual events,
so no reversible error occurred in the admission of the
film.
12 6
In the case of In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport
on August 2, 1985,127 Delta Airlines brought a motion to
compel production of documents by the United States.
Delta requested production of all notes, memoranda or
other documents arising out of the investigation of the
crash which were prepared by any employee or agent of
the United States. 28 The United States objected, stating
that the NTSB is an independent agency over which it did
12.4 Id.
I24 ld. The court stated that it saw "no reversible error in the district court's
ruling that it would not admit the bulletin because the court questioned its trust-
worthiness." Id.
1. Id. at 1277.
121i Id. at 1278.
.21 117 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
"28 Id. at 393. Specifically, Delta requested production of the following:
"Any and all notes, diagrams, photographs, memoranda or other
documents or writings relating to or arising out of the investigation
of the crash prepared or compiled by any persons", including nine
named members of the NTSB technical panel and "any other em-
ployee or agent of the United States of America."
[55
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not have enforcement power. 129 The NTSB, who was not
a party to the lawsuit, filed an ex parte brief in support of
its position that the materials should not be disclosed.
The district court held that it was clear the NTSB was
entirely autonomous and not under the direction of any
other executive agency. The NTSB had sole and exclu-
sive control over the analysis reports and other materials
requested and, consequently, the United States could not
produce such reports. The only appropriate means to
compel a non-party, such as the NTSB, to produce docu-
ments was to serve them a subpoena under Rule 45 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 0
The court further explained that a substantial question
existed as to whether such reports were discoverable even
if Delta had complied with these formalities. Delta was
seeking to compel production of pre-decisional analytical
documents, and production of these types of documents
was governed by federal regulations. '3' After conducting
an in-camera inspection of the documents, the court
found that these materials were privileged and exempt
from public disclosure, since they contained preliminary
opinions which were not necessarily the opinions adopted
in the NTSB's final report. 3 2 Delta's motion was there-
fore denied.
E. NTSB Accident Investigation
In Miller v. Rich,' 3 3 a single engine North American T-
28C aircraft crashed into an open field in California
shortly after takeoff. The owner of the aircraft was not on
board at the time. The defendant, in his official capacity
with the NTSB, assumed custody of the wreckage and
1211 Id.
SId.
Specifically, Delta claimed that production of these documents was governed
by section 801.54 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 49 C.F.R.
§ 801.54 (1988). Air Crash at DFW, 117 F.R.D. at 393.
,12 Air Crash at DFW, 117 F.R.D. at 394.
1 - 845 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1988).
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planned to disassemble and inspect the engine. 34 The
owner brought an action seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to enjoin the inspection and disassembly of the
engine until his representative had been authorized to ob-
serve the inspection. The request for a preliminary in-
junction was denied and the owner appealed. 35 The
Ninth Cirucit Court of Appeals reviewed prior case law
and noted that it had previously held that the regulations
governing NTSB investigations did not give individuals
the right to participate in the investigation. 36 The court
held, however, that the NTSB's discretion was not unbri-
dled and since the agency had not given any rational justi-
fication for excluding the owner, its actions constituted an
abuse of discretion. The court noted that the person
seeking to be present had established an ownership inter-
est in the aircraft and was not seeking to actively partici-
pate in the disassembly and inspection, but rather to
merely observe. Since no rational justification for deny-
ing the request was advanced, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded the
issue to the district court. 3 7
F. Statute of Repose
In Walis v. Grumman Corporation,'38 the Florida Supreme
Court dismissed a product liability action brought by a
person injured in the crash of an aircraft. The crash oc-
cured more than 12 years after the delivery of the aircraft
to its original purchaser. The court cited and reaffirmed
its recent decision that an amendment which abolished
the statute of repose in product liability actions in Florida
could not be construed to operate retrospectively as to a
,.4 Id. at 191.
SId.
Id. at 192. The court continued to adhere to those prior decisions but held
that its "inquiry must focus on whether the NTSB has abused its discretion in
making its determination denying Appellant the opportunity to observe the test-
ing of the engine." Id.
1.17 Id.
,-11 515 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1987).
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cause of action that accrued before the effective date of
the amendment. 3 9
The court also held that the plaintiff's attempt to re-
move his tardy cause of action from the realm of product
liability should fail. The plaintiff argued that his allega-
tion of breach of duty by the manufacturer to warn of a
known defect did not give rise to a product liability action
under the applicable Florida statute. 4 ' The Florida
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the allegation of
the failure of a continuing duty to warn is clearly founded
on the design and manufacture of the aircraft because the
duty arises due to the manufacturer's status as either an
aircraft manufacturer or seller. Since there was no prod-
uct liability claim as twelve years had passed since delivery
of the aircraft by the manufacturer, there was also no duty
to warn of a defect.1
4 1
III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Feres Doctrine
In Walls v. United States,142 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a district court decision in an action fall-
ing under the Feres doctrine. In Feres v. United States,' 43 the
Supreme Court held that the federal government is not
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen which "arise out of or in the course of activity
incident to service."'' 4 4 In Walls, the plaintiff was an active
duty member of the United States Army who suffered in-
juries in the crash of an Air Force Aero Club airplane. Air
Force Aero Clubs are established and operate under the
control of the Air Force as non-appropriated instrumen-
talities of the United States to promote morale among
1- Id. at 1277.
1401 Id.
141 Id.
142 832 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1987).
14 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
,44 Id. at 146. The Federal Tort Claims Act delineates the circumstances under
which the government can be held liable for the negligent or wrongful conduct of
its agents or employees. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
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members of the military. Only active-duty military per-
sonnel are eligible for membership in these clubs.1
45
The plaintiff alleged that the Aero Club failed to pro-
vide adequate supervision of the pilot of the aircraft and
that the pilot was negligent in flying the plane. 46 The
Seventh Circuit stated that the application of the Feres
doctrine turned on the classification of plaintiff's activities
when the Aero Club plane crashed. 147 The court cited the
Supreme Court's most recent explanation of the Feres doc-
trine, which identified three factors that underlie the
doctrine:
(1) the distinctively federal nature of the relationship be-
tween the government and members of its armed forces,
which argues against subjecting the government to liabil-
ity based on the fortuity of the situs of the injury; (2) the
availability of alternative compensation systems; and (3)
the fear of damaging the military disciplinary structure. 48
The Seventh Circuit in the Walls case agreed with the dis-
trict court's reliance on the third Feres rationale, reasoning
that if the courts allow servicemen to bring lawsuits for
injuries incurred while engaged in Aero Club activities,
there could be adverse effects on military discipline and
decision making. 4 9 The court noted that the Feres doc-
trine applies as long as the soldier is subject to military
supervision at the time of the injury.'5 0 The court rea-
soned that, although he was traveling on an "out of
bounds" pass, the plaintiff was considered to be on active
duty and subject to military jurisdiction. Moreover, he
could not have been a member of the Aero Club without
being a member of the armed forces. This activity was di-
Walls, 832 F.2d at 94 n.2.
,4, Id. at 94.
,47 Id. at 95.
148 Id. (citing United States v.Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987)).
4 Id.
'. " Id. The court cited an earlier decision which held that the Feres doctrine
applies even if the soldier is on leave or off duty when he is injured while taking
advantage of military privileges generally restricted to the military or if he is in-
jured while under military jurisdiction. Id. (citing Herreman v. United States, 476
F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1973)).
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rectly related to his serviceman status, and the district
court properly dismissed his claim for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. '5 '
B. Air Traffic Control
In Rodriquez v. United States,'52 the United States ap-
pealed the finding of a federal district court that an air
traffic controller's negligence was the sole cause of a mid-
air collision between two private airplanes at a New Jersey
airport. After one plane received permission from the
control tower to join the airport traffic pattern, it collided
in mid-air with a plane which was practicing landings and
takeoffs. 53 Despite a last minute warning by the control-
ler, the aircraft being flown by the plaintiffs' decedents
collided with a student pilot on the downwind leg of the
traffic pattern, immediately before midfield. While the
student pilot was able to land on one of the airport's run-
ways, the decedents lost control of their aircraft and
crashed. 54 Both occupants of the aircraft were killed in
the crash, and the survivors of the deceased pilot and in-
structor pilot brought suit, alleging that the collision was
caused by the air traffic controller's negligence. The
plaintiffs also named as defendants the student pilot, his
flight school, and his flight service.' 5 5
The district court found that the negligence of the air
traffic controller was the sole cause of the mid-air collision
and awarded the plaintiffs $2,786,634. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals applied New Jersey law in determining
the liability of the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and affirmed the finding that the controller
was negligent. 156 The controller and a trainee were aware
'' Id. at 96.
1-2 823 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1987).
'I ld. at 737.
I. ld. at 739.
''Id.
Id. at 741. The court held that the controller's warning was not sufficient
and "represented a negligent performance ... of his duty to issue safety adviso-
ries." Id.
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that the two aircraft were on a collision course sixteen
seconds prior to the collision. The controller's initial
safety advisory was not in conformity with the air traffic
control handbook, however, and was insufficient to con-
vey to the decedents the need for immediate action. 57
The court also found that the United States had intro-
duced evidence that if the decedents had been adequately
performing their duty under FAA regulations to scan for
other aircraft they would have observed the student pilot
and been obligated to take action to avoid the collision. 58
While the decedents may have been negligent, the
court found that, even if the pilots had been negligent,
this negligence was not a proximate cause of the colli-
sion. 59 Under New Jersey law, the survivors of the pilots
could recover from the United States only if the pilots'
negligence was comparatively less than the negligence of
the air traffic controller.' 60 The court rejected the posi-
tion that a pilot's negligence in performing his duties
would free the air traffic controller from liability.' 6' The
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court,
instructing the district court to first apportion compara-
tive negligence between the deceased pilot and the de-
ceased instructor pilot. The district court was then
instructed to compare the negligence of the pilots to that
of the air traffic controller. The plaintiffs could recover
from the government if the negligence of the pilots was
less than that of the air traffic controller. 62
In Berry v. United States, 163 an air crash killed five persons
,-1 Id. The court found that neither the content of the controller's warning nor
the controller's tone of voice reflected a sense of urgency sufficient to convey the
need for immediate action. Id.
I Id. at 743-44. The court held that the district court was clearly erroneous in
finding that the decedent pilots were not negligent in performing their duty to see
and avoid other aircraft. Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
SId.
Id. The court noted that both the pilot and the controller are responsible
for the safety of the aircraft and passengers. Consequently, "there may be concur-
rent liability." Id. at 746.
,62 Id.
1' 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,436 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
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when the pilot, who was conducting the flight under in-
strument flight rules (IFR), intentionally descended below
the minimum descent altitude (MDA) approved for ap-
proach to the airport, even though he could not see the
airport.'64 Personal representatives of the decedent pas-
sengers sued the government for wrongful death under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 165 When the air traffic con-
trol center informed the pilot during the descent that the
airport was to his left, the pilot acknowledged the trans-
mission but continued his approach, descending below
the MDA and eventually crashing.' 66 Because the aircraft
never left the protected airspace, the controller was not
required to make a course deviation advisory. 16 7
The court found that the air traffic controller had com-
plied with the regulations in the Air Traffic Control Man-
ual and had handled the aircraft in a reasonable and
prudent manner.' 68 Therefore, the court found that the
pilot's own negligence in failing to execute the approved
missed approach procedure as required by the FAA was
the sole proximate cause of the accident. 69
In Apostol v. United States,' 71 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a district court's judgment for the
United States. A pilot was injured when his small plane
crashed shortly after it had taken off from San Juan Inter-
national Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. 17 ' The pilot
, Id. at 18,438.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
Berry, 20 Av. Cas. at 18,438. The pilot crashed "440 feet below the MDA
permissible on the approved instrument approach procedure." Id.
167 Id. While controllers are to issue safety advisories to an aircraft flying at an
altitude too close to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft for safe flight, "the
aircraft never descended close enough to terrain to warrant a safety advisory"
while it was still under radar coverage. Id.
- Id. The court said that the "controllers could not have reasonably antici-
pated ... [the pilot's] violation of Federal Aviation Regulations... [or] prevented
such violations because the descent ...occurred below radar and radio cover-
age." Id.
" 1 Id. at 18,441. A pilot cannot dip below the minimum descent altitude
(MDA) unless he has the runway clearly in sight. 14 C.F.R. § 91.116(b) (1988).
17(, 838 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1988).
171 Id. at 596.
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sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act,172 claiming that the air traffic controller did not allow
sufficient separation time between the departure of a jet
and the departure of plaintiffs' plane. 7 3 After a bench
trial, the district court found that the pilot's own negli-
gence caused the crash by precipitating a stall. 174
The court of appeals found that the district court had
favored the testimony of the government's expert witness
over the testimony of the plaintiff's expert. 75 Pointing
out that "findings based on witness credibility are lodged
firmly in the province of the trial court" and are disturbed
only by "a compelling showing of error," the court of ap-
peals noted that the government's expert witness based
his testimony on studies of wing tip vortices which he had
personally supervised, while the plaintiff's expert used
data collected during studies performed by other persons.
In addition, the plaintiff's expert relied on studies of wing
tip vortices of airplanes in flight and the plaintiffs' plane
took off from the runway when the preceding commercial
jet still had its wheels on the ground. 176 Consequently,
the trial court did not commit clear error in deciding to
give more credit to the government's witness.
In Biles v. United States,' 7 7 the plaintiff was the widow of a
passenger in an aircraft which crashed into a mountain
ridge in poor weather. A weather briefing warned the pi-
lots that low cloud ceilings and poor visibility made VFR
flight risky. Even though the pilots and the aircraft were
qualified and equipped for IFR flight, they elected to file a
VFR flight plan. 78 Before the aircraft crossed into air
space controlled by another air traffic control center, the
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
17. Apostol, 838 F.2d at 596-97. The plaintiff claimed the wake turbulence from
a previously departing commercial jet" caused the crash. Id. at 596.
,74 Id. at 597.
,71 Id. at 598. The government's expert testified that wake turbulence from
even the largest airplanes only lasts thirty seconds, and two minutes elapsed be-
tween the takeoff of the previous plane and plaintiff's plane. Id.
176; Id.
,77 848 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1988).
179 Id. at 662.
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handling air traffic controller advised the pilots that radar
service was about to be terminated and the frequency
change was appoved. Shortly after the controller termi-
nated radar service, the aircraft collided with a mountain
ridge approximately 2,000 feet above mean sea level.' 79 A
passenger's widow alleged that the air traffic controller
was negligent because he failed to warn the pilots of the
nearby mountains. 8 0 The trial court concluded that the
Air Traffic Control Manual did not impose such a duty to
warn. 181
The court of appeals affirmed, finding that while the air-
craft was apparently flying a straight course toward the
mountain at an altitude below its crest in weather that
caused marginal VFR flying conditions, other information
was available to the controller which made her judgment
reasonable.' 82 The court stressed that the pilot's last com-
munication with the controller indicated the aircraft was
remaining on VFR status, and the controller was entitled
to assume that this representation was accurate. Since
Federal Aviation Regulations require the pilot operating
in VFR conditions to have flight visibility of at least one
mile, 183 the air traffic controller could not be presumed to
know that the pilot was not complying with the statute.8 4
C. Discretionary Function
In McFarland v. United States,' 8 5 the court denied dam-
,7, Id. A couple living about one-quarter of a mile northwest of the crash said
that the area surrounding them was covered by fog, making visibility about fifty
feet during the three hour period before the crash. Id.
IM Id.
is, 1d.
,,- Id. at 663. The controller determined that the pilot maintained an altitude
between 1500 and 1900 feet, and, in addition, the crash occurred more than
twenty miles from the Chattanooga Airport. Id. The court found that "the con-
troller could not simply assume that the cloudiness reported in Chattanooga was
uniform" all the way to the mountain ridge, and that the "people who were best
informed about the weather at the critical area were the crew members of the
plane." Id.
14 C.F.R. § 91.105 (1988).
Biles, 848 F.2d at 663.
I"5 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,460 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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ages from the government to a pilot and his wife for inju-
ries they suffered when their airplane crashed on landing
at an airport located in a national park area.1 86 The-plain-
tiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 87 alleging that the United States negligently op-
erated or maintained the airstrip. 88 While trying to avoid
a car on the runway, the plane overshot the departure end
of the airstrip and flipped over.1
8 9
The district court found that prior to takeoff, the pilot
learned that the airstrip was in poor condition and that
the only road in the area crossed a part of the airstrip. 90
The court also found that during the course of the pilot's
pre-landing fly-by an alert pilot would have seen any
ground vehicle coming from either direction on the road.
In this case, however, neither plaintiff observed the vehi-
cle until the airplane was already committed to landing.' 9'
Applying Arizona law and the FTCA, the district court
held that decisions regarding design and safety aspects of
airports and airstrips fall within the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA.19 2 The court also noted that,
even if the government had breached a duty, that breach
was not the proximate cause of the injuries. The court
noted that contributory negligence on the part of either
plaintiff would defeat their ability to recover. 193
Id. at 18,460-61. The pilot chose to attempt his landing on land "partially
appropriated by ground vehicular traffic." Id. at 18,461.
-1 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
," McFarland, 20 Av. Cas. at 18,461.
Id. On final approach, "a ground vehicle came into the plaintiffs' view on
the eastern side of the Airstrip and proceeded . . . [in] the direction in which Mr.
McFarland was attempting to land his Airplane. Mr. McFarland turned the Air-
plane in order to fly over and around the vehicle." Id.
, Id. The airstrip, which was the only one at the airport, "(i) was unattended
and unpaved, (ii) had no refueling or repair facilities, and (iii) did not have a wind-
sock." Id. In addition, the pilot knew "that the only road in the area . . .forks
... and crosses the southeast corner of the Airstrip." Id.
, Id. The vehicle "had turned onto the airstrip and ... was running directly
into the Airplane's landing path." Id.
.... 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
,' McFarland, 20 Av. Cas. at 18,463. The court was reluctant to conclude
solely on the basis of the stipulated evidence that Ms. McFarland would be barred
from recovery on grounds of contributory negligence. Id. at 18,464.
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In West v. FAA, 194 a widow and her three children ap-
pealed a district court's decision that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to determine whether the acts of cer-
tain FAA employees caused an airplane crash at Bishop
Airport in California.19 5  An FAA procedures specialist
designed and approved a special instrument approach
and departure procedure for Bishop Airport, which re-
quired pilots to climb steeply while maintaining a two
mile visual distance from the airport. 19
6
The district court found that a lack of sufficient ground
lighting probably caused the night crash by misleading
the pilot as to his distance from the airport. 97 Although
FAA employees knew about the visual phenomenon, they
did not take any special steps to analyze its effects. 9 8 In
addition, the FAA did not check the visual climb aspect of
the departure procedure by making a night flight. 99 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiff's claim that the
challenged actions of the FAA did not fall within the dis-
cretionary function exception to liability under the
FTCA'2 0 0 and consequently it affirmed the district court's
ruling.
The Ninth Circuit focused on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. Varig Airlines,20 1 explaining that
two factors were useful in determining when the acts of a
government employee are protected from liability. First,
,,- 830 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1470 (1988).
, Id. at 1045. The airport is located in a valley and surrounded by mountains
on the east and west. Id. The land east of the airport rises rapidly at three and
one-half miles and the land west of the airport at eight miles. Id.
w" Id. The FAA used daytime flights to determine whether the airport's proce-
dures followed FAA regulations. Id. The FAA did not, however, conduct a night
check of the climb portion of the departure. Id. at 1046.
"' Id. The court noted that "pilots flying on a very black night could be misled
into believing they were closer to the airport than they actually were." Id.
"'" Id. The FAA did not determine "whether there was a problem with the
lighting at Bishop Airport or reliance on the two mile distance requirement on a
dark night." Id.
*!K Id ,
... 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
2.. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In Vanig, the Supreme Court held that the FAA, in
certifying commercial aircraft, could chose applicable procedures in its discretion
and avoid liability under the discretionary function exception. Id. at 819-20.
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the nature of the conduct, rather than the actor's status, is
important in determining whether Congress intended to
shield the government from tort liability. Second, the dis-
cretionary function exception includes "the discretionary
acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of
the conduct of private individuals. 2 0 2 The exception
would apply whenever judicial review would overlap an
agency's determination of policy issues.2 °3
The district court determined that the FAA employees'
negligence in not conducting tests at night proximately
caused the accident.2 °4 The Ninth Circuit, however, held
that the FAA employees had exercised their discretion in
determining that additional tests were not feasible or nec-
essary. °5 The circuit court ruled that determination of
safety requirements involves a balancing of social, eco-
nomic or political policies.20 6 Therefore, the court held
that the case fell within the discretionary function excep-
tion and affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari has been
filed with the United States Supreme Court.
D. Statute of Limitations
In Weiss v. United States,20 7 the administrator of a pilot's
estate brought a wrongful death action against the United
States, claiming that the negligence of air traffic control-
lers employed by the FAA caused the pilot's death. The
pilot and his plane, a two-seater Grumman aircraft, disap-
peared shortly after takeoff when the airport released
flight control of the aircraft to the Terminal Radar Air
2... West, 830 F.2d at 1047 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 813-14).
2... Id. (citing Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985)).
21"4 Id. at 1046. The FAA employees were acting in the scope and course of
their employment. Id.
25. Id. at 1048. The Ninth Circuit stated that the "costs of doing the type of
tests the appellants suggested would greatly outweigh any added safety benefits."
Id.
'(,,, Id. at 1047. The appellants had argued "that the district court considered
safety alone and did not evaluate policy considerations." Id.
21,7 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,465 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
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Control Center.20 8 A proceeding was brought in a New
York Surrogate Court on December 18, 1985, and the
court ruled that the pilot had died intestate on the date he
disappeared, which was July 12, 1982.209
The plaintiff brought suit against the United States in
the Eastern District of New York onJuly 30, 1986.210 The
plaintiff asserted that the statute of limitations began run-
ning on December 18, 1985, the date the Surrogate Court
rendered its decision, while the United States contended
that the statute began running on the date that the plane
presumably crashed. 21 ' The district court held that it
must examine state law to determine whether the plaintiff
filed the wrongful death action within the proper time.21 2
Under New York state law, the date of the catastrophe,
and not the date of the Surrogate Court's decree, is the
date of death.2t 3 The court therefore granted the govern-
ment's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, as the two-year statute of limitations
had expired.2 14
IV. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
In Auer v. Kawasaki Motors Corporation,215 the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reheard this case in conjunction
with another personal injury case.2 16  Both cases
presented the issue of whether state or federal law should
determine the effect of a release of one joint tortfeasor
208 Id. at 18,465-66. The court noted that neither the airplane nor the dece-
dent were ever found. Id. at 18,466.
2W1I Id.
2 0 Id. There was a two year statute of limitations. Id.
211 Id.
I2- d. at 18,467.
211 Id. Under New York law, the court presumes death occurs at the end of an
unexplained absence of five years, unless the absentee has met his death in a "per-
ilous occurrence". Id. (citation omitted). In such a case, the court presumes
death occurred on the date of the accident. Id.
214 Id. Since-the plane disappeared on July 12, 1982, under New York law the
latest the plaintiff could have brought the suit would have been July 12, 1984. Id.
2- 830 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988).
2W Id. at 536. The court had jurisdiction over both based on diversity
jurisdiction.
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upon the state-created rights and liabilities of the other
alleged joint tortfeasors.2 1 7  Applying state law, the
Fourth Circuit held that the release of one joint tortfeasor
effectively released the other joint tortfeasors, and the
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the de-
fendant in each case. 2
1 8
In Auer, one of the plaintiffs was a passenger on a
Cessna 172H Skyhawk which crashed in the foothills of
the Blue Ridge Mountains approximately 30 minutes after
taking off from a Virginia airport.2 9 The plaintiff sued
the manufacturer of the airplane and the airplane's en-
gine, the owner of the plane, and the plane's senior pilot.
The owner of the plane settled in return for a convenant
not to sue. After an FAA report was filed stating that no
defect in or malfunction of the engine had been found,
the plaintiff settled with the manufacturer of the plane's
engine for $2,000.220 The court later granted summary
judgment to the aircraft manufacturer because, under Vir-
ginia law, dismissal of the claim against the engine manu-
facturer with prejudice constituted a release and
extinguished the plaintiff's claim against the aircraft
manufacturer.22
In 1979, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a stat-
ute providing that a convenant not to sue, given in good
faith to a joint tortfeasor, would discharge other joint
tortfeasors only if there was a specific provision for it.222
The legislature amended the statute in 1980 to include a
release given in good faith. 223 The court determined,
however, that it must apply Virginia law as it existed at the
time of injury and not at the time of the release. At that
time, each joint tortfeasor obtained a right of contribution
217 Id
21. Id.
2- id. at 537.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (1980).
22. Id.
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from the other joint tortfeasors.2 24 The Fourth Circuit
therefore affirmed the district court's ruling that there had
been an accord and satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim
against the engine manufacturer, ultimately releasing the
other joint tortfeasors.225 A dissenting judge argued that
because the case involved a release reached during a fed-
eral proceeding, federal common law, not state law, gov-
erned the effect that a settlement with one joint tortfeasor
had on other joint tortfeasors. 22 '6 A writ of certiorari has
been filed with the United States Supreme Court.
V. AIRPORTS
A. Premises Liability
In Great American Airways v. Airport Authority, 227 an airline
sued for negligence and breach of contract because one of
its planes struck a chunk of ice while attempting to take off
from a runway. 228 The Airport Authority had examined
the runway at least once during the two hours prior to
takeoff.22
9
The Nevada Supreme Court conducted a plenary re-
view of the contract between the parties and did not defer
to the lower court's interpretation. 230 Noting that the em-
phasis in contract construction is to determine the con-
tracting parties' intent, the court found that the contract
required the Airport Authority to maintain the facilities
free of obstructions, and that this requirement was consis-
tent with the Authority's contractual obligation to main-
tain its facilities in a manner suitable for the lessee's air
transport uses. The Airport Authority drafted the con-
224 Auer, 830 F.2d at 540.
225 Id.
2211 Id. at 541.
227 743 P.2d 628 (Nev. 1987).
22" Id. at 628-29. The crash damaged the "the airplane's nose wheels, fuselage
and engines.", Id. at 629. The evidence showed that the "weather that morning
was dry and the runway was clear of snow and slush." Id.
221) Id.
23o Id. This may be done where a trial court has interpreted a contract solely
from its written terms. Id.
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tract, and the court held that if they had intended for the
airline to bear such losses, they could have made such
specifications in the contract.23 ' The court therefore up-
held the trial court's dismissal of the negligence claim, but
ordered a new trial on the claim of contract liability.232
B. Preemption
In Western Airlines v. Port Authority,233 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an airline was not entitled to
enjoin a Port Authority that operated an airport from en-
forcing its "perimeter rule," which prohibited airlines us-
ing the airport from running nonstop flights beyond the
distance of 1500 miles. 23 4 The airline argued that the pe-
rimeter rule was preempted by Section 1305(a)(1) of the
Airline Deregulation Act, and that it violated substantive
provisions of two other aviation statutes. 235 The perime-
ter rule was instituted to reduce congestion by encourag-
ing business persons to use La Guardia for relatively short
trips and inducing vacationers to use Newark and Ken-
nedy Airports for vacation flights.23 6
The FAA limits flights to and from La Guardia by using
"slots" which authorize the holder to make one landing or
takeoff during a thirty-minute period. Western wanted
these slots for three nonstop flights daily between La,
Guardia and Salt Lake City.23 7 In upholding the district
21 Id. The Authority could have instead provided that it would keep the run-
ways ."reasonably' free from obstructions." Id.
2.'2 Id. at 630. A new trial was required because the trial court's dismissal pre-
cluded the Authority from presenting evidence which refuted the plaintiff's claim
that ice caused the damage to the plane. Id.
2--1 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987).
2-.4 Id. at 223. The district court had denied the airline's suit for an injunction.
" Id. at 224. Section 1305(a)(1) provided that
no State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or
other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes or services of any air
carrier having authority. . . to provide air transportation.
Id. at 224 n. I.
21I Id. at 223.
37 Id.
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court's ruling, the Second Circuit held that although "the
perimeter rule may be a regulation 'relating to... routes'
within the meaning of section 1305(a)(1). ... the rule, at
least when enacted by a multi-airport proprietor such as
the Authority, falls within the proprietory powers of air-
port operators exempted from preemption by section
1305(b)(1). ' 23 8
In Stream Aviation, Incorporated v. Anders Production, Incor-
porated,23 9 the plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendant, alleging that it had provided air transportation
services to the defendant for approximately one and a half
years and had not been compensated. The plaintiff
sought damages in the amount of $132,624.48. Harold
Stream, son of the sole shareholder of plaintiff, had been
married to the sole shareholder of the defendant, Lynn
Anderson, and was bringing an action for reimbursement
of transportation provided to Ms. Anderson and the Lynn
Anderson Band during their marriage. 24' The defendant
contended that it was entitled to summary judgment be-
cause the plaintiff did not have authority from the FAA to
act as a commercial operator. 24' The defendant argued
that because the plaintiff did not have an operating certifi-
cate, it could not seek enforcement of its alleged contract
since it was in violation of federal regulations.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court stated that when Congress en-
2.18 Id. at 226-27. Section 1305(b)(1) provided in pertinent part that "[n]othing
in [Section 1305(a)] shall be construed to limit the authority of... the owner or
operator of an airport served by any air carrier certificated by the Board to exer-
cise its proprietary powers and rights." Id. at 224 n. 1.
2... 517 So. 2d 1157 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
24.. Id. at 1158. Harold Stream had been granted full authority to act for plain-
tiff s sole shareholder in all of her business affairs pursuant to a power of attor-
ney. Id.
I2 d. Anderson argued that Stream should have obtained a Part 135 Air
Taxi/Commercial Operator's operating certificate before transporting the band
for commercial purposes. Id. at 1158-59. The FAA regulations in question ap-
plied to air carriers carrying less than twenty passengers for compensation as a
commercial operator, and prohibited operation under that section without an Air
Taxi/Commercial Operator's operating certificate. 14 C.F.R. § 135.1(A)(3)
(1988).
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acted the Federal Aviation Act242 it expressly preempted
the field of air transportation. 243 The lower court con-
cluded that FAA regulations have the effect of law and
providing plaintiff with a remedy would violate the
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
2 44
A Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed the decision and
remanded the case, holding that the lower court had in-
correctly interpreted the statute in question. 24 5 The court
ruled that Congress had not intended to preclude the
courts from enforcing legally binding contracts because
the "judicial enforcement of a contract for air transporta-
tion, subsequent to the faithful completion by the carrier,
even when the carrier is not appropriately certified, is not
the enactment or enforcement of a law or regulation relat-
ing to 'rates, routes, or services of an air carrier'.."
246
C. Jurisdiction
In Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation v. Commonwealth,247 a
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the Kentucky Air-
port Zoning Commission lacked jurisdiction to deny a
broadcasting company permission to construct a tower
between airports located in two different counties. The
tower was located approximately 20 miles from the near-
est airport.2 4 8 The appellant television station argued that
the Commisssion had exceeded its jurisdiction in attempt-
ing to regulate the proposed construction because the
tower was not in the vicinity of an airport. 249 The appel-
242 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
2. Stream Aviation, 517 So. 2d at 1159. The trial court cited 49 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a)(1) (1982) as authority for this preemption. Id.; see supra note 235 for text
of this section.
244 Stream Aviation, 517 So. 2d at 1159.
24-1 Id. at 1160-61.
2"1 Id. at 1160. The court remanded to resolve the issue of the validity of the
alleged contract for transportation. Id. at 1160.
N7 759 S.W.2d 824 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
I2 d. at 826.
249 Id. at 825. The trial court disagreed with this argument, holding that the
legislature's intent was to grant broad regulatory authority to the zoning commis-
sion. Id. at 826.
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late court agreed, holding that under Kentucky statutes
"navigable air space" was "limited to areas within and
around publicly owned airports."2 ' The court was per-
suaded that the intent of the state legislature was to con-
fine the Commission's power to the use of land only
within and around airports. The court also noted that ex-
listing cases interpreting the statute all involved safety as it
related to aircraft take-off and landings, which would ob-
viously occur at the airport. 51
D. Equal Protection
In Herrick's Aero-Auto-Agua Repair Service v. State Depart-
ment of Transportation and Public Facilities,25 2 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that repair companies who were les-
sees at an Alaskan airport were denied equal protection
under the Alaskan Constitution. The State Department of
Transportation required on-base companies to obtain
permits to conduct business on airport property or pro-
vide comprehensive public liability insurance, while itiner-
ant mechanics were not subjected to the same
regulations. 2 " The specific services provided by the
plaintiffs were mechanical maintenance and air-frame re-
pair. Their lease agreements required them to provide in-
surance against public liability and indemnify the airport
for any damages caused. Mobile or itinerant mechanics
provided services from their vehicles at their customers'
storage facilities, but were also providing similar services
at public areas in the airport and had not obtained the
statutorily required permits. 25 4
In determining whether the lessees had been denied
2M Id. The court found that the legislature had not intended to grant the com-
mission jurisdiction over "every square inch of usable, navigable airspace within
the state." Id.
251 Id.
2.'2 754 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1988).
21 Id. at 1112. Although the itinerant mechanics were legally required to obtain
such permits, none of them had filed a permit request, and the Department of
Transportation had failed to take any action against them. Id.
" Id.
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equal protection under the law, the trial court applied the
rational basis test 255 and concluded that the financial im-
pact of enforcing the law against itinerant mechanics justi-
fied requiring only the lessees to obtain permits and
provide insurance coverage.256 On appeal, the Alaska
Supreme Court applied the rational basis test under the
Alaska State Constitution. Under the state test, the court
determines "whether the classification is 'reasonable, not'
arbitrary' and rests 'upon some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the leg-
islation.' " 257 In applying this test, a court cannot assume
facts which would justify otherwise questionable legisla-
tion.258 Thus, the burden on the state under the Alaska
Constitution is greater than that required under the
United States Constitution. Theburden increases as the
primacy of the individual interest involved increases. The
court explained that "[e]ventually this burden reaches the
functional equivalent of the federal compelling state inter-
est test in those cases where fundamental rights and sus-
pect categories are at issue."' 259
The court noted that this legislation dealt with eco-
nomic and commercial interests, which are generally sub-
jected to a low level ofjudicial scrutiny. Consequently the
Department of Transportation was only required to show.
that it had legitimate objectives. 2 60 The Department of
Transportation argued that their selective enforcement
policy was justified due to the significant increase in re-
sources necessary to enforce the regulation against itiner-
2.- See generally United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54
(i938), for an articulation of the rational basis test.
2-" Herrick's, 754 P.2d at 1114.
.7 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)).
2- Id. The court noted that this differed substantially from the rational basis
test under the United States Constitution which would permit a court to hypothe-
size facts necessary to sustain legislation. Id. at 1114 n.6; see also Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (challenge of legislation on equal pro-
tection grounds will not prevail unless all considerations presented to the legisla-
ture and those which the court will assume establish that the issue is debatable).
2 5 Herrick's, 754 P.2d at 1114.
211 Id.
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ant mechanics. They also argued that it was hard to
identify itinerant mechanics and to monitor their actions
because the airport had so many entrances. 26' The court
rejected the latter argument, stating that this was merely
an admission that security at the airport was inadequate
and that, as a result, the Department could not be ex-
pected to change its policies.262 With regard to the signif-
icant financial impact of full enforcement, the court held
that "cost savings alone are not sufficient government
objectives under [an] equal protection analysis. "263 Since
itinerant mechanics may incur the same type of liability as
lessees, the state's potential exposure to liability was the
same in either situation.264 Because the Department of
Transportation had failed to prove a rational basis for dis-
crimination, the court held that there had been an equal
protection violation. The plaintiffs were not entitled to
damages, however, since there was no authorizing statute
and injunctive relief was an available and appropriate
remedy.265
E. Free Speech
In Jamison v. St. Louis,266 the plaintiff had been an em-
ployee of Trans World Airlines for sixteen years but was
fired in 1984. The plaintiff had been diagnosed as a ma-
nic-depressive and believed that his discharge was solely a
result of his mental illness. He informed the director of
the Lambert-St. Louis International Airport that he
2'' Id. at 1114-15.
211 Id. at 1115.
26 Id. at 1114. The court cited Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d
264 (Alaska 1984), in which the court had stated that:
Although reducing costs to taxpayers or consumers is a legitimate
government goal in one sense, savings will always be achieved by
excluding a class of persons from benefits they would otherwise re-
ceive. Such economizing is justifiable only when effected through
independently legitimate distinctions.
Brown, 687 P.2d at 272.
21w Herrick's, 754 P.2d at 1115.
'; Id. at 1116.
21.1 828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987).
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wished to protest the airline's action by standing on an
airport concourse with a sign reading "TWA discriminates
against the handicapped. ' 267 After the director indicated
that he would deny the plaintiff's oral request, the plain-
tiff then submitted a similar written request emphasizing
that he intended the protest to be entirely peaceful. The
director denied the request in writing without stating his
reasons for doing so. 261
At the time of the request, the Airport Authority oper-
ated under a rule establishing certain procedures for the
exercise of constitutional freedoms at the airport. 269 The
rule provided that those wishing to exercise constitutional
freedoms shall be protected if their activities are not com-
mercial in nature and "do not result in interference with
transportation functions at the Airport. ' 270 The plaintiff
claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated.
The defendants claimed that although the rule was still in
effect, it was "moribund" when plaintiff made his request,
and the director did not apply the rule in making his deci-
sion to deny the request. Instead, the director believed he
had general discretion to permit or deny any activities that
he felt would not be in the best interests of the airport or
its patrons. The director testified that he generally denied
all requests for permission to protest or solicit, unless a.
court ordered that such permission be granted.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the
government can generally restrict access to its property
only if it is a nonpublic forum, and then cited a lengthy list
of decisions which held that an airport is a public fo-
rum.27' The court noted the Supreme Court's admonish-
2j7 Id. at 1281.
2M Id. The director's testimony indicated that he felt he had to protect the pub-
lic from any potential ramifications of plaintiff's illness and that he did not desire
to cause plaintiff any harm. Id. at 1282 n.3.
2 9 Id. at 1282.
2111 Id. The rule stated that "persons or organizations desiring to exercise con-
stitutional freedoms 'shall be protected in such activities, provided that the same do not
constitute commercial activities and do not result in interference with transporta-
tion functions of the Airport.' " Id.
21' Id. at 1283.
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ment that "speakers can be excluded from a public forum
only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest. ' 27 2 The court held the airport's pro-
cedure regarding the excercise of First Amendment rights
constitutionally defective in two respects. First, the city
had erred by giving the airport director blanket discretion
in determining whether a person would be allowed to ex-
ercise his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly rejected these methods "in recognition of
the immeasurable injury inflicted on First Amendment
freedoms by the potentially arbitrary and discriminatory
exercise of an official's unfettered discretion. '273 Second,
the airport's practice was not narrowly drawn to achieve
compelling interests because the director testified that he.
regularly refused all solicitation requests. 274
Consequently, the court held that the practice violated
both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court
further noted that the airport authorities have legitimate
interests in security and operational efficiency, but the city
failed to show how the exclusion of all mentally ill persons
would further its valid efficiency interests.275 The court
quoted the Supreme Court, stating that "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. "276
F. Landing and Terminal Rental Fees
In Rocky Mountain Airways Incorporated v. Pitkin County ,277
the plaintiffs were two airlines who alleged that certain
rates and charges imposed by the county were excessive,
272 Id. at 1284 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,'
473 U.S. 788 (1985)).
271 Id.
274 Id. The court noted that it could not "discern [a] compelling government
need that would warrant such a drastic exclusion of speakers from a public fo-
rum." Id.
27.1 Id. at 1285.
2111 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969)).
277 674 F. Supp. 312 (D. Colo. 1987).
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unreasonable, and discriminatory. The plaintiffs operated
air carrier services between Stapleton International Air-
port in Denver and Aspen/Pitkin County Airport. Both of
the airlines occupied space in the airport terminals and
used the airfield facilities pursuant to agreements with Pit-
kin County.2 78 The county decided to enlarge and re-
model the existing terminal, and some of the construction
funds were to be generated by increasing the landing fees
for regularly scheduled commercial airlines, based on
maximum allowable gross landing weight. Additionally,
the annual rental charges for terminal space would be in-
creased by 153 percent. 279 The airlines alleged that while
they only accounted for 28.7 percent of annual operations
at the airport, they would be paying 50.6 percent of all
operating revenues for the airport in 1988. The county
was not increasing costs for privately owned aircraft,
although they allegedly accounted for 67.7 percent of an-
2810nual operations.
The District Court held that the resolution violated the
Anti-Head Tax Act. 28 ' The court noted that gross weight
was a figure which related to the number of passengers in
the airplane and consequently the landing fee, which was
based upon gross weight, arguably amounted to an indi-
rect head-tax. Additionally, the terminal rental fee
amounted to an indirect charge on persons traveling in air
commerce because the airlines would pass the costs to
consumers. Consequently, the court held that both fees
were an indirect charge on the carrying of persons in air
278 Id. at 313.
2111 Id. at 314. The rental fees were to increase from $233,417 to $564,488.
The increase in landing fees was approximately fifty-two percent. Id.
2M) Id.
281 Id. at 316. The Anti-Head Tax Act provides that
No State (or political subdivision thereof. . ) shall levy or collect a
tax, fee, headcharge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on per-
sons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons travel-
ing in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the
gross receipts derived therefrom ...
49 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (1982). Section 1513(b) provides some exceptions and al-
lows airport owners or operators to levy reasonable rental charges and landing
fees. Id. § 1513(b).
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commerce in violation of the Act. 28 2 The county argued
that the fees and rentals were merely "reasonable rental
charges and landing fees" and were therefore protected
under the exceptions to the Act.283 The court explained,
however, that it was ruling on a motion to dismiss and
therefore was bound to take the allegations in the com-
plaint as true. The airlines had alleged that the fees and
rentals imposed were unreasonable, and this sufficiently
alleged a violation of the Act. The "reasonableness" of




In Runway 27 Coalition, Incorporated v. Engen,2 a5 the plain-
tiffs claimed that the FAA had instituted certain changes
at Boston's Logan Airport without considering the envi-
ronmental impacts of the changes. Plaintiffs challenged
the FAA's introduction of a plan for arrivals and depar-
tures on two runways. 8 6 The plaintiffs were seeking relief
pursuant to provisions of the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA)28 7 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.288
The court noted that the statute requiring an environ-
mental impact statement 289 clearly places a burden on the
FAA to determine whether its actions "constitute major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 29 0
The court determined that during the time period in
which the FAA's actions were challenged, FAA regula-
tions required the agency to evaluate environmental fac-
tors and determine whether an environmental impact,
2 Rocky Mountain Airways, 674 F. Supp. at 315.
29.3 Id.
284 Id.
28.1 679 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1987).
28"" Id. at 96-97.
287 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
2,, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1982).
2- 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
21m Runway 27, 679 F. Supp. at 98.
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statement (EIS) was required.29 ' The court concluded
that the FAA's refusal to make such an assessment in this
case was erroneous as a matter of law. In order to justify
the lack of an environmental assessment, the record must
show that changes to flight paths under 3,000 feet did not
"routinely route air traffic over noise sensitive areas" or
"tend to increase noise over noise sensitive areas. '292 In
this case, it was clear that the changes in the departure
procedures affected flight paths over residental areas at a
level less than 3,000 feet.293
The court concluded that it was permitted to make a
determination as to whether the FAA actions challenged
constituted major federal actions and to order the agency
to prepare an EIS.294 The court ruled, however, that the
appropriate procedure would be to first order the prepa-
ration of an environmental assessment within 180 days,
because the record was insufficient to justify ordering an
EIS. The matter was remanded to the FAA for prepara-
tion of this report and for any further agency action as
might be required by reason of the FAA's findings. 295
The court retained jurisdiction over the case in order to
ensure prompt judicial review.
In Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Environment v. En-
gen, 296 the plaintiffs brought an action against the FAA,
alleging that the agency had violated the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act 297 by failing to prepare an envion-
mental impact statement (EIS) on a new terminal built at
the Nashville Metropolitan Airport. The court began by
reviewing the extensive history of studies performed on
the airport, the development of two master plans, and the
preparation of an environmental assessment on the new
2'1 Id. at 101.
292 Id. at 102.
211-1 Id. at 103.
2 4 Id. at 108.
211. Id. at 109.
2111 665 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
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terminal.298  The court also noted that on the date the
lawsuit was filed, contracts had been awarded for over $96
million, and $54 million had already been paid for com-
pleted work. The terminal was essentially complete and
opening was targeted for four months from the date that,
the motions for summary judgment were filed.299
The plaintiffs argued that the FAA had improperly re-
jected an alternative solution of building an entirely new
airport.3 0 0 The court disagreed, however, concluding that
it was not arbitrary and capricious to eliminate from fur-
ther study the alternative of moving the airport to another
site.301 In addition, a decision of the FAA to exclude from
consideration the speculative impact of a new runway in
an environmental assessment was not arbitrary where the
new runway would not be necessary for at least ten
years.3 02 The defendants' motions for summary judgment
were granted.
H. Auto Concessions
In Alamo Rent-a-Car, Incorporated v. Sarasota-Manatee Air-
port Authority,30 3 the Airport Authority established a sched-
ule of user or privilege fees in order to meet various
expenses not covered by state and federal grants which
applied to a wide range of activities conducted on the air-
port's facilities. 0 4 After considering measures aimed at al-
leviating ground traffic congestion and obtaining revenue
2tw Neighbors, 665 F. Supp. at 539-43.
"1Y: Id. at 543.
--, Id. at 544. Plaintiffs alleged that the FAA's rejection was based on deceptive
treatment of one of the studies. Id.
I'l Id. The court noted that it was neither "reasonable or prudent to radically'
change [comprehensive] planning when apparently no adverse environmental im-
pacts were associated with pursuing it." Id.
.- 2 Id. at 544-45.
- 825 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1022 (1988).
' ld. at 369. The activities subjected to the charge included "airplane landing
fees, fees and lease payments for car rental companies located on airport prop-
erty, parking fees, rent from restaurants and gift shops, and fees paid by taxis and
limousines serving the airport." Id.
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from operators of hotel and motel courtesy vehicles,30 5
the Authority adopted two resolutions. The first resolu-
tion assessed a flat fee for hotel and motel courtesy vehi-
cles, while the second resolution assessed a fee against
off-airport car rental companies of ten percent of all re-
ceipts derived from rentals to passengers picked up at the
airport.3 0 6 The plaintiff, an off-airport auto rental service,
brought an action in federal district court to enjoin the
ten percent user fee, claiming that it violated the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. The
district court held that the fee denied plaintiff equal pro-
tection and issued an injunction against enforcement of
the fee. 0 7
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It
held that differences in the types of business conducted by
these companies was a factor to be considered when ana-
lyzing an equal protection claim.30 8 In this case, however,
the court held that even if there were no differences in the
two types of companies involved, the Authority's scheme
of user fees did not lack a rational basis and was therefore
not arbitrary.30 9 The court found that the Authority had
drawn rational distinctions based upon the relative bene-
fits and the extent of use of each category of vehicles en-
tering the airport. Therefore, the resolutions were
rationally related to legitimate objectives of the Authority
and were upheld. 1 0 Certiorari was denied by the United
States Supreme Court.3 1'
In Airline Car Rental Incorporated v. Shreveport Airport Au-
1,.5 Id. Hotel and motel courtesy vehicles transported customers between the
airport's main terminal and certain businesses on airport property. Id.
.4 moi Id.
, Id.
5, Id. at 370. The court noted that "in some cases this distinction alone may be
sufficient to uphold the challenged legislation." Id.
I, ld. at 370-71.
Id. at 371. The court held that "[iln establishing these classifications, the
Authority need not achieve perfection or mathematical exactitude." Id.
"I Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 108 S. Ct. 1022
(1988).
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thority,312 the Shreveport Airport Authority passed a reso-
lution imposing charges on entities who did not have
contracts with the Authority but used airport facilities in
their business pursuits. The resolution required nonten-
ant rental car businesses to obtain a permit which re-
quired payment of seven percent of all gross business
receipts obtained from renting vehicles to persons picked
up at the airport.31 3 The plaintiff, a car rental service lo-
cated near the airport, brought an action seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. The Authority filed a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).3"4
The Authority argued that dismissal was appropriate
because the plaintiff was engaged in a business that was
not within the scope of the Commerce Clause because it
was only tangentially related to interstate commerce. s i
The plaintiff, however, demonstrated that a substantial
amount of its business was derived through a national res-
ervation system. 3' 6 The court found that a great deal of
the plaintiff's operations were prearranged by interstate
communications, and consequently the plaintiff had al-
leged facts which, if proven, would show that it engaged
in interstate commerce. Therefore, the plaintiff had
stated an interstate commerce claim upon which relief
could be granted.31 7 The court also held that, even
though the Authority alleged it was exempt from antitrust
liability because it was an agent of the state, the plaintiff
had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted
under the Sherman Antitrust Act. i s The court held, how-
'112 667 F. Supp. 293 (W.D. La. 1986).
-. Id. at 294-95.
-114 Id. at 295.
,- Id. at 296. The defendant relied upon United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218 (1947), "as authority for the proposition that 'an individual or company
can be engaged in a business tangentially related to interstate commerce and still
not fall within the ambit of the commerce clause.' " Airline Car Rental, 667 F.
Supp. at 296.
.41 Id.
.1,7 Id. at 296-97.
.- Id. at 297-98. The Authority alleged exemption from antitrust liability be-
cause it was an agent of the state with authority to enforce state policy regarding
the airport. Id. at 297.
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ever, that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action
for violation of the Airport Development Acceleration Act
of 1973, t9 since that Act did not apply to a provider of
ground transportation services. 2 °
On November 25, 1986, the court heard cross-motions
for summary judgment in the same case. The court de-
nied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
granted the defendant's summary judgment motion in
part.321 The Authority had argued for summary judgment
on the plaintiff's Commerce Clause claim under the mar-
ket participant doctrine, arguing that a state or local gov-
ernment entering the market as a participant is not
subject to the restraints imposed by the Commerce
Clause. 22 The court held that the Authority had not en-
tered the market as a participant in the rental car industry,
but rather acted as a market regulator. 2 3 Because the Au-
thority acted as a market regulator, the resolution was
subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. 24
Therefore, summary judgment on the plaintiff's Com-
merce Clause claim was denied.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's antitrust claims,
holding that the Authority was protected by a state action
-' See 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1982).
-1211 Airline Car Rental, 667 F. Supp. at 298-99.
1'2 Id. at 304.
.122 Id. at 305. The Authority relied on the market participant doctrine as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1976). See also Reeves, Inc. v. Strake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (The Court
explained that "the Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and reg-
ulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. There
is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the states themselves
to operate freely in the free market.").
'2' Airline Car Rental, 667 F. Supp. at 306. The court stated:
The Authority has not entered the market for rental car services.
The Authority neither provides nor purchases these services.
Rather, the Authority has simply created a suitable marketplace for
the buying and selling of these services by private individuals. In the
market for rental car services, the Authority's role, then, is essen-




exemption from the federal and state antitrust laws.3 25
Under the exemption, the Sherman Act does not apply to
the anticompetitive conduct of a state acting through its
legislature.3 26 In this case, a state statute expressed a pol-
icy of permitting anticompetitive conduct, so the plain-
tiff's state antitrust claims were also dismissed. The court
found that the fee imposed by the resolution was properly
fixed according to some fair and uniform standard, and
that the resolution did not affirmatively discriminate
against interstate transactions.327 Therefore, the resolu-
tion was reasonable and did not impermissibly burden in-
terstate commerce.
The plaintiff also claimed that the Authority's resolu-
tion violated the equal protection clause in that it created
two classes which were treated differently: nontenant car
rental businesses and all other off-airport businesses
which used courtesy buses to pick up or deliver customers
to and from the airport.3 28 The plaintiff failed to allege,,
however, that the resolution either impinged upon a fun-
damental right or discriminated against a suspect class.329
Therefore, the court applied the rational basis test set
forth by the Supreme Court 330 and found that the resolu-
12. Id. at 307-08.
126 Id. at 306. The court held:
Municipalities, however, are not beyond the reach of federal anti-
trust laws by virtue of their status because they are not themselves
sovereigns. "[B]efore a municipality will be entitled to the protec-
tion of the state action exemption from the antitrust laws, it must
demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to
a clearly expressed state policy."
Id. (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)).
327 Id. at 313-14. A fee is fair if "it was reasonable, and ... the actual amount
paid was directly proportional to the number of customers involved." Id. at 313.
The fee is uniform if "it was proportional to volume of business, and . . . a com-
monly accepted charge throughout the nation." Id.
.12. Id. at 308. The airline further alleged that the first class was treated differ-
ently from the second class because the resolution arbitrarily required the
"[a]irline and other nontenant car rental businesses to pay a flat fee of seven per-
cent of gross receipts for access to the airport terminals while other shuttle service
operators pay only a lower fee flat or no fee at all." Id.
SId.
•" Id. at 308-09. The court stated that in deciding "whether the challenged
resolution passes the rationality test, this court must answer two questions: '(1)
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tion had a legitimate purpose, and that it was reasonable
for the Authority to believe that the use of the resolution
would promote that purpose. 3 1 Since the resolution was
an economic regulation, it did not violate either federal or
state equal protection guarantees.
VI. WARSAW CONVENTION
A. Jurisdiction
In Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corporation,332 plaintiff initi-
ated an action seeking damages for injuries suffered at the
hands of hijackers of a Kuwait Airways flight from Kuwait
City to Karachi. The district court dismissed plaintiff's
claims against both Kuwait Airways and Pan Am, issuer of
plaintiff's ticket, ruling that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction over both carriers under Article 28(1) of the War-
saw Convention.333  It also dismissed Kapar's claim
against Middle East Airlines Airliban, S.A.L., for lack of
personal jurisdiction.334
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal based on
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. 3 5 The district
court concluded that the United States could not serve as
a proper forum under the first, second or fourth clauses
of Article 28(1) because Kuwait Airways is based in Ku-
wait and the ultimate destination of the flight was Paki-
Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) was it reason-
able for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would
promote that purpose?' " Id. at 309 (quoting Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981)).
"'Id.
845 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1102. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Pan Am
because it was fully entitled to Kuwait Airways' Warsaw Convention defenses
since Pan Am was Kuwait's agent. Id.
Id. at 101.
. Id. at 1102. The court noted:
Article 28(1) provides that an action for damages arising out of in-
ternational air travel "must be brought" in one of four countries: (1)
the carrier's domicile; (2) the carrier's principal place of business; (3)
the country where the carrier has a place of business through which
the contract of carriage was made; or (4) the place of destination.
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stan. Regarding the third clause, the court rejected
Kapar's theory that jurisdiction was established by the fact
that his ticket was electronically confirmed in New York
and that as a federal employee he was obligated to buy his
ticket from an American carrier. 36 On that basis, the
court granted Kuwait Airways' motion to dismiss.
The court also rejected Kapar's argument that Pan Am,
as the issuing airline, was a "carrier" under the terms of
the Convention. While the term "carrier" is not defined
in the Convention, the court held that the Convention
clearly establishes that its drafters were using the term
"carrier" to refer only to those airlines that actually trans-
port passengers or baggage. 3 7 Accordingly, the court
held that Pan Am was acting only as an agent for the car-
rying airline. The court concluded that by including Arti-
cle 28(1), the Convention drafters intended to restrict the
forums in which damage actions may be brought, and that
the nexus of the United States with this case is too far re-
moved to support jurisdiction. 8
In Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corporation,339 the court
held that in a Warsaw Convention action where an airline
was dismissed as a party defendant for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, the airline could not be compelled to pro-
duce witnesses for deposition. Plaintiff sought to depose
Kuwait Airways' employees subsequent to Kuwait Air-
ways' dismissal as a party. The district court affirmed the
magistrate's order denying plaintiff's motion to compel
Kuwait Airways to produce these witnesses in New York
on the grounds that the court had not previously directed
their production, the court lacked subject matterjurisdic-
-(; Id.
.3.7 Id. at 1103. The court stated that it could not "reasonably be concluded that
the drafters intended an airline that merely issues a ticket to face potential liability
as a 'carrier.' " Id.
3- Id. at 1104. The court stated that "[b]ecause the nexus with the United
States in this case can only be described as 'slight . . and remote,' .. , subjecting
Pan Am to suit in the District Court would be inconsistent with the underlying
purpose of Article 28(1)." Id.
-1: 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,388 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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tion over Kuwait Airways rendering all earlier discovery
orders invalid, and the subpoenas served on Kuwait Air-
ways under Rule 45(d)(2) did not compel it to produce
witnesses for deposition in New York.3 40
In Alawode v. Nigeria Airways, Ltd. ,341 the court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention. 4 2 The court held that although the
plaintiff's trip consisted of several parts, the final destina-
tion was Lagos, Nigeria, and not New York City.3 43 Ac-
cordingly, New York was an improper forum under
Article 28.
In Boyar v. Korean Airlines,34 4 the district court exercised
jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention in three sepa-
rate actions arising from the downing of a KAL airliner by
Soviet military aircraft in 1983. In each of the three ac-
tions, the issue was the time at which a contract for air
carriage was formed. The court concluded that for pur-
poses of determining jurisdiction under the Warsaw Con-
vention, the place where the ticket is issued is usually, but
not always, the place and time in which the contract
arises. 4 5 Applicability of the Convention is based on a
contract of carriage arising between an air carrier and its
passengers. The carrier must consent to transport the
passenger internationally, and the passenger must con-
sent to being transported. 46 The court noted that the
Id. at 18,398-90. The court noted that the witness would be subpoenaed
to testify as a nonparty corporate witness, but must be examined at his residence
or business. Id. at 18,390.
-' 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,441 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
.42 Id. at 18,442.
33Id.
44 664 F. Supp. 1481 (D.D.C. 1987).
.14. Id. at 1485. The court concluded that in determining where the contract is
formed, it must determine the "place of mutual consent." Id. This is a factual
determination which courts will have to make in each individual case. Id.
.14,1 Id. The court cited Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1967), which examined the contractual relationship required to establish ju-
risdiction under the Warsaw Convention:
It is based on a contract of carriage that arises from the relationship
between a "carrier" and the passengers. This contractual relation-
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passenger's ticket "is not the contract but is instead evi-
dence of the parties' contractual relationship. 3 47
The court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of
treaty jurisdiction as to passenger Lee, concluding that
the formation of his contract for carriage had occurred in
Seoul. The court denied the motion to dismiss as to pas-
senger Park, concluding that his contract had been
formed when his sister-in-law booked their trip with a
Michigan travel agent.3 48
Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Incorporated349 was one of eighteen
wrongful death actions arising out of the crash of an Ar-
row Air DC-8 in Gander, Newfoundland. The actions
were consolidated for consideration in the Florida state
courts. The complaints were filed under the Florida
Wrongful Death Act and were based solely on the state
cause of action and not on the Warsaw Convention .350 De-
fendants removed the cases to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that
although plaintiffs failed to plead the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the wrongful death claims arose out of international
air transportation and thus necessarily presented a wrong-
ful death claim under the Warsaw Convention. 1 On that
basis, defendants contended that they had the right to re-
move the lawsuit to federal court even if the state court
had concurrent jurisdiction.
The district court concluded that the cases should be
remanded to the state court. The court rejected the de-
fendants' argument that the cause of action created by the
Warsaw Convention preempts the application of state
wrongful death statutes for losses occurring during inter-
ship requires only that the carrier consent to undertake the interna-
tional transportation of the passenger from one designated spot to
another, and that the passenger in turn consent to the undertaking.
Block, 386 F.2d at 330-31.
47 Boyer, 664 F. Supp. at 1485 (citing Block, 386 F.2d at 336).
-14. Id. at 1486-87.
636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Pa. 1986).
Id. at 738-39.
'' Id. at 738.
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national flight25 2 While courts in the past have held that
the Warsaw Convention applies to limit recovery even
when the cause of action is based on state law, the cause
of action upon which recovery is based is not limited by
the Convention. Both state law and the Convention may
provide a cause of action. Any recovery obtained under
either basis, however, is subject to the limitations of the
Convention. 53 Because plaintiffs chose to state their
cause of action exclusively under the state wrongful death
statute, the removal to federal court was improper.
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on
July 9, 1982,354 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered issues concerning the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens as it applies to cases governed by the Warsaw
Convention. The issue arose when defendant Pan Am
sought to have actions filed in New Orleans dismissed on
the grounds that the suit should be tried in Uruguay,
plaintiff's home country. 55 As a preliminary issue, the
court held that a federal court sitting in a diversity action
is required to apply the federal law of forum non con-
veniens when addressing motions to dismiss a plaintiff's
case in favor of a foreign forum. 56 The court then con-
sidered and rejected plaintiff's claim that Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention granted them the absolute right
to choose the national forum in which their claims would
be litigated. The court determined that adherence to the
Warsaw Convention does not require the court to forfeit
the valuable procedural tool of forum non conveniens. 357
•..1 Id. at 740-41. The court noted, however, that "[t]here is no question that
when a state cause of action is in conflict with the provisions of the Convention
the conflicting provision of the state action will be preempted by the applicable
provisions of the Convention." Id. at 741.
Id. at 740.
821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 1150.
356 Id. at 1154-59.
"7 Id. at 1162. The court stated:
If we were to adopt the plaintiffs' construction of Article 28(1) and
ignore the language of 28(2), American courts could become the fo-
rums for litigation that has little or no relationship with this country.
The plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 28(1) cuts against the Con-
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Noting that the standard of appellate review for a denial
of a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens is
narrow, the court of appeals ultimately affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of the motion. The appellate court
held that the case was properly tried in the United States
because no other forum could entertain the plaintiff's ac-
tions against all defendants. 358 The presence of the
United States as a party defendant precluded dismissal of
the action for forum non conveniens.
In Martin v. Trinidad & Tobago (BIWA International) Air-
ways Corporation,59 a federal district court determined that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention. The court held that under the
Convention, the original point of departure of a roundtrip
flight is the destination of the journey.3 60 Accordingly,
even though the flight made an interim stop in Miami,
Florida, the destination for the journey was Trinidad and
Tobago. Thus, the plaintiff could not use Miami as one of
the venues in which a civil action could be brought under
Article 28(1).361 Consequently, the court granted defend-
ants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.362
B. Injuries and Events Within the Scope of the Warsaw
Convention
In Schneider v. Swiss Air Transport Company Ltd. ,s63 the
plaintiff, a five feet tall, 250 pound woman, occupied an
vention's underlying purpose of ensuring that a dispute arising out
of an air travel accident is litigated in a forum that has an actual
interest in the matter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1168.
21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,497 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
,o Id. at 17,498.
I, Id. Under Article 28(a) of the Warsaw Convention, "[ain action for damages
must be brought.., either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his princi-
pal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the con-
tract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination." Id.
I d. at 17,499.
363 686 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988).
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aisle seat on a trans-Atlantic flight from Israel to Boston.
The person seated to her left required frequent access to
the aisle, but the passengers in front of the plaintiff re-
fused to move their fully reclined seats to the upright po-
sition. 3 Since the plaintiff could not get up from her
seat, she attempted to move herself over the arm rest to
allow the person to her left access to the aisle. During this
maneuver, the plaintiff injured her left knee.365 The ques-
tion for the court was whether an "accident," as defined
by the Warsaw Convention, caused the plaintiff's injuries.
The Schneider court followed the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Air France v. Saks for the interpretation of the term
"accident. 3 66  In Saks, the Supreme Court held that
under the Warsaw Convention, an "accident" must result
from an event external to the passenger, such as the ab-
normal or unusual operation of the aircraft or equip-
ment.367 The Schneider court determined that material
factual issues remained as to whether the Swiss Air per-
sonnel's denial of assistance and the other passengers' re-
fusal to raise their seats were external to the injured
passenger. 68 Accordingly, the court denied the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment.
In Mazze v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd. ,369 plaintiff
was injured when she fainted in a lavatory during an over-
night flight from New York to Zurich. The trial court de-
,1 Id. at 15-16. The plaintiff claimed that she "asked the children seated in
front of her to return their seats to the upright position so that she could get up"
and also "sought assistance from the children's father." Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)).
367 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-06. The Supreme Court held:
[Lliability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a
passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger .... [W]hen the injury
indisputably results from the passenger's own internal reaction to
the usual, normal and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not
been caused by an accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion cannot apply.
Id.
Schneider, 686 F. Supp. at 17.
21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,320 (C.D.N.Y. 1988).
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termined that an "accident," for purposes of the Warsaw
Convention, occurs only if an unexpected or unusual
event that is external to the passenger causes the injury.3 7 0
Because plaintiff failed to establish that an occurrence on
the aircraft external to herself caused the fainting spell,
the court held that defendant Swiss Air was not liable.3 7 '
In Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Incorporated,372 a terrorist
attack on the airport injured the plaintiffs. The plaintffs
had checked their baggage, obtained their boarding
passes, and were awaiting arrival of the airplane which
was scheduled to fly them to New York. 73 The court held
that the terrorist attack was an "accident" within the
terms of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.374 The
court further determined, however, that the "accident"
did not take place during the course of "embarking or dis-
embarking" within the meaning of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Thus, liability could not be found.375
In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the four
criteria applied in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Incorpo-
rated.3 76 In Day, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals de-
termined that the plaintiffs, who were injured by terrorists
while standing in line at a boarding gate, were engaged in
the operation of embarking.377 The Sweis court deter-
mined that application of the Day criteria made clear that
the plaintiffs were not engaged in an operation of embark-
,70 Id. at 17,321 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-06).
471 Id.
"' 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. 11. 1988).
"7 Id.
.74 Id. at 503. The court noted that "while terrorist attacks might not seem at
first thought to be 'accidents,' they have universally been held to be so and TWA
does not contend otherwise." Id. (citation omitted).
.17.1 Id. at 503-04. The court held that the Convention did not contemplate car-
rier liability to extend to a situation where passengers were waiting to check in
their baggage and obtain boarding passes. Id.
376 Id. at 504 (citing Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976)).
.47 Day, 528 F.2d at 33-34. The Second Circuit held that "[w]hether one looks
to passengers' actions (which was a condition to embarkation), to the restriction
of their movements, to the imminence of boarding, or even to their position adja-
cent to the terminal gate, we are driven to the conclusion that plaintiffs were 'in
the course of embarking.' " Id. (citation omitted).
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ing.3 78 Accordingly, the court granted TWA's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of liability under the
Warsaw Convention.3 7 9
C. Cargo and Passenger Baggage Claims
1. Claims Under the Warsaw Convention
In Adesina v. Swissair,380 defendants appealed from ajudgment in small claims court awarding plaintiff $1,281
and costs for the loss of baggage during an international
flight. On appeal, the court held that the state lacked ju-
risdiction to entertain such a claim because the claim was
covered by Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention and
the United States did not fall within any of the four cate-
gories that would have given rise to jurisdiction 8.3 1
In Abbaa v. Pan American World Airways, Incorporated,382
defendant Pan Am brought a motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint for lost baggage, arguing that the district court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dis-
pute since jurisdiction was based on diversity and the
amount in controversy was less than $10,000.38 3 Defend-
ant based its claim on Warsaw Convention limitations on
reimbursement for lost luggage, allegedly a total of
.$3,175.50 for five lost bags.384
.71 Sweis, 681 F. Supp. at 505. The court determined that "on all four factors
identified in Day this case presents no really persuasive reason to apply Article 17
[of the Warsaw Convention] .... Id.
[The] Sweises' activities were several steps further removed from ac-
tual boarding [than the Day plaintiffs'] ... [the] Sweises were not in
TWA's control in the same sense as the [Day] plaintiffs ... departure
was not scheduled until two hours after the attack.. .[and] in Day the
plaintiffs were a few feet from the boarding gate and 250 meters
from the plane. Here [the] Sweises were about 620 feet ... from the
boarding gate, and their plane had not yet even landed in Rome.
Id.
• Id. at 506.
.4921 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,469 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
• 82 673 F. Supp. 991 (D. Minn. 1987).
."- Id. at 992; see 18 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) for requirements of diversity
jurisdiction.
I"' Abbaa, 673 F. Supp. at 992. The amount under the Warsaw Convention was
limited to $634.90 per bag, based on a presumptive weight of seventy pounds per
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Although the plaintiff argued that the limitation should
not apply since the airline did not note the weight of the
baggage, the court held that technical failure to comply
with the Warsaw Convention does not preclude the airline
from applying the limitations on liability, as long as the
claimants were not prejudiced by the omission.8 5 As
plaintiff was in the business of exporting merchandise and
had previously exported goods through international car-'
riers, the court held that plaintiff had not suffered preju-
dice from the omission. 6 Accordingly, the court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice due to
lack of jurisdiction. 7
In Royal Insurance Company v. Aerolineas Argentinas,3 as
plaintiff brought suit because of damage to cartons of
shoes delivered by a ground handling crew of Trans
World Airlines to the terminal where they were picked up
by a trucking company hired by the consignee. An inspec-
tion and claim form noted that fifteen of the sixty cartons
were "wet and intact subject to inspection." A legend be-
low noted that the form was not a claim or legal notifica-
tion of intent to file a claim.38 9
The court held that under Rule 23(B) of the tariff filed
by the defendant with the Civil Aeronautics Board, writ-
ten notice of damage to cargo must be made within seven
days of the date of receipt of the damaged goods.3 90 The
bag, with Pan Am's reimbursement rate at $9.07 per pound. Id. Plaintiff con-
tended that the total value of bags and goods to be reimbursed was $10,539, plus
the baggage charge of $450 and special damages, which brought total damages to
$15,778. Id. at 993.
.195 Id. at 993-94.
mw" Id. The court found that plaintiff could reasonably be held responsible for
understanding the conditions under which merchandise is shipped, and that the
plaintiff knew the weight of the luggage was in excess of the presumptive weight
but declined to declare excess weight and to arrange for excess insurance. Id.
7 Id. at 994.
20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,404 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
Id. at 18,405. Plaintiff did not complete and file a claims form, but the
freight forwarder did approximately one month after the shipment arrived. Id.
.x) Id. Rule 23(B) of the tariff which defendant filed provides:
No action shall be maintained in case of damage to or partial loss of
cargo unless a written notice, sufficiently describing the cargo con-
cerned, the approximate date of the damage, and the details of the
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court held that the notation on the inspection and claim
form was not sufficient to apprise the defendant that the
shoes inside were damaged and that a claim would be
made.3 9 1 Accordingly, the requisite notice of claim was
not timely presented, and defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted.
In Leather's Best, Incorporated v. Aerolineas Argentinas,39 2 the
plaintiff brought an action to recover $9,250.78 for de-
fendant's failure to deliver one of three pallets of semi-
finished leather shipped from Argentina to New York.
The consignee's trucker received the incomplete ship-
ment on or about September 13, 1983. The trucker's re-
ceipt identified one of the separately marked and
numbered pallets as "missing." Plaintiff consignee filed a
notice of claim with defendant on approximately October
3, 1983, twenty days after receipt of the shipment 93
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment for plaintiff, the appellate court held that under de-
fendant's tariff, the loss of one of three pallets of a
shipment constitutes a partial loss of the total shipment
and not the total loss of part of the shipment. 94 The
court found that the notation on the trucker's receipt and
the description of the shipment as consisting of three pal-
lets was evidence that the plaintiff consignee had notice
that one pallet was missing. The court noted that none of
the documents described the portion of the cargo deliv-
ered as a partial shipment, which would have led plaintiffs
to believe that delivery of the remaining pallet was immi-
nent.3 95 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's ac-
claim is presented to an office of Carrier within 7 days from the date
of receipt thereof...
Id.
.4., Id. Moreover, TWA's form required that the type and amount of any dam-
age be specified. Id.
.4"1 136 Misc. 2d 797, 520 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Term. 1987).
.w. Id. at 797, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
.11,4 Id. In cases of damage or loss to part of the cargo, as opposed to total loss,
the consignee is immediately aware of the carrier's breach, and the seven day time
period for filing notice of a claim should not be relaxed. Id.
--, Id. at 797, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Apparently, the court believed that if the
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tion was barred by its failure to file a written notice of
claim within seven days from the date of receipt of a por-
tion of the cargo, as required by defendant's tariff rules.
3 96
In Maro Leather Company v. Aerolineas Argentinas,397 the
same court addressed the identical issue. The court again
concluded that plaintiff's action for failure to deliver two
of nine pallets of unfinished leather goods shipped should
be dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to file a written
notice of claim within seven days of receipt of a portion of
the cargo. 98
In Royal Insurance v. Amerford Air Cargo,399 the issue
before the court was whether an indirect air carrier can
claim the limitations of liability provided under the War-
saw Convention. Defendant Amerford was an air freight
forwarder who lost three cartons of goods which were to
be shipped to Hong Kong for Royal Insurance's insured,
IBM. Total value of the lost goods was in excess of
$95,000. When a claim was submitted for the full value of
the goods, Amerford responded that its contractual liabil-
ity was limited to $20 per kilo or a total of $1,310 under
the terms of the Warsaw Convention. 40 0 After paying the
claim, IBM's insurer, Royal Insurance Company, brought
this action seeking to recover the value of the lost goods.
The court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Warsaw Convention
applied. The court noted that although the goods were
notation had indicated it was a partial shipment, the plaintiffs could have reason-
ably inferred that the rest of the shipment was coming later and the action would
not have been time barred. Id.
• t). Id. The court noted that the purpose behind such a short time limit for a
partial loss claim was to allow the carrier to make a prompt investigation and en-
deavor to locate the item and identify the person or practice responsible. Id.
.197 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,598 (N.Y. App. Term. 1987).
,- Id. at 18,599. The court reasoned in both cases that the loss of one of a
number of pallets constituted a partial loss of a total shipment which, according to
defendant's tariff, triggered the seven day limit for filing notice of a claim. If the
loss had been a total loss of part of the shipment, the plaintiff would have 120
days to file notice. Id.
-, 654 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
.) Id. at 680. IBM had not declared a higher value for the goods, nor paid for
additional insurance.
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being stored in a warehouse near JFK International, such
storage was incidental to defendant's business as an indi-
rect air carrier. The court also noted that Amerford is-
sued an airway bill to IBM when the lost goods were
picked up.40 ' Thus, the Warsaw Convention applied
rather than New York law concerning the liability of ware-
housemen for lost goods.40 2
Finally, the court also rejected Royal's argument that
willful misconduct had occurred under the terms of Arti-
cle 25 of the Convention.4 °3 The court noted that
Amerford's affidavits showed that reasonable security
measures were taken to safeguard the goods.40 4 Accord-
ingly, the court declined to apply the presumption of con-
version which applies to losses by warehousemen under
New York law. For those reasons, the court denied
Royal's motion for summary judgment and granted that
of Amerford.
2. Non-Warsaw Convention Baggage Claims
In Arkin v. New York Helicopter Corporation,40 5 plaintiffs
sought remand of an action after it was removed by one of
the defendants from the New York State Supreme Court.
The plaintiff asserted five common law causes of action
resulting from the loss of his luggage. The complaint
neither invoked federal law nor referred to the Warsaw
Convention.4 °6
4," Id. at 682. Federal regulations defined an air freight forwarder to be an indi-
rect air carrier. Id. In determining that Amerford was a carrier, the court looked
at a variety of other factors, such as the way the party made its profit, the way the
party's obligation was expressed in the agreement, and the history of dealings
between the parties. Id.
41"2 Id. at 684. The court emphasized that its holding was consistent with the
fundamental purpose of the Warsaw Convention in limiting the liability of air car-
riers to fix costs and establish a uniform body of rules to govern international
aviation. Id.
4".1 Id. Royal did nothing to suggest that any actions or omissions taken by
Amerford had resulted in the loss of the goods. Id.
41"4 Id. at 680.
4,,. 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,403 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
406 Id. Plaintiffs had traveled from New York to London, and their luggage
never made it out of New York City. Id.
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The court granted plaintiff's motion to remand the ac-
tion, noting that the Warsaw Convention created a sepa-
rate cause of action independent of state law and is not
the exclusive cause of action by which plaintiffs may seek,
relief.40 7 The court held that under the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule, removal to federal court will not be permitted
by the defendant unless the plaintiff's complaint estab-
lishes that the case arises under federal law.40 8 Since
plaintiff's complaint was based on state common law, the
removal was improper.
In Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, Incorporated,40 9 plaintiff
sued TWA for $78,000, an amount exceeding the baggage
liability limitation printed on her ticket. She alleged that
the liability limitation was voided because the ticket agent
misinformed her that she could not carry the remains of
her late husband on board but instead would have to
check the package with her luggage. 410 TWA moved for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the lia-
bility limitation was valid notwithstanding the airline's
negligence. The district court granted the motion and
awarded Ms. Coughlin $1,250, which was the maximum
liability under TWA's tariff.4 "
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The
court held that a carrier may only limit its liability for loss
or destruction of luggage if it allows passengers to protect
the luggage by either carrying it on board or purchasing
excess valuation insurance.41 2 TWA's ticket agent would
not allow Ms. Coughlin to carry her husband's cremated
remains on board, even though they were contained in a
package well within the size restriction for carry-on lug-
407 Id.
408 Id.
4- 847 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988).
410 Id. at 1433.
411 Id.
412 Id. TWA's published tariff expressly instructed passengers to carry their
valuables personally. Id. The court stated that the cremated remains were un-
questionably valuable, and nothing suggested that the carriage of human remains
was prohibited. Id.
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gage.4t3 The court held that while a carrier's negligence
does not invalidate the tariff limitation, 41 4 TWA breached
the tariff rule requiring that passengers personally carry
their valuables.41 5 The court concluded that the failure to
allow Ms. Coughlin to carry the remains of her late hus-
band on board was a material breach of the agreement
which warranted its rescission, and consequently TWA
could not enforce the tariff limitations.41 6
In Ofikuru v. Nigerian Airlines Ltd.,4 7 plaintiff initiated a
small claims action in April, 1986 to recover $1,500 for
the loss of a piece of luggage and its contents which were
on a Nigerian Airlines flight from Lagos, Nigeria to New
York in October, 1983. Defendant Nigerian Airlines re-
moved the action to federal court and filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) on the ground that plain-
tiff failed to commence the action within the appropriate
period of limitation under the Warsaw Convention. 41 8
The court initially determined that Nigerian Airlines
was an instrumentality of a foreign state as defined under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 ' 9 and thus re-
moval was proper. The court subsequently determined
that the case was barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions under Article 29 of the Convention. 420 Accordingly,
plaintiff's case was dismissed.
In Nahm v. SCAC Transport Incorporated,42 ' plaintiff
4,' Id. The issue then became the effect of the agent's instructions on the en-
forceability of the tariff limitation. Id.
4"4 Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987) (carrier's
negligence in killing and injuring passenger's racing dogs did not invalidate the
tariff limitation).
41. Coughlin, 847 F.2d at 1433.
-"I ld. at 1434. TWA could not attempt to enforce a provision of a contract it
had violated. Id.
4,7 670 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
418 Id. at 90.
4.. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982).
420 Oikuru, 670 F. Supp. at 91. The court stated that the terms of the Warsaw
Convention applied to all international transport of persons, baggage, or goods
performed by aircraft for hire, and that the carrier was liable under the Conven-
tion for damage for destruction or loss for any checked baggage. It therefore
applied the two-year statute of limitations under Article 29. Id.
421 167 Il. App. 3d 971, 522 N.E.2d 581 (1987).
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brought suit for recovery of goods lost during transit from
Paris to Chicago. International freight forwarder SCAC
admitted liability, but maintained that plaintiff had agreed
to limit liability to a $10,000 level of insurance coverage.
Defendant Flying Tigers argued that plaintiff had no
cause of action against it because the transport of her
goods did not constitute successive carriage under the
terms of the Warsaw Convention, and because she did not
contract directly with Flying Tigers.4 2 The trial court de-
nied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
granted defendant's motions, entering judgment against
SCAC in the amount of $10,000.423
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling
that plaintiff was limited to the $10,000 recovery based on
her election to insure the goods for that amount. The
court noted that in order to limit a carrier's liability to a
specific amount, the shipper must make an absolute, de-
liberate and well-informed choice to do so. In this case,
the court held that the election by this shipper did not
consitute such a deliberate and well-informed choice be-
cause the shipper was not engaged in the import-export
business and was not informed that her choice would be
construed to limit liability.424 The court also rejected
SCAC's argument that recovery was limited to $10,000
under the "released value doctrine," which applies only
where the carrier and shipper agree upon the value of the
goods 425
The court affirmed the Flying Tigers' motion for sum-
mary judgment based on its interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention provisions regarding successive carriage.
The court noted that successive carriage occurs where all
of the parties intended and understood that the perform-
ance of the shipment by several carriers would constitute
42 ld. at 971, 522 N.E.2d at 583.
42 Id.
424 Id. at 971, 522 N.E.2d at 584.
42- Id. The court found the released value doctrine inapplicable here.
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a single operation.426 The court held that Flying Tigers
did not understand or intend its transport of a consoli-
dated shipment by SCAC to be a single operation for the
benefit of plaintiff. Thus, under these circumstances,
shipment of plaintiff's goods by Flying Tigers was not a
transport of successive carriers, and the trial court prop-
erly granted summary judgment.
D. Statute of Limitations
In Blaw-Knox Construction Equipment Company v. Royal
Jordanian Airline,42 7 plaintiff's air cargo was lost during
shipment from Chicago to Saudi Arabia. The defendant
shipper, BDG International (BDG), moved to dismiss the
amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) due to
plaintiff's failure to file within the period of limitations. 428
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that, based upon its informa-
tion and belief, the cargo was scheduled to arrive at its
destination four to seven days after its scheduled depar-
ture on March 23, 1985. BDG sought dismissal, asserting
that plaintiff's cause of action accrued on the date of ship-
ment. Consequently plaintiff's filing of the complaint on
March 24, 1987 was untimely under Article 29(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, which requires that suits be brought
within two years.42 9
The court denied BDG's motion to dismiss, holding
that the cause of action did not accrue when the goods
were supposed to be shipped. Rather, it accrued when
the goods did not arrive in Saudi Arabia at the expected
time, some four to seven days later. Accordingly, even
though the complaint did not specify a particular arrival
date, the estimated four to seven days were consistent
with the contract agreed upon between the parties.430
42,1 Id. Under a successive carriage arrangement, a shipper whose goods are lost
has a right of action against both the first carrier and the carrier who performed
the transport during which the loss occurred. Id.
42, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,450 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
428 Id.
4211 Id. at 17,450-51.
4.1,, Id. at 17,451. The court stated that "the breach occurred when the goods
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Moreover, the court noted that this interpretation was
consistent with the Warsaw Convention provisions con-
cerning limitations incorporated by reference into the
contract. Thus, the period from March 27 to March 30,
which occurred four to seven days after shipment, was
equated to the date upon which the aircraft ought to have
arrived pursuant to Article 29(1) of the Warsaw
Convention.4 '
In Data General v. Air Express International Company,43 2
plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to the Warsaw Con-
vention against Air Express International for alleged dam-
age to a cargo of computer parts. Thereafter, Air Express
filed a third party action against Iberia Lineas Aereas de
Espana (Iberia), claiming that it was responsible for any
alleged damage.43 Iberia filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the action against it was not timely filed
under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, and the
trial court agreed.
Article 29(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides that
actions for cargo damage must be brought within two
years of the date of the cargo's arrival or the date upon
which it should have arrived.4 34 The court determined
that it was the intent of the drafters to make this two-year
limitation an absolute bar which applied to all causes of
action. Accordingly, the court held that filing an action
within the two year time period was a prerequisite to
maintaining an action under the Warsaw Convention, in-
did not arrive in Saudi Arabia within a reasonable time, that is, between four and
seven days from the time that transport began." Id.
411 Id.
4-42 676 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
I41 d. at 539. Air Express claimed that it delivered the computer parts in good
condition to Iberia in New York on October 23, 1984. It further alleged that the
parts were damaged while under Iberia's control during shipment to Madrid,
Spain on October 26, 1984. Air Express filed its third party complaint against
Iberia on May 7, 1987, more than two years after the date of shipment. Id.
4.4 Id. Article 29 provides in part that "[tihe right to damages shall be extin-
guished if an action is not brought within two years, reckoned from the date of
arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have
arrived, or from the date on which the transportation stopped." Id. (citing 49
U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)).
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cluding an action for indemnification or contribution
against a third party.435 Thus, Iberia's motion to dismiss
was granted.
E. Damages
In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland on December
12, 1985 436 was one of many actions stemming from an
air crash in Newfoundland which claimed the lives of
American servicemen returning from the Middle East to
Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Defendant brought a motion
for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive
damages, claiming that such damages were unavailable
under the Warsaw Convention, and the court agreed. 3 7
Both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the Warsaw
Convention controlled this case. Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention establishes the liability of international air
carriers for harm to passengers. The Convention pro-
vides that a carrier is liable only for damage sustained or
bodily injury suffered by a passenger when the accident
causing the injury takes place on board the aircraft or dur-
ing boarding or deboarding of the airplane. 438 The court
interpreted the text of Article 17 as entirely compensatory
in tone, and noted that punitive damages are not damages
sustained but are private fines levied to punish a defend-
ant for his conduct and to deter others from engaging in
similar conduct in the future.439 Accordingly, punitive
damages are not measured solely by the bodily injury suf-
fered by a plaintiff. Instead, they are determined "accord-
ing to other factors such as the outrageousness of the
4. Id. at 540-41. The court noted that the drafters had considered and rejected
a provision which would have incorporated the tolling provisions of the forum
court. Id. at 540.
43(i 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
4.7 Id. at 930.
I , d. at 931 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)). Article 17 provides that -[t]he
carrier should be liable for damage sustained in the event of death or wounding of
a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Id.
4.111 Id.
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injurious act, the defendant's culpability, the defendant's
motive and intent, and the nature and extent of the harm
to the plaintiff. 440
In holding that punitive damages cannot be recovered
under the Warsaw Convention, the court rejected plain-
tiff's contention that punitive damages may be levied for
wrongful acts that rise to the level of willful miscon-
duct.44' Article 25 provides that a carrier may not avail
itself of the liability limitation provisions of the Conven-
tion if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or
by conduct which is considered to be equivalent to willful
misconduct.44 2 The court determined that this limitation,
as well as that of Article 3(2), 443 is most reasonably inter-
preted as exceptions to the limitations on the recovery of
compensatory damages, not authority for the recovery of
punitive damages.444 Finally, the court noted that other
courts had held that the Warsaw Convention does not
permit a claim for punitive damages.44 5 Consequently,
the court granted defendant's partial motion for summary
judgment.
In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983 446 arose
from the downing of a KAL Airliner by a Soviet military
aircraft. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment
on the issue of the per passenger damage limitation of the
44.. Id. at 931-32.
441 Id. at 932.
442 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)). Article 25 provides that:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct.ld.
44. Id. Article 3(2) provides that "if the carrier accepts a passenger without a
passenger ticket having been delivered, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of
those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability." Id. (citing
49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)).
444 Id.
44. Id. at 933.
44.. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Korean Airlines 11], cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988) (certiorari granted to decide whether the law of the trans-
feror forum has stare decisis effect).
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Warsaw Convention, seeking a declaration that KAL was
liable for compensatory damages without limitations and
regardless of fault.447 The motion claimed that the type
size used in the liability limitation notice printed on KAL
passenger tickets was inadequate. The notice was printed
in 8-point type while the Montreal Agreement specified
10-point type. 448 The district court denied plaintiffs' mo-
tion, holding that KAL could avail itself of the $75,000
per passenger limitation. In so ruling, the district court
considered and rejected contrary Second Circuit prece-
dent.4 49 An interlocutory appeal from the district court's
ruling was granted.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the decision
of the district court, holding that the Warsaw Conven-
tion/Montreal Agreement's $75,000 per passenger dam-
age limitation applied to all actions, including those
transferred from district courts bound by the Second Cir-
cuit's contrary ruling.450 In so holding, the court rejected
the rule that the law applicable in the transferor forum
attends the transfer and applies to transferred federal
claims. 451 The court of appeals noted that, in theory, fed-
eral courts were members of a single system and apply a
single of body of law.45 2 Thus,,the plaintiff cannot expect
41 Id. at 1172. The per passenger damage limits were set at $75,000 by the
Montreal Agreement. Id.
44A Id.
441, Id. The contrary decision cited was In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Po-
land on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.) (holding that airline's use of 8.5-
point type constituted a violation of the notice provision of the Montreal Agree-
ment, thereby depriving the airline of the Agreement's defenses and liability limi-
tations), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983). For the opinion of the district court, see
In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C.
1985) [hereinafter Korean Airlines 1].
4-11 Korean Airlines H, 829 F.2d at 1173.
4" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (where an action is properly
brought in the district court and defendants seek venue transfer, the change of
venue is not accompanied by a change in governing state laws). In the Korean
Airlines case, several actions were filed against KAL in several district courts and
were subsequently consolidated and transferred to the District Court of Columbia
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Korean Airlines H, 829 F.2d at 1173.
4.2 Id. at 1175. (citing H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963)). Thus, the difference between Korean Air-
lines and Van Dusen is that Korean Airlines involved a transferred federal claim and
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a favorable interpretation of that law based solely on his
ability to choose the original forum.4 53
The court of appeals adopted the memorandum and or-
der of the district court, rejecting plaintiff's argument that
KAL's failure to print the Montreal advice concerning
damage limitations in at least 10-point type constituted
nondelivery of a ticket under Article 3(2) and that there-
fore KAL forfeited the limitation provisions of the War-
saw Convention.454 In reaching this conclusion, the court
rejected plaintiff's argument that because KAL was a cor-
porate citizen of a nonparty to the Warsaw Convention, it
had no standing to avail itself of the Warsaw Convention
defenses.4 55 The district court held that the Montreal
Agreement, while it must be read in connection with the
Warsaw Convention, does not provide for loss of damage
limitation for failure to provide warning in 10-point type
size.45 6 Moreover, while the domestic carriers agreed to
the requirement in the Montreal Agreement, foreign air
carriers are not contracting parties to that treaty.457 Ac-
not a state law claim. Id. at 1174. Normally, a plaintiff in a diversity action is
allowed to pick the forum and, thus, effectively pick the applicable law regardless
of where the case is ultimately decided. Id. at 1175. When federal claims are
involved, however, the courts are attempting to apply a single body of federal law.
Thus, the reasons for allowing the transferor forum's law to govern the disposi-
tion of the case are no longer compelling. Id.
45 Id.
4- Id. at 1172-73.
4 Id. at 1173. The court of appeals, while not expressly rejecting this argu-
ment, implicitly rejected it by adopting the district court's opinion. The district
court had concluded that although Korea had not expressly adopted the Warsaw
Convention, it was in fact a party because of its adoption of the Hague Protocol.
Korean Airlines I, 664 F. Supp. at 1469; see also infra notes 459-460 and accompany-
ing text.
4.- Korean Airlines I, 664 F. Supp. at 1476. The district court noted that:
While it is indeed correct that the Montreal Agreement must be read
in connection with the Warsaw Convention, the resulting War-
saw/Montreal system does to include delimiting liability for failure
to provide the statement in 10-point type size. In short, the Mon-
treal Agreement may not be read wholesale into the Warsaw
Convention.
Id.
457 Id. Since foreign air carriers are not contracting parties, the district and ap-
pellate courts rejected plaintiff's argument that KAL was on notice that it would
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cordingly, they cannot be required to forfeit their damage
limitations based on a failure to comply.
Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that
there is no treaty relationship between the United States
and Korea.458 In reading its decision, the court noted that
while the Republic of Korea adheres to the Hague Proto-
col rather than the Warsaw Convention, the Protocol con-
sists of nothing more than a list of amendments to the
original treaty. The court held that the Hague Protocol
was intended to be and, in fact, is merely the Warsaw
Convention with certain alterations." 9 The court noted
that it is the goal of the Warsaw Convention to establish
uniformity in international civil aviation law and proce-
dure, and a requirement of reciprocity would not further
that goal.46 °
F. Miscellaneous
In Sethi v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,46 1 plaintiff brought
suit after KLM officials prevented him from boarding a
KLM airliner for the second part of his trip from Georgia
to New Delhi because his visa had expired. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based
on a tariff rule that provided for refusal of carriage to any
passenger who could not present the required docu-
ments.46 2 The court denied attorneys' fees to the airline,
be stripped of limitations on liability for failure to provide adequate notice
thereof. Id.
. Id. at 1489.
4' Id.
4,'0 Id. The court stated that "it would hardly encourage the goal of the Warsaw
Convention to establish uniform rules, law, and procedure for claims arising out
of international aviation and then to complicate the application of those rules by
requiring reciprocity in ratification." Id.
4, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,401 (Ga. 1988).
462 Id. at 17,402. Passenger Tariff Rule No. PR-3, C.A.B. No. 55, Rule 22
provided in part that:
The passenger must present all exit, entry and other documents re-
quired by laws, regulations, orders, demands or requirements of the
countries concerned. Carrier will refuse carriage to any passenger
who has not complied with applicable laws, regulations, orders, de-
mands or requirements or whose documents are not complete. Car-
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however, due to the fact that it had permitted the passen-
ger to complete the Georgia-to-Amsterdam part of his
trip before refusing to allow him to complete the remain-
der of his journey to New Delhi.4 63
In Lee v. China Airlines Ltd.,46 plaintiffs were injured
when the aircraft in which they were traveling made an
unexpected and uncontrolled descent off the coast of Cal-
ifornia.465 Defendant moved to dismiss the action due to
lack of jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention. The
Lees unsuccessfully argued that Article 28 of the Conven-
tion did not require dismissal and that, even if it did, the
court should ignore the Convention's mandate because
the Convention is unconstitutional.4 66 The court con-
cluded that the Warsaw Convention required dismissal
because the United States was not one of the proper ve-
nues under the Convention. It was not the destination,
carrier's principal place of business, the place where the
ticket was purchased, or the carrier's domicile.46 7
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims that the War-
saw Convention is unconstitutional as violative of sub-
stantive due process, procedural due process, and equal
protection.468 In rejecting plaintiff's substantive due pro-
cess claims, the court noted that although the right to
travel interstate is fundamental, the right to international
rier is not liable to the passenger for loss of expense due to the
passenger's failure to comply with this provision.
Id.
4,:. Id.
4- 669 F. Supp. 979 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
4 . I d. at 980. The plane dropped approximately 31,000 feet. Id.
4W Id. The Lees argued that the Convention did not apply because Hong Kong,
their departure point, was not a contracting party. The court held that the United
Kingdom's status as a contracting party extended to Hong Kong. Id.
4,7 Id. at 980-81. The Lees and China Airlines agreed that the airline's principal
place of business and its domicile was Taiwan, and that the ticket was purchased in
Hong Kong. Id. at 981. They disagreed as to the flight's destination. The Lees'
tickets enabled them to travel from Hong Kong to Taipei, on to San Francisco and
then back to Hong Kong. Id. The court held that each ticket has only one desti-
nation, and "the Lees' destination was Hong Kong because that was the ultimate
stopping place of their travels .... Id.
4,I Id. at 982-85.
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travel is not.4"9 Accordingly, the court had only to evalu-
ate the Convention under the rational basis test. The
court held that its goal of establishing uniformity in the
law of international aviation clearly passed muster.4 7 °
The plaintiffs also argued that the Warsaw Convention
violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment because it makes distinctions among passengers on
the same plane depending on their ticket and the destina-
tion specified thereon. Thus, some passengers would be
able to bring an action in the United States for injuries
suffered while other passengers would be precluded from
bringing such an action.47' The court noted that treating
similarly situated people differently is not always uncon-
stitutional, and held that the distinctions must merely pass
the rational basis test.472 The court then noted that it had
already determined that the Convention passed the ra-
tional basis test.
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the
jurisdictional limit violated due process by preventing
American residents injured in or near the United States
from bringing a tort action in the United States.473 Even
assuming that the Lees had a property interest in their
cause of action against the airline, the court determined
that dismissal was appropriate.4 74 The court held that the
4611 Id. at 982-83 (quoting Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978)).
-, Id. at 983. The court held that the Convention had a de minimis impact on
international travel because it neither prevented anyone from traveling abroad
nor prevented an international traveler from obtaining additional insurance to
compensate for the Convention's liability limitations. Id. Thus, any limitations on
international travel are incidental and not wholly irrational. Id.
471 Id.
47. Id. The Convention did not violate the equal protection clause because it
did not impair any fundamental rights and did not create suspect classifications.
Id. The classifications were rational because they ensured "that the Convention
will only apply to journeys with a clear nexus to High Contracting Parties, and ...
that passengers will have had some notice and an opportunity to choose whether
they are willing to subject themselves to the dictates of the Convention." Id. at
984.
473 Id.
174 Id. The court cited Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which estab-
lished three factors to consider in determining how much process is due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
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Lees failed to demonstrate that they would be unable to
receive an adequate hearing of their claims in either Tai-
wan or Hong Kong, the two forums appropriate under
Article 28. Accordingly, the court granted China Air-
lines' motion to dismiss.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
A. Statute of Repose
In Harrison v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Incorporated,476 the
plaintiff filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of New York for damages due to
personal injuries allegedly suffered on a flight from Cali-
fornia to Washington when she tripped over a luggage
strap protruding into the aisle from underneath a seat.
The court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was
time-barred under the California statute of limitations for
personal injury.477
The court's subject matter jurisdiction was founded
upon diversity of citizenship. The New York "borrowing
statute" came into play because the plaintiff did not reside
in New York. It provided that when the cause of action
accrues outside of the state, the limitations period would
be the lesser of the New York or California statute of limi-
tations period.478 The court determined that the accident
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
475 Lee, 669 F. Supp. at 984. The court noted that the Lees had produced al-
most no evidence about the adequacy of proceedings in Hong Kong or Taiwan.
Id. Additionally, the court noted that since both locations are parties to the Con-
vention, a lot of the usual mystery regarding the law of the forum disappears since
the Convention will play a dominant role in either country. Id.
47, 677 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
477 Id. at 132. The California statute of limitations was one year, while the New
York limitations period was three years. Id.
479 Id. The court noted that the statute provides:
1989]
84 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
occurred while the flight was in California air space, and
that since the flight was from California to Washington,
no other state had a more compelling interest in resolving
the suit than California. 479 Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that California's one year statute of limitations ap-
plied, and the action was barred.
B. Tolling
In First Interstate Bank v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,480
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action nearly six years
after the fatal crash, alleging negligent design and con-
struction, failure to warn, and intentional concealment of
the airplane's defective design and construction. Plaintiffs
also asserted that because of the alleged concealment, the
defective nature of the airplane was not known to them
until publication of an article in the Wall Street Journal on
December 15, 1983.481 Piper moved to dismiss, contend-
ing that plaintiffs' cause of action accrued at the time of
the crash and was therefore barred by the applicable stat-
utes of limitation. Plaintiffs countered that the fraudulent
concealment tolled the statute of limitations.
The court noted that Colorado had consistently recog-
nized fraudulent concealment as a basis for tolling stat-
utes of limitation.482 The court rejected defendant's
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state
cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the
laws of either the state or the place without the state where the ac-
tion accrued, except that where the cause of action accrued in favor
of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of the state
shall apply.
Id. (citing N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 202 (McKinney 1972)). The court noted that
the purpose of the "borrowing statute" was to prevent forum shopping based on
favorable limitations periods in New York. Id.
471, Id. at 133-34. Thus, the court concluded that, under either the traditional lex
loci delicti doctrine or New York's "grouping of contacts" approach, the most suita-
ble forum was California and consequently, California law should apply. Id.
4" 744 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1987).
4K, Id. at 1198. The plaintiffs alleged that Piper destroyed engineering data and
other relevant information. Id. at 1198 n.2; see also Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
482 First Interstate Bank, 744 P.2d at 1200. The court noted that:
The elements of fraudulent concealment which a plaintiff must
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argument that in products liability cases, knowledge of
death is tantamount to knowledge of the existence of the
basis of a potential claim. The court noted that negligent
conduct cannot be presumed from the happening of an
accident, and that some time is required for interested
persons to discover sufficient information about the cir-
cumstances of the accident to permit accurate assessment
of the actual cause of injury or death.48 3 Additionally, the
facts and circumstances surrounding different accidents
vary widely. Due to these factors, the question of whether
a plaintiff applied reasonable diligence in discovering that
a death was caused by a negligent act must generally be
determined as a question of fact. 484  Accordingly, the
court held that the limitations period in Colorado's




National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Zuver4 5 involved
an action for declaratory relief in which the court was
asked to determine insurance coverage under an aviation
policy. The insured was a pilot with a visual flight rating
who crashed under weather conditions normally requiring
an instrument flight rating.4 8 6 The liability carrier ten-
prove in order to toll a statute of limitation are: (1) the concealment
of a material existing fact that in equity and good conscience should
be disclosed; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against whom
the claim is asserted that such a fact is being concealed; (3) igno-
rance of that fact on the part of the one from whom the fact is con-
cealed; (4) the intention that the concealment be acted upon; and (5)
action on the concealment resulting in damages.
Id. (citing Kopeikin v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 679 P.2d 599 (Colo.
1984)).
481 Id. at 1201 (citing Richardson v. Pioneer Constr. Co., 164 Colo. 270, 434
P.2d 403 (1967)).
484 Id. The court determined that "[tihe limitations period does not begin to
run until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the existence of facts forming the basis of a claim for relief." Id.
,1 110 Wash. 2d 207, 750 P.2d 1247 (1988).
48 Id. at 207, 750 P.2d at 1247.
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dered a defense to claims against his estate under a reser-
vation of rights and subsequently filed an action for
declaratory judgment.48 7
At issue was the interpretation of two provisions of the
policy. The first provision was an exclusionary clause
which provided that the policy did not apply if the pilot
was not properly certified for the operation involved.48 8
The second provision was a pilot warranty which provided
that insurance would be effective only when the aircraft
was operated by a pilot who possessed qualifications for
the flight involved. 48 9 The petitioners argued that the ex-
clusionary clause created an ambiguity when read with the
pilot warranty because the term "for the operation in-
volved" was not defined. The insurer contended that the
phrase "for the operation involved" was not ambiguous
and required a different meaning than "for the flight in-
volved" because "operation" and "flight" of an aircraft
are not the same.49 °
The court held that the construction of the two phrases
was ambiguous and, therefore, must be given the con-
struction most favorable to the insured.49 ' Construed
most favorably to the insured, "operation involved" refers
487 Id. at 207, 750 P.2d at 1248. The trial court found for the insurance com-
pany, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id.
4" Id. This clause provided:
This policy does not apply ... [tlo any insured while the aircraft is in
flight (a) if piloted by other than the pilot or pilots designated in the
Declarations; (b) if piloted by a pilot not properly certified, qualified,
and rated under the current applicable Federal Air Regulations for
the operation involved, whether or not said pilot is designated in the
Declarations.
Id.
484. Id. This warranty clause stated that "[i]nsurance will be effective only when
the operation of the insured aircraft... is by a pilot.., who possess [sic] a current
and valid pilot certificate of the kind specified with appropriate ratings .... as re-
quired by the Federal Aviation Administration for the flight involved." Id.
4", Id. Presumably, under National's scheme, "operation" referred to the quali-
fications of the pilot in terms of his ability to fly in particular circumstances in
compliance with federal regulations, while "flight" referred to the flight itself. Id.
at 207, 750 P.2d at 1249.
49.. Id. at 207, 750 P.2d at 1248-49. The court noted that it was bound to strictly
construe exclusionary clauses against the insurer. Id. at 207, 750 P.2d at 1248.
The court stated that when "any clause in the policy is ambiguous, a meaning and
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to the flight as a whole, and since the insured took off
under VFR conditions for which he was qualified, the in-
surance contract applied to the entire flight. The court
held that such an interpretation permits insureds to know
with certainty whether their insurance covers the opera-
tion of the aircraft for the flight involved without fear that
unexpected weather conditions may void their policy.492
Accordingly, the court determined that the weather con-
ditions at the time and place of departure control.
In Fidelity and Casualty Company v. Burts Brothers Incorpo-
rated,493 the insurer brought a declaratory relief action
seeking a determination of its duty to defend and indem-
nify Burts Brothers and the estate of Edwin M. Burts in a
wrongful death case arising out of a helicopter crash. The
insurance policy at issue contained an exclusionary clause
which voided coverage if the pilot in command did not
meet certain qualifications as to ratings and flight time.494
The pilot during the accident, Edwin M. Burts, clearly did
not meet these requirements. In ruling on cross-motions
for summary judgment, however, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the insureds, holding that
the insurance policy viewed as a whole was ambiguous
and should be construed to provide coverage. 495 The in-
construction most favorable to the insured must be applied, even though the insurer
may have intended another meaning." Id. at 270, 750 P.2d at 1249.
4... Id. at 270, 750 P.2d at 1249-50.
4, 744 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
41M Id. at 221. The clause read as follows:
PILOTS. The policy shall not apply while the aircraft is in flight unless
the pilot in command holds a currently effective pilot certificate and
rating(s) issued by the Federal Aviation Administration designating
him a commercial (or better) pilot with rotorcraft category and fur-
ther provided he has a written log indicating he has flown a mini-
mum of 2000 total hours as pilot in command in helicopter
including at least 1000 hours in turbine powered helicopter of which
not less than 200 hours have been in Bell 206 model aircraft ....
ld.
495 Id. at 222. The supposed ambiguity arose out of a special endorsement in
the policy for a Jerry McBeth. Id. at 221-22. The endorsement extended the pol-
icy's coverage to McBeth, even though he only had 100 hours of experience in
Bell 206 aircraft. Id. Apparently, the trial court felt this left the requirements for
others insured under the policy in question.
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surer appealed.
The Texas Court of Appeals determined that the con-
troversial clause was not ambiguous and expressly stated
that the policy provided no coverage unless the pilot met
the qualifications and ratings. 496 A clause reducing the
qualifications for one pilot under a separate endorsement
did not affect the validity of the entire clause. In rejecting
plaintiff's arguments that the clause did not apply to the
named insureds, the court noted that such an interpreta-
tion would provide coverage for the named insureds
whether they were qualified pilots or not, an interpreta-
tion unreasonable in light of the policy's language.497
The court declined to grant summary judgment to the
insurer, however, noting that it had failed to show a causal
connection between the breach of the pilot's clause and
the resulting crash.498 While the wrongful death action
which triggered the coverage dispute determined that in-
flight negligence was a proximate cause of the crash, the
court concluded that the determination merely raised a
factual issue as to whether such negligence was the result
of Burts' failure to obtain proper licensing or possess the
required flight hours.4 99 Moreover, the court held that
factual issues existed concerning the possibility of fraud in
the inception of the policy and in the representations of
the insurance agents at the time the policy was issued.
These remaining issues precluded summary disposi-
tion. 50 0 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.
Howell v. United States Fire Insurance Company 50 involved
the crash shortly after takeoff of a Cessna 208 Caravan
496 Id. at 222.
417 Id.
4... Id. at 222-23.
41M Id.
.- Id. at 223-24. The insurer was in possession of affidavits sworn by the agents
who issued the policy in question which stated that the decedent represented to
the agents that he personally would never fly the craft. Id. at 224.
.,o, 185 Ga. App. 154, 363 S.E.2d 560 (1987), cert. denied, 258 Ga. 338, 370
S.E.2d 338 (1988).
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Aircraft carrying sixteen parachutists. Plaintiff insurer
had issued a policy which provided coverage for damage
to the aircraft and liability resulting from its operation. 50 2
It initiated this declaratory relief action for the determina-
tion of its duties under the policy. It sought a declaratory
judgment that the crash was not covered under the policy
and that it had no duty to defend any civil action arising
from the crash.50 3 The insurer moved for partial summary
judgment on the ground that the pilot did not meet the
terms and conditions set forth in the "open pilot provi-
sion" of the policy. 5 °1
The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
grant of summary judgment. The court rejected appel-
lant's arguments that provisions of federal aviation law re-
quired the insurer to provide coverage.50 5 In addition,
the court rejected arguments that the insurer was bound
by a clause appearing in a binder form issued to the in-
sured prior to the actual policy, noting that a binder is a
temporary contract which is replaced by the formal pol-
icy. 506 Finally, the court held that the qualification provi-
sions were clear and unambiguous and rejected
appellant's arguments that a manufacturer's flight school
-- Id. at 154, 363 S.E.2d at 561.
, Id.
Id. This provision read, in part, as follows:
Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid and effective pilot
and medical certificates with ratings as required by the Federal Avia-
tion Administration for the flight involved will operate the aircraft
... pilots who must have a commercial or airline transport certificate
with an instrument rating and a minimum of 2000 logged pilot hours
of which 250 hours have been in turbine aircraft and are graduates
of the ground and flight training school conducted by the manufac-
turer or an entity under contract to it for the [Cessna 208 Caravan]
aircraft ...
Id. at 154, 363 S.E.2d at 561-62.
Id. at 154, 363 S.E.2d at 562 (the "issue of the extent to which coverage
would be afforded must be determined on the basis of the policy as interpreted by
applicable Georgia law").
,- Id. The insureds attempted to argue that, since the words "binder No." had
been stricken and replaced with "assigned policy No. ," the binder had become a
policy which could not be changed without the insured's consent. Id. The court
held, however, that this change was insufficient to alter the temporary nature of
the binder. Id.
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requirement could not be complied with due to lack of an
appropriate training program because the manufacturer
itself provided such training.50 7 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of the insurer.
In United States Fire Insurance Company v. Producciones
Padosa Incorporated,"0 8 the court again interpreted an exclu-
sionary clause. In 1982, United States Fire Insurance
Company (USF) issued an insurance policy to defendant
covering the latter's Beech A100 aircraft. The policy con-
tained several exclusions, one of which made the coverage
inapplicable to any loss which occurred while the aircraft
was piloted by someone not named in the agreement. 50 9
The declarations contained a clause which unambiguously
articulated certificate, rating and experience minimums
for pilots other than the two named pilots covered under
the policy. 510 The pilot in command at the time of the
crash clearly did not have the requisite qualifications or
experience 5l' and, although he was named as an insured
for a period of time in a policy binder, he was not named
as an insured under the policy in effect at the time of the
crash.5t 2 Accordingly, the court held that the certification
.... Id. at 154, 363 S.E.2d at 563.
835 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1987).
' Id. at 951. The exclusion provided that the insurance agreement did not
apply "to any occurrence or to any loss or damage occurring while the aircraft is
operated in flight by other than the pilot or pilots set forth [in]... the Declara-
tions[.]" Id.
'' Id. The "pilot clause" specifically required that the pilot have (1) a current
commercial or airline transport certificate, (2) multi-engine and instrument rating,
and (3) a minimum of 3000 logged pilot hours of which at least 1000 hours must
have been as a pilot in command of a multi-engine aircraft, with 500 of those
hours in a turbine aircraft and at least 50 hours in the same make or model aircraft
as the insured craft, namely the 1972 Beech A100. Id.
.- Id. at 952. Following the crash, USF discovered that the pilot had less than
400 hours of turbine aircraft flying time and that little of that time had been as a
pilot in command. Id. Thus, the pilot failed to meet the minimum requirements
for coverage under the policy. Id. at 951,
.'1 Id. at 955-56. USF sent a telex to Professional Underwriter's Insurance
Company that the pilot had been accepted for coverage. The court held that even
if Professional Underwriter's Insurance could be viewed as an agent of USF, thus
binding the company to its acceptance of the pilot, this oral binder was negated
under the Puerto Rican Insurance Code, which provided that an oral binder was
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and experience minimums applied to him. 51 3
The court determined that the exclusionary language
was a condition precedent to coverage, and a breach of
these conditions automatically voided USF's obligations
to the insured under the policy. 5t4 The court further held
that the insured's misstatements regarding the accident
pilot's qualifications, even though made in good faith,
amounted to a breach of the contract.51 5 Finally, the court
rejected the insured's claim that the policy should be en-
forced because of its good faith belief that the conditions
were met. As the court noted, the insured was in a better
position than the insurer to ascertain the truth about the
pilot's credentials but neglected to do so. 5 16 Accordingly,
the court ruled that USF was entitled to summary disposi-
tion as a matter of law and affirmed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment.
In Insurance Company v. Mather, t7 plaintiff had issued an
aviation insurance policy which contained certain condi-
tions and exclusions. One of the conditions provided that
coverage would be disallowed if a pilot without the proper
qualifications operated the aircraft.5 1 8 The insurer sought
a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
the estate of the named insured in subsequent wrongful
only effective until a written policy was issued. Id. at 956. Almost a month before
the crash and after the oral binder, USF issued a written endorsement of its policy
which reaffirmed the qualification requirements and failed to identify the pilot as
one of those covered by the policy. Id.
., Id. at 958.
.1,4 Id. at 955. The court observed that although the phrase "condition prece-
dent" did not actually appear in the policy, the format, structure, and language of
the exclusionary clause combined to unmistakably constitute the functional
equivalent of a direct statement that the stipulations in the pilot clause must be
met before recovery under the policy would be possible. Id.
SId.
" ld. at 957-58. The court noted that an "insured's good faith belief that it has
complied with a policy exclusion like that here in issue, without more, does not
serve to override the exclusionary language and to work a retention of coverage
contrary to the policy terms and conditions." Id.
.7 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,182 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1985).
m" Id. at 17,183. In September, 1982, the insured aircraft crashed, killing the
pilot named in the insurance policy and three passengers. Id.
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death actions filed by passengers.51 9
The court held that even if the decedent pilot had ob-
tained his medical certification by fraud, that did not
render him improperly certificated under the terms of the
policy, and consequently coverage applied.5 20 In its rul-
ing, the court noted that under the Federal Aviation Act,
only the FAA could revoke the decedent's medical certifi-
cate, and only the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court could review that revocation. 52 ' Having determined
that the court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the valid-
ity of the certificate, the court held that the proffered evi-
dence concerning the decedent's fraudulent certificate
was irrelevant. 522 Finally, the court noted that the insur-
ance company could easily have included language void-
ing coverage in the event the certificate had been
obtained fraudulently. Since the decedent had a current
medical certificate in his possession when the flight was
commenced, he was in strict compliance with the terms of
the policy.52 3
B. Renter Pilots
In Transport Indemnity Company v. Sky-Kraft, Incorpo-
rated,512 4 the insurer sought a determination that an aircraft
hull and liability policy and an airport/fixed base opera-
tor's policy did not provide coverage for claims arising
out of the fatal crash of one of Sky-Kraft's aircraft. At is-
sue was whether the VFR-qualified renter pilot's takeoff in
5111 Id. The insurance company argued that at the time of the accident, the in-
sured possessed a medical certificate obtained by fraud and thus was not "prop-
erly certified", as required for coverage. Id.
.121 Id. at 17,186-87. The court reasoned that "properly certificated" was not
an ambiguous term, and the court should not read into its meaning that the certif-
icate cannot be obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. Id. at 17,186.
-, Id. at 17,185.
-522 Id. at 17,185-86. The insurance company had argued that at the time of
his medical examination, the insured did not disclose the fact that he had been
placed on medication for angina pectoris. Id. at 17,183.
5.1 Id. at 17,187. The court stated that the "policy requires only that the pilot
be 'properly certificated.' [The insured] was 'properly certificated' in that he held
a medical certificate which had not been suspended or revoked by the FAA." Id.
.2 48 Wash. App. 471, 740 P.2d 319 (1987).
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marginal VFR conditions and subsequent flight into IFR
conditions violated the pilot clause, which required that a
pilot be "properly rated for the flight" before the policy
applied. The insurer argued that subsequent flight into
IFR conditions violated the clause, while the decedent pi-
lot's estate urged that the decedent was properly rated for
the flight because he had filed a VFR flight plan and be-
cause at the beginning of the flight his weather briefing
and the weather at the field permitted VFR flight.525
After lengthy discussion, the appellate court adopted
the analysis of the Texas Supreme Court in Glover v. Na-
tional Insurance Underwriters.526 The Glover court articulated
a two-step analysis for characterizing a flight as IFR or
VFR. First, the court held that the flight should be viewed
as a whole, rather than in segments. Second, the flight
was characterized as a whole according to weather condi-
tions existing at the inception of the flight.527 The appel-
late court found that the Glover analysis allowed a court to
determine the character of the flight without resort to
speculation or conjecture as to the existing conditions.
Moreover, the court noted that use of a "segmented
flight" analysis ignored the reality of unreliable weather
forecasting and sudden weather changes.52 8
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the insurer's
argument that the court should characterize the flight as
.52-1 Id. at 476, 740 P.2d at 322-23.
-2 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1979). The Glover pilot requested a weather briefing
at 7:55 a.m. for a flight from Midland to Eagle Pass, Texas. He planned to depart
within three to four hours from the time of the briefing. He was informed that the
weather in both cities was poor. When the weather cleared in Midland the pilot
took off for Eagle Pass without requesting another weather briefing. The weather
in Eagle Pass had not improved. Id. at 758.
.27 Id. at 762. The Texas Supreme Court stated that the "weather conditions
existing at the beginning of the flight should . . . be looked to in determining
whether the flight is a VFR or an IFR flight." Id.
528 Transport Indem., 48 Wash. App. at 479, 740 P.2d at 324. The court noted
that "'segmented flight' analysis ... would require the court to examine every
brief segment of a flight to determine whether a pilot was properly rated for that
portion of the flight." Id. at 478-79, 740 P.2d at 324. The court further reasoned
that very little physical evidence would be available to the court in making a seg-
mented flight analysis. Id. at 479, 740 P.2d at 324.
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IFR or VFR depending on the pilot's knowledge of
weather conditions existing along the flight path or at his
destination.5 29  The court rejected the analysis of the
Texas Supreme Court in United States Fire Insurance Com-
pany v. Marr's Short Stop,530 in which the court held that the
pilot's knowledge of weather conditions was a determin-
ing factor in characterizing a flight. The court ultimately
determined that the record before it failed to establish
whether IFR or VFR conditions prevailed at the time of
the decedent's departure. Accordingly, the court noted
the existence of a genuine issue of fact which precluded
granting summary judgment.53 '
The court was also required to determine the existence
of coverage under the fixed base operations policy issued
by the insurer.532 With regard to that policy, the court af-
firmed the lower court's ruling that coverage did not exist
because the crash did not occur "in or about" the prem-
ises since the tragedy happened some three and one-half
miles east of the field. 533 The court rejected plaintiff's al-
ternative arguments that Sky-Kraft negligently entrusted
the keys of the aircraft to the decedent or that Sky-Kraft
was performing any duties in connection with its business
at the time of the crash.534
5 Id. at 481-82, 740 P.2d at 325.
--o 680 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1984). The Transport court noted that adoption of the
"pilot's knowledge" test would require the court to apply the precepts of negli-
gence law to a case involving the issue of contract construction. Transport Indem.,
48 Wash. App. at 482, 740 P.2d at 326.
Id. at 483-84, 740 P.2d at 326.
See id. at 485, 740 P.2d at 327. The insurer agreed under the terms of the
fixed base operations policy to pay for bodily injury caused by an accident "in or
about the premises" or "elsewhere in the course of any work or of the perform-
ance of any duties carried out by the Insured." Id. (quoting the insurance policy
terms).
Id. at 487, 740 P.2d at 328. The court interpreted "in or about" as "limiting
the scope of coverage to areas within the immediate vicinity of the premises." Id.
.1.14 Id. at 487-88, 740 P.2d at 328. The court held that after the decedent ob-
tained the aircraft keys, "Sky-Kraft ceased performing any work in connection
with its business." Id. at 488, 740 P.2d at 328. Sky-Kraft was in the business of
flight instruction. Decedent had received instruction from Sky-Kraft culminating
in a private pilot certificate. The flight at issue in this case occurred approxi-
mately one month after decedent received his certificate. Decedent had rented an
[55
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The court also held that no coverage was afforded
under the completed operations and products liability
section of the fixed base operations policy where the dece-
dent's estate claimed only that he died as a result of negli-
gent operation of Sky-Kraft's flight school.53 5
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment, holding that coverage did not exist
under the fixed base operations policy.
C. Miscellaneous Coverage Cases
In State v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London,53 6 the dispute
concerned liability for repairs to a Boeing 747 aircraft
owned by Japan Airlines (JAL) which was damaged when
it slid off an icy taxiway at the Anchorage International
Airport. The cost to repair the aircraft was nearly
$20,000,000. 537 JAL and its property insurers sued the
state of Alaska, owner of the airport, claiming that the ac-
cident resulted from the faulty design and maintenance of
the taxiway. At trial, the state was found eighty percent
responsible for the accident and settled with JAL and its
insurers prior to entry of final judgment. 538 At the time of
the accident, the state was an additional named insured
on a policy issued to JAL by the underwriters of Lloyds of
London. In the instant case, the state sought a declara-
tion that the underwriters provided liability insurance for
the state covering the accident under the premises liability
policy which named the state as an additional insured.
5 39
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling denying the existence of coverage. The court held
airplane from Sky-Kraft for a solo flight to Oregon. See id. at 473-74, 740 P.2d at
321.
---5 Id. at 498, 740 P.2d at 329. The court stated that the policy "was not in-
tended to provide coverage for Sky-Kraft's negligent operation of its flight school,
but rather was designed to provide coverage for injuries or damages caused by
defects in goods or products." Id.
755 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1988).
"' Id. at 397.
I" /d.
., Id. The State also brought a judgment for a portion of the defense and set-
tlement costs. Id.
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that the premises operations coverage extended to the
events on the taxiway under the clause which provided
coverage for "all airport and airline operations necessary
or incidental" to JAL's ownership, maintenance, and use
of the premises. 540 The court declined to interpret an air-
craft exclusion which denied coverage for damage to air-
craft owned by, hired by, or loaned to the insured, finding
thatJAL's use of the airliner did not avoid coverage of the
state.54' Finally, the court rejected the underwriters' ar-
gument that the policy did not cover the accident because
it was beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties
to the contract.54 2 Accordingly, the court determined that
the loss was covered under the policy.
In Hutzel v. United States Aviation Underwriters,543 the issue
was whether the policy excluding coverage for persons
engaged in commercial aviation applied to the decedent
independent contractor piloting the aircraft at the time of
the accident. While the defendant insurance company
submitted that the decedent was excluded because he had
previously flown for a commercial airline, was paid for his
services as a pilot and flight instructor, and was receiving
compensation for piloting the aircraft at the time of the
crash, the plaintiff argued that the clause was ambigu-
ous.544 The court agreed with the plaintiff.
The court noted that ambiguities, especially in the ex-
clusionary clause of a policy, must be construed against
the insurer.545 It found that "commercial aviation" could
.411 Id. at 399. The court noted that "premises operations coverage is not nar-
rowly confined to accidents occurring on the insured premises." Id. The court
reasoned that since an airline could not sell tickets or board its passengers without
taxiing planes, "taxiing aircraft is an operation necessary to JAL's use of the
leased premises." Id. at 400.
54, Id. The court noted that the cross-liability clause required it to read the
policy as if a separate policy had been issued to the state. Since the state did not
"own, hire, borrow or operate the aircraft," the aircraft exclusion did not apply.
Id.
.54. 132 A.D.2d 45, 522 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 1987).
5 Id. at 45, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
- Id. The court stated that "ambiguities, especially in the exclusionary clause
of a policy, are to be construed against the insurer, which bears the burden of
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reasonably refer to a person who was receiving compensa-
tion for piloting the aircraft. An equally reasonable inter-
pretation, however, is that the exclusion applies to a
person operating the aircraft when the airplane's owner is
deriving compensation from its use. Moreover, the policy
left unclear whether the person had to be so engaged at
the time of the occurrence or might have been so engaged
at some earlier time. Accordingly, the court held that the
decedent pilot was covered.546
The aviation policy issued by the insurer in United States
Fire Insurance Company v. Cowley & Associates547 covered
"personal and pleasure use and use in direct connection
with the insured's business, excluding any operation for
which a charge is made."5 48 The insurer sought to avoid
liability for claims arising from the crash of the private air-
craft by alleging that the flight on which the accident oc-
curred was part of a charter operation run by an
independent contractor pilot who flew the plane for
owner Cowley. The trial court found that the accident
was covered and granted summary judgment to the in-
sured.5 49 The court of appeals affirmed.
While the insurer offered evidence that payments were
solicited and received by the decedent pilot after previous
trips, and that this procedure was followed after an earlier
flight with some of the same passengers who were killed
in the accident, the court found that there was no direct
evidence that any payment arrangement was used on the
flight in question.550 Moreover, owner Cowley testified
showing that its interpretation is the only one which reasonably can be placed on
the exclusionary clause." Id.
146 Id. at 45, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 304. The court stated that "commercial aviation"
could also refer to "regularly scheduled airplane service complete with tickets,
schedules and attendants." Id. at 45, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 303. Since several interpre-
tations of "commercial aviation" were reasonable, the court held that the insurer
had failed to meet its burden in interpreting the exclusionary clause. Id. at 45,
522 N.Y.2d at 304.
147 183 Ga. App. 478, 359 S.E.2d 160 (1987).
54 Id. at 478, 359 S.E.2d at 161.
549 Id.
Id. at 478, 359 S.E.2d at 162. The court stated:
Since all of the passengers died in the crash, none was available to
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that he did not make any charges regarding the operation
of the plane on the fatal flight, and that use of the plane as
a charter was strictly prohibited. As to the fatal flight,
Cowley said that the decedent was acting on his own be-
half in showing some of the passengers the plane's capa-
bilities and in investigating the possibility of work at a
Lexington, Kentucky building site. 551 ' As the insurer
could show only a possibility that the flight was made for
profit, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court deci-
sion in favor of coverage.
In Amatuzio v. United States Fire Insurance Company,552 the
question was whether "air racing" was included in the
policy endorsement covering "aerobatic flight, air shows
or aerobatic competition." The insured aircraft was de-
stroyed in an accident during a closed-course pylon race
at the Reno, Nevada National Championship Air Races.5 53
The insurer denied coverage, alleging that the closed-
course pylon race did not fall within the definition of"aer-
obatic flight, air shows and aerobatic competition" for
which coverage was provided.55 4 The trial court agreed,
but the court of appeals reversed.
The policy did not define the terms "aerobatic flight, air
show or aerobatic competition." Common usage also did
not settle the issue since the acceleration and maneuver-
ing involved in pylon racing falls within the common defi-
nitions of aerobatics.5 55 Federal Aviation Regulations 55 6
testify whether or not arrangements had been made for payment for
the flight. There were no invoices, memos, bills, pre-flight charges,
or other documents or testimony evidencing a charge made by [the
decedent pilot] for the flight or the intention of the passengers to
pay any amounts to [the decedent pilot] for the flight.
Id.
' Id.
409 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 279. "In a closed-course pylon race, the aircraft fly six to ten laps
around an oval course at heights from 35 to 400 feet above the ground. The Reno
course was one mile in the straight-away and one-half mile at the ends, defined by
35-foot high pylons." Id.
'~Id.
Id. at 280. The court articulated the test for determining whether ambiguity
exists in an insurance policy as "what a reasonable person applying for this type of
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define aerobatic flight as "an intentional maneuver involv-
ing an abrupt change in an aircraft's altitude, an abnormal
altitude, or abnormal acceleration, not necessary for nor-
mal flight. ' 557 The court found that the abrupt maneuver-
ing, sharp turns, and rapid acceleration of pylon racing
are well within the FAR description of acrobatic flight.
The court concluded that the language of the policy was
ambiguous and therefore should be construed in favor of
coverage.558
In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Evans, 59 the
coverage issue turned on the interpretation of "passen-
ger." The plaintiff alleged that coverage was excluded by
policy provisions which excepted coverage for certain pas-
sengers.560 In holding that the exclusion was effective, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that a "passen-
ger" under Oklahoma law is one that pays for the ride
while a "guest" rides for free.56' The court held that this
interpretation, utilized in the context of automobile guest
statutes, was inapplicable in the instant case. Instead, the
court found that the term "passenger" should be given its
insurance would have understood the term to mean." If a term "is susceptible to
more than one meaning [it] is ambiguous." Id. The court further stated that "any
reasonable doubt as to the meaning of insurance policy language will be resolved
in favor of the insured." Id.
... 14 C.F.R. § 91.71 (1988).
. 7 Id. The regulation prohibits acrobatic flight "(a) Over any congested area of
a city, town, or settlement; (b) Over an open air assembly of persons; (c) Within a
control zone or Federal Airway; (d) Below an altitude of 1,500 feet above the
surface; or (e) When flight visibility is less than three miles." Id. These provisions
may be waived. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.63 (1988) (authorizing the Federal Aviation
Administrator to issue a certificate of waiver).
.- Amatuzio, 409 N.W.2d at 281. The court noted that FAR 91.7 1's definition of
"acrobatic" flight did not resolve the ambiguity in the policy language referring to
"acrobatic flight." Id. The court held: "The terms 'acrobatic flights, airshows and
acrobatic competition' are susceptible to the inclusion of the activity of 'air rac-
ing.' When language of an insurance policy is ambiguous or susceptible of two
meanings, it must be given the meaning which is favorable to the finding of insur-
ance coverage." Id.
20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,592 (N.D. Okla. 1987).
.. Id. at 18,593. The second page of the policy, attached as Exhibit A to the
complaint, excluded from coverage "any passenger in or intending passenger of
any aircraft or vehicle which is used directly in event covered herein." Id.
.-1 Id. at 18,593-94.
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ordinary meaning, which is a person who travels in a
mode of conveyance without participating in its opera-
tion, and that the decedent was a passenger and thereby
was excepted from coverage.562
In Forum Insurance Company v. Seitz Aviation, Incorpo-
rated,56 3 an insurer sought a determination that an exclu-
sion in an aviation insurance policy relieved it of liability
for the death and injury of passengers resulting from an
aircraft accident. The insurance company urged that an
exclusion in the policy voided liability where the dece-
dents and injured parties were employees or directors of
various entities named as additional insureds.564 The trial
court, however, did not reach the merits of whether the
exclusion applied, determining instead that all exclusions
in the base policy were voided by an endorsement to the
policy which provided coverage for air taxi operations.565
On that basis, the court granted judgment in favor of the
defendants and the insurance company appealed.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether all the basic policy exclusions had them-
selves been excluded by the provisions of the endorse-
ment concerning air taxi operations, the clause relied
upon by the lower court.566 The court concluded that the
endorsement applied only to liability arising from air
transport operations, interpreting that term to mean the
carrying of persons or property for compensation as a
.- Id. at 18,594. The ordinary meaning relied upon by the court was that a
passenger is "a person who travels in a train, airplane, ship, bus, or other convey-
ance, without participating in its operation." Id. (citing the AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE).
---1 241 Kan. 334, 737 P.2d 29 (1987).
.- '4 Id. at 334, 737 P.2d at 30. The relevant exclusion applies to "any claim or
suit by one insured, its agents, servants or employees against any other insured,
its agents, servants or employees." Id.
SId.
Id. at 334, 737 P.2d at 31. The endorsement provided that "the [exclusions]
of the policy to which this endorsement is attached are deleted and are replaced
by the following exclusions .... Id. Specifically, the endorsement excluded from
coverage "any loss arising from operations other than carriage by aircraft of per-
sons or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire or the carriage of
mail by aircraft in interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation." Id.
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common carrier in interstate air transportation. Absent
those circumstances, the court held that the underlying
policy and its exclusions applied.567 The court ultimately
remanded the case for rehearing because insufficient facts
were developed to determine whether or not the flight




In Borden v. FAA Administrator,5 69 the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) suspended Borden's certifi-
cate for a period of twenty days for violating Federal
Aviation Regulations requiring that an aircraft not be op-
erated contrary to air traffic control (ATC) instructions in
an area where ATC is exercised.5 7 0 The alleged violation
occurred when Borden taxied across a runway without
clearance. 57' The court of appeals noted that although
there was apparently some confusion created by the ex-
change between the pilot and the ground controller con-
cerning which taxiway to use, a request for clarification
was the appropriate response for the pilot.5 7 2 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the order of the NTSB upholding
the suspension.
In Komjathy v. National Transportation Safety Board,7 3 the
plaintiff appealed the suspension of his airman certificate
for 180 days for alleged violations of the Federal Aviation
Regulations on the grounds that the FAA had no statutory
authority to suspend airman certificates, and that the reg-
ulation permitting such suspension was unconstitutionally
- I,17 ld. at 334, 737 P.2d at 34-35.
m"s Id. at 334, 737 P.2d at 35.
mw 849 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1988).
.7 Id. at 319.
.171 Id. at 320.
.72 Id. at 322. The court stated that "even in the face of confusing or inade-
quate instructions from the control tower, the pilot must, if he can, assure the
public safety by requesting clarification before he proceeds." Id.
., 832 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2825 (1988).
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vague. 4 The court rejected this argument, noting that
the Federal Aviation Act gave the administrator of the
FAA broad discretion to suspend airman certificates upon
a determination that safety and the public interest re-
quired suspension. The regulation implementing that
Act reiterated the statutory language, precluding any ar-
gument that notice and comment procedures were re-
quired prior to suspension. 6
Plaintiff also claimed that the implementation regula-
tion was unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the vagueness of which plaintiff
complained is simply the broad discretion granted by
Congress to the FAA Administrator.5 7 7 The court also
noted that plaintiff did not challenge the regulations
which actually proscribed the conduct for which plaintiff's
certificate was suspended. The plaintiff instead alleged
only that he was not duly warned of the penalty the Ad-
ministrator might choose to impose. Accordingly, the
petition for review was denied.
In Westmoreland v. National Transportation Safety Board,579
the plaintiff, an FAA Aviation Safety Instructor, alleged
that the NTSB did not properly consider her claim that
the FAA's suspension of her license was in retaliation for
plaintiff's filing a civil rights complaint against her super-
visor. The court of appeals ultimately determined that
the appeal was moot since Westmoreland had regained
her suspended commercial pilot certificate.58 0
-174 Id. at 1296.
.7.1 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1982).
.7,1 Komjathy, 832 F.2d at 1296-97. The court stated that the "fact that the regu-
lation merely reiterates the statutory language precludes any serious argument
that the regulation affects the agency or holders of airman certificates in such a
way as to require notice-and-comment procedures pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553."
Id. at 1296; see 14 C.F.R. § 13.19 (1988) for the test of the implementing
regulations.
.77 Komjathy, 832 F.2d at 1297 (the vagueness complained of "is nothing other
than the broad discretion that Congress has chosen to bestow on the Administra-
tor of the FAA").
579 Id.
833 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 1463. The court held that the "instant case is moot because the order
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While Westmoreland argued that a live controversy re-
mained because she might be disqualified from potential
future employment based upon her previous suspension,
the court of appeals dismissed this possibility as specula-
tive.58 ' The court further held that the appeal was not
saved by any exception to the mootness doctrine.58 2 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the case was moot because
the order of suspension lapsed as soon as Westmoreland
successfully passed her re-examination.
In National Center for Air Travel Safety, Ltd. v. Dole,583
plaintiff, a non-profit corporation that sought to promote
safety in air carrier travel and general aviation, filed com-
plaints alleging that the Air Deregulation Act of 1978 in-
creased competition and reduced air fares, and this
required air carriers to price fares in a way that created
conflict between air safety and profitability.58 4 Plaintiff
sought an order compelling defendants to promulgate
regulations that would authorize the defendants to review
air fares and issue cease and desist orders to prohibit in-
ordinately low air fares and maintenance and flight officer
economies that endanger the public. 585 The complaint
also alleged that the FAA delegated a number of testing
and inspection functions to private parties who had inher-
ent conflicts of interest and were otherwise incapable of
performing their functions properly. The complaint also
protested the inadequacy of air traffic controllers and the
of suspension lapsed as soon as Westmoreland successfully passed her reexamina-
tion ... the claim of hardship due to the lapsed suspension order is too specula-
tive to justify further review." Id.
- Id. ("The possibility of this harm is too speculative to create a cognizable
interest in the outcome of this litigation for Westmoreland.").
.1 Id. In particular, the court referred to the "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review" exception. Id. The court held that this exception is limited to cases in
which the following factors are found: "'(1) The challenged action was in its dura-
tion too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there
was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected
to the same action again.' " Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147,
149 (1975)). The court held that Westmoreland did not satisfy either criteria. Id.
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lack of proper regulations limiting takeoffs and landings
at airports.586
Defendants moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6),
alleging that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administra-
tive remedies, and the trial court agreed. The court noted
that the FAA has established procedures by which parties
can petition the agency for action concerning the promul-
gation of rules. Since plaintiffs wholly failed to exhaust or
even make use of the available administrative remedies,
the court held that the action must be dismissed.5"7
In Alphin v. National Transportation Safety Board,5 aa the
FAA suspended the plaintiff for forty-five days due to im-
proper sign-offs on engine overhauls.5 89 The NTSB re-
versed, finding that the substandard conditions in the
engines could not be directly attributed to Alphin's ac-
tions. 590 Alphin subsequently applied for attorneys' fees
and costs in the amount of $135,525 under the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act (EAJA).5 9 ' After both the Administra-
tive Law Judge and the NTSB denied his application,
Alphin appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals.592 The court of appeals found that the NTSB
incorrectly evaluated whether the FAA was substantially
5841 Id.
- Id.
839 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
I ld. at 819.
m" Id. at 820.
.I1" Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III 1985) (the court decided A1phin under the
1985 Amendments; the EAJA was amended again in 1986, but the portions of the
act relevant to the case were not affected). The EAJA provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall
award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and
other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that pro-
ceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the
position of the agency was substantially justified or that special cir-
cumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the position of
the agency was substantially justified shall be determined on the ba-
sis of the administrative record, as a whole, which is made in the
adversary adjudication for which fees and other expenses are
sought.
5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III 1985).
51,2 Alphin, 839 F.2d at 820-21.
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justified in suspending Alphin.59 3 The NTSB's initial de-
termination indicated that, based on its inspectors find-
ings, the FAA was substantially justified. The NTSB,
however, failed to review the record as a whole in making
its determination.59 4 Although the FAA may have had evi-
dence sufficient to initiate and continue proceedings
against Alphin, that was not the standard required by the
EAJA.595 The NTSB erred in failing to consider whether
the FAA was substantially justified in basing its order in
part on allegations that the NTSB itself ultimately deter-
mined to be without merit.596 Moreover, the NTSB
should have examined the application to determine
whether a partial award was appropriate with respect to
each allegation in light of the FAA's knowledge at various
stages of the proceedings. 97 The court of appeals re-
manded the case to the NTSB for a more extensive evalu-
ation of the FAA's position at each step of the
proceedings to determine whether a partial award was ap-
propriate and the amount of any such award. 598
In Rawlins v. National Transportation Safety Board,599 the
plaintiff's aircraft crashed while carrying approximately
750 pounds of marijuana. The plaintiff was convicted of
multiple drug offenses, each carrying penalties of impris-
onment in excess of one year.60 0 The FAA subsequently
"-"- Id. at 821.
.... Id. The EAJA requires that the record be viewed "as a whole." 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(l)(Supp. III 1985).
mn, Alphin, 839 F.2d at 821. The court stated that the EAJA expressly requires
an examination into "the lesser administrative record, as a whole" and that "any
lesser examination would defeat the purposes of the EAJA." Id.
mm Id. at 822. The court condemned the "shotgun approach" used by the
NTSB, which included disposing of several alleged deficiencies in a footnote and
failing to discuss the allegations. Id.
517 Id. The court applied the standards set in Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d
801, 804-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (allowing for partial awards of attorneys fees when
some but not all of the government's defenses are substantially justified), and
Martin v. Lauer, 740 F.2d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (mandating that each step of a
proceeding must be separately evaluated).
. Alphin, 839 F.2d at 823.
837 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1988).
""' Id. at 1328. Rawlins was convicted of "conspiracy to violate narcotic laws (in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846); possession of marijuana (in violation of 21 U.S.C.
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revoked his commercial pilot's license and ordered that
he could not apply for a new certificate for five years.60 '
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the NTSB erred in
holding that the Administrator was precluded from con-
sidering sanctions less severe than revocation under sec-
tion 609(c) of the Federal Aviation Act.6 °2 The court of
appeals disagreed, relying on the plain language of the
statute and the legislative history of section 609(c), which
confirmed that Congress intended the Administrator to
revoke an airman certificate for drug trafficking
violations .60
The court noted further that under section 609(c)(3) of
the Federal Aviation Act, the NTSB may only affirm or
reverse the Administrator's order of revocation.604
Therefore, the NTSB had no discretion to consider miti-
gating circumstances in determining whether to revoke a
certificate. 60 - The court rejected Rawlins' argument that
the language of section 609(c)(3), which affords an airman
§ 841(a)(1)); and importation of marijuana (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952 and 21
U.S.C. § 960(b))." Id.
lowI Id.
-0,2 Section 609(c) of the Federal Aviation Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1429(c) (Supp. III 1985). The statute mandates that "[t]he Administrator shall
issue an order revoking the airman certificates of any person upon conviction of
such person of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year under a State or Federal law relating to a controlled substance.
Federal Aviation Act § 609(c), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(c) (Supp. III 1985).
".11 Rawlins, 837 F.2d at 1329. The court stated that "[t]he legislative history
only confirms that § 609(c) [r]equires the Administrator to revoke an airman cer-
tificate" if a pilot is convicted of violating drug trafficking laws. Id. (citing H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1085, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3916, 3921).
14" Section 609(c)(3) of the Federal Aviation Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1429(c)(3) (Supp. III 1985). The statute provides that "[any person whose cer-
tificate is revoked by the Administrator under this subsection may appeal the Ad-
ministrator's order to the National Transportation Safety Board and the Board
shall, after notice and a hearing on the record, affirm the Administrator's order."
Federal Aviation Act § 609(c)(3), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(c)(3) (Supp. III 1985).
.101 The court contrasted the mandatory language of section 609(c)(3), supra
note 604, of the Federal Aviation Act with that of section 609(a) "which permits
the NTSB to amend, modify or reverse the Administrator's order amending, sus-
pending, modifying or revoking an airman certificate if safety in air commerce or
air transportation and the public interest requires ...... Rawlins, 837 F.2d at
1329.
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the opportunity to "be heard as to why such a certificate
should not be revoked," permits mitigation by the NTSB.
The court held that this language affords an airman the
opportunity to be heard concerning the validity of the
facts underlying the FAA's order of revocation, but not
regarding the degree of sanction.60 6  Accordingly, the
court affirmed the NTSB's decision.
X. NEGLIGENCE
In Biles v. United States,6 °7 the plaintiff's decedent was
killed when the aircraft in which he was a passenger col-
lided with a ridge line on Lookout Mountain, Georgia, af-
ter flying marginal VFR conditions at approximately
2,000 feet mean sea level. The airplane crashed a few mo-
ments after the air traffic controller terminated radar ser-
vice.608 Biles alleged that the air traffic controller was
negligent because she breached a duty to warn the pilot of
the plane's proximity to the mountainous terrain.60 9 The
trial court concluded that under the circumstances: (1) no
duty arose out of paragraph 33 of the Air Traffic Control
Manual; 610 (2) even if a duty did arise, the controller was
not negligent; and (3) even if she was in some manner
negligent, her negligence was not a proximate cause of
the crash.6 '
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the circumstances did not impose a duty on the air
(RH; Id.
848 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1988).
id. at 662.
Id.
I' d. The court held that:
[T]he circumstances did not give rise to a duty of the air traffic con-
troller to issue a warning or advisory concerning the proximity of
[the plaintiff's airplane] to the terrain. Paragraph 33 of the Air Traf-
fic Control Manual, FAA order 7110.65C, establishes the guidelines
for issuance of such advisories as follows:
Issue a safety advisory to an aircraft if you are aware that the air-
craft is at an altitude which, in your judgment, places it in an unsafe




108 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
traffic controller to issue a warning or advisory concern-
ing the aircraft's proximity to high terrain. Although the
weather at the control site was marginal and the pilot in-
formed the controller that he might not be able to fly
above 1,500 feet and remain VFR, the crash site was some
twenty miles from the airport, and the controller could
not be expected to assume that conditions were uniform
all the way to Lookout Mountain.61 2 Moreover, the flight
crew's last communication with the controller indicated
that the aircraft was still flying VFR.613 Radio communica-
tions between the controller and the aircraft indicated
that there were no problems. Absent some awareness
that minimum VFR conditions had ceased to exist or that
the aircraft was in trouble, the court held that the control-
ler had no duty to warn.6 14
In Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines,6 15 a briefcase fell from an
overhead compartment and struck the plaintiff's head, af-
ter the compartment was opened by another passenger. 61 6
The jury awarded $420,000 in general damages and
$560,000 in lost earnings, and his spouse received
$35,000 for loss of consortium.61 7 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment but reduced the award
'1"1 Id. at 663. The controller's radar indicated that the pilot had been varying
between 1,500 and 1,900 feet, contradicting the pilot's statement that he could
not fly above 1,500 feet. The court held that the plane's crew was in the best
position to be informed about conditions at the area of the crash. Id.
'. Id. at 663 n.4. "The controller had a right to assume that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, conditions were such that the aircraft could operate
under visual flight rules." Id. at 663 (quoting Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d
178, 183 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983)). The court held that
the controller could assume that the pilot could see the terrain himself. Id.
I ld.
516 So. 2d 452 (La. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 520 So. 2d 750 (La. 1988).
.I. ld. at 456. Schwamb drove himself home, but later complained of dizziness,
pain and numbness in his arm and leg. Id.
,ill Id. at 466. The jury awarded damages as follows:
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of general damages to $290,000.618
The court examined Delta's liability, first noting that a
passenger injured on a common carrier need only estab-
lish a prima facie case of negligence, and the burden then
shifts to the defendant to overcome the plaintiff's show-
619ing. Schwamb carried his burden, and Delta failed to
prove that it did everything possible under the circum-
stances to prevent the accident, as required of a common
carrier. 620 The court relied in part upon the testimony of
an expert witness that Delta could have taken steps to
minimize the risk to passengers, including: (1) a preload-
ing announcement concerning how to load baggage; (2)
preboarding inspection of carry-on baggage; (3) a printed
warning on the plastic safety card concerning overloading
of bins; and (4) a prelanding announcement to passengers
concerning the removal of baggage from overhead
bins.62 '
In Erickson Air-Crane Company v. United Technologies Corpo-
ration,622 plaintiff sought damages for the loss of a helicop-
To Mr. Schwamb:
Past physical pain and suffering $50,000
Future physical pain and suffering 100,000
Past mental anguish 20,000
Future mental anguish 20,000
Disability 200,000
Past medical expenses 20,000
Future medical expenses 10,000
Past loss of earnings 200,000
Future loss of earnings 360,000
Loss of profits from proposed project 0
To Mrs. Schwamb:
Past lost or impaired consortium, services and society $15,000
Future lost or impaired consortium, services and society 20,000
Id.
,' Id. at 467. The court found that the award of general damages was clearly
excessive because it failed to take into consideration the fact that Schwamb's in-
jury was of indefinite duration and that there was no indication that he had suf-
fered permanent brain injury. Id.
4-, Id. at 461.
620 Id. at 463.
621 Id.
622 87 Or. App. 577, 743 P.2d 747, petition denied, 304 Or. 680, 520 P.2d 142
(1987).
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ter manufactured by defendant.62 3 At trial, United
Technologies presented evidence that Erickson failed to
comply with FAA regulations requiring it to maintain
records of life-limited parts624 and to make certain that
the aircraft conformed to type certificate data sheets.62 5
Using this evidence, United Technologies attempted to
establish that Erickson was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law.626 The court refused to instruct the jury on
contributory negligence per se based on these viola-
tions.6 27 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
proper test for determining whether Erickson was con-
tributorily negligent per se was whether, as the injured
623 Id. at 577, 743 P.2d at 749.
624 Id. Section 91.173(a)(2)(ii) of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
states that:
(a) Except for work performed in accordance with § 91.171, each
registered owner or operator shall keep the following records for the
periods specified in paragraph (b) of this section: . . . (2) Records
containing the following information: ... (ii) The current status of
life-limited parts of each airframe, engine, propeller, rotor, and
appliance.
14 C.F.R. § 91.173(a)(2)(ii)(1988).
. Erickson, 87 Or. App. at 577, 743 P.2d at 749. Section 91.171(b) of Title 14
of the Code of Federal Regulations states that:(b) The [altimeter system and altitude reporting equipment] tests
required by paragraph (a) of this section must be conducted by -
(1) The manufacturer of the airplane or helicopter on which the
tests and inspections are to be performed;
(2) A certificated repair station properly equiped to perform
those functions and holding -
(i) An instrument rating, Class I;
(ii) A limited instrument rating appropriate to the make and
model of appliance to be tested;
(iii) A limited rating appropriate to the test to be performed;
(iv) An airframe rating appropriate to the airplane or helicopter
to be tested; or
(v) A limited rating for a manufacturer issued for the appliance in
accordance with § 145.101(b)(4) of this chapter; or
(3) A certificated mechanic with an airframe rating (static pressure
system tests and inspections only).
14 C.F.R. § 91.171(b) (1988).
61, Erickson, 87 Or. App. at 577, 743 P.2d at 749.
627 Id. at 577, 743 P.2d at 749 n.4. United Technologies assigned error to the
instruction the trial court gave on negligence per se. The court of appeals, how-
ever, held that the error was harmless because it held that negligence per se did
not apply to the facts of the case. Id.
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party, he was within the class protected by the statute.628
The court rejected United Technologies' assertion that
the maintenance regulations were intended to protect
against economic loss, holding that they are for the pro-
tection and safety of pilots, passengers and persons on the
ground.629 Accordingly, the court declined to hold that
Erickson's violation of the maintenance regulation gave
rise to a finding of negligence per se.
In Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Company,63 ° the Washington
Supreme Court held that owners and operators of aircraft
should not be strictly liable for ground damage caused by
aircraft operation. 61' Rather, general principles of negli-
gence controlled.632 The action arose when an aircraft on
a test flight ran out of fuel and landed on the roof of
Crosby's garage, causing $3,199.89 in damage.63 3 Crosby
sued both the pilot and owner of the airplane to recover
for his property damage. 634 The trial court granted par-
tial summary judgment for Crosby, holding that both the
pilot and owner, Cox Aircraft, were strictly liable for all
damage to Crosby's property.63 5
On appeal, the Boeing Company and the Washington
State Trial Lawyers Association both filed amicus curiae
briefs regarding the appropriate standard of liability.
Boeing argued for a simple negligence standard, while the
Trial Lawyers Association contended that strict liability
629 Id. at 577, 743 P.2d at 749.
629 Id.
109 Wash. 2d 581, 746 P.2d 1198 (1987).
Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1199 (Crosby was a 5-4 decision); see infra note 644 for
additional information regarding voting of the judges.
Crosby, 109 Wash. 2d at 581, 746 P.2d at 1199.
Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1198.
4 Id. Crosby's complaint raised the following alternative allegations: (1) negli-
gent operation of the plane by the pilot; (2) negligent maintenance of the plane by
Cox Aircraft; (3) vicarious liability attributed to Cox Aircraft for all of the pilot's
negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior; and (4) strict liability of
both Cox Aircraft and the pilot for all damage caused by the crash. Id. at 581, 746
P.2d at 1198-99.
' Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1199. The trial court did not address Crosby's negli-
gence claims and a third-party complaint against Parker Hannifin Corporation,
which equipped the plane with its fuel system. Id.
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should apply. The defendants argued for a third stan-
dard, which was a "rebuttable presumption" of negli-
gence on the part of the aircraft's operator and owner.6 36
The court held that general principles of negligence ap-
plied.637 The court rejected the argument of Crosby and
the Trial Lawyers Association urging adoption of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 520A,63 8 which establishes
strict liability for ground damage caused by aircraft. Sec-
tion 520A is a "special application" of sections 519 and
520, which governs liability for "abnormally dangerous"
activity.639
Rejecting the strict liability standard, the court noted
--i Id.
6"7 Id.
638 Id. Section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § (Restatement)
states:
520A. Ground Damage From Aircraft
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is
caused by the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping
or falling of an object from the aircraft, (a) the operator of the air-
craft is subject to liability for the harm, even though he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent it, and (b) the owner of the aircraft is
subject to similar liability if he has authorized or permitted the
operation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
w- Crosby, 109 Wash. 2d at 581, 746 P.2d 1199. Comment a to section 520A of
the Restatement states that "[t]his Section is a special application of the rule
stated in § 519, together with that stated in § 520." RESTATEMENT § 520A com-
ment a. Section 519 of the Restatement states:
§ 519 General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is sub-
ject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another
resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibil-
ity of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Id. § 519. Section 520 of the Restatement states:
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the fol-
lowing factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
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that the modern trend followed by a majority of states was
to impose liability based on a negligence standard. Only
six states impose strict liability for ground damage caused
by aircraft, and those states impose it only upon the air-
craft's owner."4° Moreover, the court noted that a number
of courts have expressly disavowed the notion that avia-
tion is an "ultrahazardous activity." 64 ' The court further
noted that even passengers injured in aircraft accidents
must prove negligence in order to recover damages, and
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is still available to
prove negligence.64 2
The court also rejected the plaintiff's alternative argu-
ment that a rule of strict liability should apply to ground
damages caused by test flights of aircraft. The court de-
clined to impose such a rule, holding that the plaintiff
failed to show that test flights are so inherently dangerous
that a "high degree of risk of harm" cannot be eliminated
by the exercise of reasonable care. Instead, in light of the
extensive regulations regarding design development and
testing of new aircraft pursuant to FAA standards, the
court concluded that test flights are not abnormally dan-
gerous. Consequently, the court reversed the lower
court's grant of partial summary judgment and remanded
the case for trial.643
In a dissent joined by the chief justice and two other
members of the court,644 Justice Brachtenbach argued in
favor of adopting a strict liability standard for property
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
Id. § 520.
-,, Crosby, 109 Wash. 2d at 581, 746 P.2d at 1200. The states imposing strict
liability include Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey and Vermont. Id.
64 Id.; see Wood v. United Air Lines, 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1961),
aff'd, 16 A.D.2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022, appeal dismissed, 11 N.Y.2d 1053, 184
N.E.2d 180, 230 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1962); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276
P.2d 92 (1954).
-2 Crosby, 109 Wash. 2d at 581, 746 P.2d at 1202.
I-~ Id.
IW4 Chief Justice Pearson and Justices Dore and Goodloe joined Justice
Brachtenbach in the dissenting opinion. Justices Anderson, Utter, Dolliver and
Durham joined Justice Callow's majority opinion.
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damage caused by aircraft. The dissent argued that the
majority misinterpreted section 520, which was intended
to stand on its own apart from the section 520 require-
ments establishing an abnormally dangerous activity. 645
Moreover, the dissent argued that even absent a deter-
mination that aviation is an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity, strict liability should be imposed for policy reasons. 646
The dissent suggested that the nature of the benefit and
the creation of risk was one-sided when the interests of
aircraft owners and operators are examined vis-a-vis
property owners.647 Another factor supposedly favoring
strict liability was the difficult and expensive burden of
proof placed on a plaintiff to prove negligence in an avia-
tion accident case.648 The dissent suggested that the ex-
pense of litigation effectively amounted to a denial of the
plaintiff's right to damages, particularly in a case where
the damages are relatively small. 649 A final policy reason
advanced for the imposition of strict liability was the abil-
ity of aircraft owners and operators to spread the financial
risk through insurance.6 50 The dissent also urged that the
policy considerations of comment c to section 402a of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts651 mandated the imposi-
-. Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1205. The dissent points out that the authors of
section 520A expressly intended for it to stand on its own. Id.
I d. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1203.
647 Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1203-04. The dissent states that:
Thus where each user of a highway receives the direct benefit of
such use but whose presence and conduct increases the risk of harm
to the other, the law of negligence applies. But the one-sidedness in
the receipt of benefits and creation of risks should lead to strict lia-
bility .... This analysis is logical and satisfies the demands ofjustice.
Its application here leads to strict liability.
Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1204.
. Id.
Id. The plaintiff was seeking only $3,199.89 in damages. Another factor the
dissent considered was the fact that the plaintiff was in the midst of a third-party
fight over the cause of the crash, which included an expected battle of experts
over the design and manufacture of a critical part of the fuel system. Id.
Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1205.
Comment c to section 402A of the Restatement states:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and con-
sumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility to-
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tion of strict liability.652 Thus, based on either policy rea-
sons or the literal language of Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 520A, the dissent would impose strict
liability.65 3
XI. ANTITRUST
In McElderry v. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. ,654 plaintiff
claimed that a $10.64 baggage charge assessed because
her baggage weighed seven kilograms over the twenty-kil-
ogram free baggage allowance was improper. McElderry
alleged that this assessment was in violation of sections
403 and 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 65 5 sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act,656 and section 1 of the Robin-
son-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act.65 7 Cathay Pacific
moved to dismiss under rules 12(b)(1) and (12(b)(6). 658
The court dismissed McElderry's claims. The court de-
termined that no private right of action exists under sec-
tions 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act.
659
ward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it;
that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of prod-
ucts which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller,
that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public pol-
icy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by prod-
ucts intended for consumption to be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products
is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.
RESTATEMENT § 402A comment c.
652 Crosby, 109 Wash. 2d at 581, 746 P.2d at 1205, 1208.
I ld.; see supra note 638 for the text of section 520A of the Restatement.
'-' 678 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
.. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1374(b) (1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
657 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
,;- McElderry, 678 F. Supp. at 1073.
659 Id. at 1073-74. The court used the four factor analysis set forth in Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), in determining that a private right of action does not
exist under sections 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. McElderiy, 678 F.
Supp. at 1074. The four factors enunciated in Cort are as follows;
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," - that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of leg-
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Moreover, the court held that even if McElderry had the
right to assert her claims under the FAA, they were with-
out merit. 660 The subject flight took place between Hong
Kong and Taipei. While Cathay Pacific was required to
maintain a piece-based luggage charge system for flights
originating from or terminating in the United States, it
could use a weight-based luggage charge system for those
flights completely outside the United States under the dic-
tates of Rule 16, the Cathay Pacific tariff.66I The court
noted that the Warsaw Convention terminology regarding
destination does not apply in interpreting Rule 16.662
The court also dismissed McElderry's claims of viola-
tions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 663 and sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act 664 for failure to meet the
requirments of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement
Act 665 and for reasons of comity. 66 6 McElderry failed to
islative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?.
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of states, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted); see also Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
544 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1976) (no private right of action under section 403(b)
of the FAA for passengers given airline package tour accommodations impractica-
bly far from airport), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Polansky v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 338 (3d Cir. 1975) (no private right of action under
section 404(b) of the FAA available to airline passengers provided with inferior
lodgings in airline package tour).
ow McElderry, 678 F. Supp. at 1075.
.i. Id. Rule 16 is the tariff filed by Cathay Pacific with the CAB, which regulates,
among other things, luggage charges. Id.
IW2 Id. at 1076. The district court held that McElderry could not rely on the
Warsaw Convention's definition of the phrase "place of destination" since the
interpretation of the Convention was not in issue and because Rule 16 used
phrasing different from that of the Convention. Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(l)(A) (1982).
. McElderry, 678 F. Supp. at 1077. McElderry claimed that Cathay Pacific vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act in that it conspired with other air carriers in
restraint of trade to adopt an illegal baggage charge system for use against pas-
sengers on flights originating or terminating in the United States. Id. McElderry
further argued that Cathay Pacific violated section 2 of the Sherman Act in that it
attempted to monopolize a portion of aerial commerce by using a baggage charge
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
allege a direct anticompetitive effect on United States
commerce, as required by the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act to state a viable cause of action under
the Sherman Act.667 The complaint alleged at most injury
only to individual passengers due to overcharging. In or-
der to state a viable Sherman Act claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate injury to American commerce in general,
and not mere monetary damage to individuals.6 68 More-
over, the court noted that it was far from clear that Cathay
Pacific's weight-based system gave it a competitive advan-
tage over airlines using a piece-based system.669
Finally, the court held that even if McElderry's claim
had met the requirements of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act, which limits the application of the
Sherman Act to foreign entities, it should still decline to
exercise jurisdiction under principles of international
comity.670 Cathay Pacific argued successfully that its man-
ner of handling baggage on a weight-based system for
flights not originating or ending in the United States was
required by the United Kingdom's regulatory system.67 '
Accordingly, the act of state doctrine applied and the
court should avoid judicial inquiry into the actions of for-
eign government officials.6 72
system which, although harmful to passengers, gave it an economic advantage
over other carriers. Id.
W7 Id.
(I, Id. at 1078; see Fine v. Barry & Enright Prod., 731 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th
Cir.)(a plaintiff suing under the Sherman Act must "show injury to a market or to
competition in general, not merely injury to individuals."), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
881 (1984).
.... McElderry, 678 F. Supp. at 1078. McElderrry alleged that the Cathay Pacific
weight-based baggage charge system was anti-competitive because it increased
Cathay Pacifics revenues in comparison to United States airlines using a piece-
based system. Id. The court, however, noted that since passengers might be
charged less for baggage under the piece-based system, this could cause airline
passengers to choose United States carriers over Cathay Pacific. Id.
670 Id.
,671 Id. at 1078-79. The court noted that the United Kingdom had repeatedly
rejected attempts to impose piece-based baggage charge systems on foreign air-
lines engaged in exclusively foreign travel and that accepting jurisdiction of this
case would "clearly exacerbate the stated differences between the two coun-
tries .. " Id. at 1079.
.;72 Id. at 1078-80. The United Kingdom filed a diplomatic note with the State
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In Ti-State Executive Air, Incorporated v. Ti-State Airport
Authority,6 7 3 plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated
federal and state antitrust laws and the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 due to its policy of reserving the exclusive
right to sell aviation fuel at -the Tri-State Airport. While
the defendant authority contended that it was immune
from the antitrust laws because of its grant of power from
the West Virginia Legislature, the court found that no im-
munity applied.674 The court noted the presumption
against implied exclusions from coverage under the anti-
trust laws.675 This presumption, combined with the legis-
lature's failure to clearly and affirmatively express a state
policy authorizing the challenged action, led the court to
deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment.676
XII. MISCELLANEOUS
In Mathews v. Northwest Airlines, Incorporated,677 the plain-
tiff paid $960 for tickets from Syracuse, New York to West
Palm, Florida. The tickets were purchased at a reduced
rate and had a nonrefundable cancellation clause. When
plaintiff subsequently was unable to use the tickets,
Department stating that Hong Kong or Taiwan should have jurisdiction, but not
the United States. Id. at 1078-79. Also, affidavits filed by Cathay Pacific conclu-
sively showed that the United States and United Kingdom disagree over the
proper baggage system, and thus the act of state doctrine necessitated dismissal of
the claim. Id. at 1079-80.
0 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,187 (S.D.W. Va. 1985).
674 Id. at 17,188-89. The airport authority claimed that the state legislature
intended to provide it with "the broadest possible powers." Id. at 17,189.
67I. Id. (citing Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)).
In Lafayette, the Supreme Court stated that the Sherman Act was intended to apply
to "every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopo-
lize commercial intercourse," and that "even when Congress by subsequent legis-
lation establishes a regulatory regime over an area of commercial activity, the
antitrust laws will not be displaced unless it appears that the antitrust and regula-
tory provisions are plainly repugnant." Layfayette, 435 U.S. at 398.
,17,1 Tri-State Executive Air, 20 Av. Cas. at 17,189. The district court specifically
stated that defendant's "fuel policy cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny un-
less it constitutes the action of the state itself in its sovereign capacity, or unless it
constitutes action in furtherance or implementation of a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy." Id.
117 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
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Northwest maintained that no refund was due.67
The court disagreed. The court found that plaintiff had
given defendant ample time to fill the seats, noting that
there was no indication that the flight left with less than a
full complement of passengers.6 79 Moreover, the court
noted that there was no mutuality of obligation since the
airline reserved the right to cancel plaintiff's reservations
but did not offer her any opportunity to alter the reserva-
tions or pay an additional premium for a ticket containing
less restrictions. 680 The court found that defendant had
been unjustly enriched at plaintiff's expense and awarded
plaintiff damages in the amount of $960.
In Lopez v. Eastern Airlines, Incorporated,68 ' plaintiff Lopez
was bumped from a flight on which he held a confirmed
reservation. He was scheduled to leave Newark, New
Jersey for Miami at 7:59 p.m. He subsequently was of-
fered a seat on a later Eastern Airlines flight, which he
accepted. He declined Eastern's offer to return the price
of his ticket.682 He later brought suit seeking actual dam-
ages for his alleged "humiliation, annoyance and
distress.''683
The court found that his complaint stated a cause of ac-
tion for breach of contract. The court held that overbook-
ing and bumping constitutes a simple common law breach
of contract for which Lopez was entitled to actual com-
pensatory damages.68 4 The court noted that inconven-
678 Id. at 17,301. Plaintiff was unable to use the tickets because she had




677 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
,"' Id. at 182.
oIw Id. Lopez had originally planned to arrive at his Key Largo condominium
around midnight and attend a wedding the following day. Although the
overbooking of the flight caused him to arrive in Key Largo between three and
four o'clock in the afternoon instead of midnight of the previous evening, Lopez
was still able to attend the wedding as planned. Id.
I4 d. at 183. The court cited Goranson v. Trans World Airlines, 121 Misc. 2d
68, 467 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. City Ct. 1983). Lopez, 677 F. Supp. at 183. In Goran-
son, the court held that a plaintiff involuntarily denied boarding on a TWA flight
19891
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ience, delay and uncertainty are worth something, even in
the absence of out-of-pocket costs, and awarded plaintiff
$450.685
In Brun-Jacobo v. Pan American World Airways, Incorpo-
rated,686 the jury awarded $20,000 for pre-impact mental
anguish suffered by parents killed in an air crash and
$65,000 to each of their children for loss of love, affection
and companionship. The trial court granted plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, holding that the awards for loss of
love, affection and companionship were unreasonably low
because of bias or prejudice against the plaintiffs, who
were foreigners.68 7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the trial
court. It noted that the district court did not refer to any
independent or specific evidence of bias or prejudice to-
ward plaintiffs.68 8 In finding the awards inadequate, the
trial court simply compared those awards with awards in
other cases arising from the same plane crash and con-
cluded that because the amounts were substantially lower,
they must have been the result of prejudice or bias.689
The court of appeals rejected this method of assessing the
adequacy of damages. The court stated that the question
was whether the original award was clearly within the uni-
verse of possible awards supported by the evidence. If
not, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion in or-
dering a new trial.690
The appellate court rejected as improper the trial
court's use of only those awards in cases arising from the
from New York to London could sue on a common law breach of contract claim
regardless of TWA's tariff or any Civil Aeronautics Board regulation limiting the
amount of compensation available to wrongfully "bumped" passengers. Goranson,
121 Misc. 2d at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
Lopez, 677 F. Supp. at 183.
. 847 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1988).
697 Id. at 243.
-is Id. at 244.
-1 Id. The damages awarded at the second trial were greater: $25,000 for pre-
impact mental anguish and $110,000 each to the children for loss of love, affec-
tion, and companionship. Id.
... Id. at 246.
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same crash when it determined the adequacy of damages.
The court held that the particular cause of the deaths was
irrelevant and that the district court should have instead
focused on awards for similar injuries.691 A more repre-
sentative sample would have been wrongful death awards
granted to children to compensate them for the loss of
their parents, regardless of the cause of deaths. 692 The
court determined that the awards contained within the
original verdict were clearly within the realm of possible
awards supported by the evidence and therefore were
proper.6 93 On that basis, the court remanded the case to
the district court with instructions to enter judgment on
the original verdict. 694
I s d.
o, Id. The court expressly stated that the "relevant similarity is that pertaining
to the injury suffered by the children on account of the parents' death, not the
cause of death." Id.
' ,. Id. at 246-47. The court commented that although the awards were lower
than those received in other airplane crash cases, they were "nonetheless well
within the permissible range of such awards in Louisiana." Id. at 246.
694 Id. at 247.
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